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[English-Language "Summaries of Major Articles" by O. V. Malyarov, A. I. Yakovlev, G. I. Starchenkov, V. B. Iordanskiy, Ye. A. Torchinov, Yu. G. Aleksandrov and A. M. Kabanov]

[Text]

"STATE CAPITALIST STRUCTURE IN THE PROCESS OF CAPITALIST EVOLUTION OF COLONIAL ECONOMY," BY O. V. MALYAROV

In those former colonies and dependencies where state power is in the hands of the national bourgeoisie or a combinationn of classes evolving into this class, the state sector and its ramifications are in the nature of the state capitalist formation (SCF). The latter is not an independent formative sector shaping the general mode of production. It functions within the framework of the system which includes also the private capitalist formation (PCF) which is the formative sector and imposes certain constraints upon the SCF in terms of the role it can play in the economy, its independence and ability to develop autonomously, limits its financial base for growth, its sectoral sphere, the market for its output, its linkages with other, particularly pre-capitalist, sectors and formations of the economy and as well the social base for its development. The extent, nature, rates and directions of its development are limited by the interests of the national private capital, changing in the course of evolution of the latter.

Within the period of transition from the colonial socio-economic structure to the capitalist structure, the relative independence of the SCF is greater at the earlier stages of capitalist development when the PCF connected with the national bourgeoisie, due to the economic weakness of the latter, is undeveloped and occupies a small place in the economy. However, with the growth of PCF and strengthening of the national bourgeoisie, the relative independence of the SCF and its rate of growth tend to diminish and the functions of infrastructural nature and those of servicing the PCF come to the fore. Thus, facilitating capitalist transformation of the colonial economy and being a major vehicle of this transformation, SCF at the same time inevitably creates conditions reducing its relative independence, role and place in the economy.

The opposite tendency can grow out of the function of social stabilization. The importance of this function increases in the course of capitalist evolution of the colonial economy, because the growth of the system of SCF and PCF is based mainly upon captial-intensive technology and, while dissipating the pre-capitalist structures where the bulk of the labor force is engaged, does not create adequate alternative employment. The resultant pauperization of the rural poor and their growing influx to cities, increasing urban unemployment and slum population, enhances a social tension. It compels the state to increase allocations to poverty alleviation programs seeking to slow down pauperization of the rural poor. The effective implementationnof these programs, though, crucially depends upon creating necessary institutional framework, the most suitable form of which seems to be the system of multi-purpose state-cum-cooperative organizations for the poor. The development of such a system as a ramification of the SCF could greatly widen and democratize a social base for its further development and open the way for progressive socio-economic transformations in the society.

"REFORMS AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF ARABIAN OIL MONARCHIES (1960S-BEGINNING OF 1980S)," BY A. I. YAKOVLEV

The author describes the social development of some capitalist-oriented Arabian states as a realization of the policy of the reforms. During the period under review Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE and other states thanks to the "oil money" made a rapid leap from the feudal backwardness. The leading role of the state in the process of profound reforms (in the economy, education, medical care, house-building) confirmed, in the eyes of the Arabian population, the importance and strength of the ruling regimes, ruling families (Al-Saud, As-Sabah, etc.). As a result, both the bedouins, workers, and the exploiting and parasitic strata of population supported the regimes in general till the end of the "oil boom."

The author analyzes in detail various aspects of the monarchy's policy in respect of modern and traditional strata of society.

"TURKEY: ISLAMIC FACTOR IN A SECULAR STATE," BY G. I. STARCHENKOV

In Turkey, from the proclamation of the republic in 1923 up to the present day, the struggle between the islamists and the secularists still continues. The article is an attempt to demonstrate the main reasons of a smaller or greater influence of the islamic factor on the political and economic situation in the country.

The founder of the republic, its first president K. Atatrk made a series of reforms to secularize the state: the islamic regulation was superseded by the West European system, the religion was disestablished, a secular system of education was created and even the European fashion was introduced. In the 1920-1930s the Kemalists put away from the political stage religious politicians opposing the state modernization.

After World War II the ruling circles of Turkey used the religion to oppose the progressive movements and organizations supporting deep social and economic reforms. The Kemalist principles were significantly weakened, in particular, in the 1950s. During the subsequent period

political parties emerged which actively used the religious feelings of the population (especially its deprived strata) to attain their narrow political goals.

In the late 1970s some islamic oil producing countries, taking advantage of the oil boom, became richest states of the world. Turkish ruling circles seeking to get trade and economic links with these countries, removed existing limits upon the religious activity in their own country. The creation of the new regime in Iran (after the revolution of 1979) also contributed to the religious activity in Turkey. The author comes to the conclusion that Turkish religious politicians using the new domestic and international situation urge today to transform Turkey into an islamic republic.

"SEDITIOUS GOD IN YORUBA MYTHOLOGY: PUBLIC CONSCIOUSNESS AND DISTURBANCE OF ETERNAL ORDER," BY V. B. IORDANSKIY

The article describes the process of formation of the God-trixter's image in the mythology of the Yoruba. As the author notes, this character is one of the most important in the mythology of African peoples in general. The feeling of its own instability, the instability of the whole universe, inherent to the ancient African society found its expression in the temper of the mythological seditionary of the eternal order—the antipode of the God-creator. In particular, the inner contradictoriness of the God-trixter Elegba reflected contradictions of the epoch of its formation in the people's consciousness when obsolescent traditions were superseded by new social relations. In addition Elegba, according to the people's notions, was connected both with the "wild" sphere of the universe and the cultural world of the man, and his actions revealed a critical antagonism between these two spheres: on the one hand, the immorality, the inhuman wildness and cruelty and, on the other hand, the kindness, the gentleness, the humanity. The image of Elegba developed on the basis of very ancient ideas became the focus of attraction of the forces interested in the breaking of age-long customs, the spiritual movements destroying the foundation of the archaic world outlook.

"TAOIST-BUDDHIST INTERACTION (THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS)," BY YE. A. TORCHINOV

The article highlights the aspects of Buddhist-Taoist interaction in the course of the development of the Buddhist tradition in China. The process of "Sinofication" of Budhism may be considered as an example of the interaction between two cultural traditions—i.e., Chinese and Indian. The Indian spiritual culture was represented by Buddhism, the Chinese—by Taoism which was a representative of the native Chinese ideological substratum. The latter significantly influenced Buddhism.

As a result, the psychological character and attitudes of Indian Buddhism were transformed into an ontologically and metaphysically oriented doctrine. The naturalistic and substantialistic approach of Chinse classical tradition expressed by Taoism led Buddhism to spiritualization and ontologization which were totally alien to standard Indian Buddhist tradition. One of the examples of such process is the discussion on the immortality of spirit (*shen pu mie*) in the course of which the Buddhists had to defend spiritualistic eternalism rejected by Buddhism in India.

Buddhism also influenced the Chinese tradition stimulating some idealistic tendencies in Chinese native philosophy.

"ON SPECIFIC SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURES IN PRE-COLONIAL ORIENTAL SOCIETIES," BY YU. G. ALEKSANDROV

In the author's opinion, the discussion about the succession of social and economic structures in Eastern countries reached a deadlock because of the Euro-centrist consideration of their productive forces as undeveloped and stagnant, which became consolidated among historians. To overcome the limits of such a narrow approach one needs to analyze deep processes which fully characterize the successive development of the productive forces of a society. He considers as one of these processes the development of the social content of labor allowing to understand the role of the man, which is determining in all respects, in the development of the productive forces.

Various social and legal structures which regulated the distribution of labor in pre-colonial Eastern societies did not stand immutable during the whole epoch of the domination of the natural economy but developed together with the growth of the productive forces. At the same time the successive development of the commodity-money relations added a new qualitative content to the public appraisal of the labor results, by their correlation with the public results of the individual labor. Consequently, important prerequisites for structural changes were created in the pre-capitalist societies, because the mechanism of the social calculation of the labor time's utilization became more and more objective and exact. This, side by side with such processes as the growth of labor resources, the accumulation of big masses of the materialized labor put in the productivity of land, the successive perfection of the instruments of labor was an expression of the objective process of the productive forces' development in the pre-colonial East as a pre-condition for structural shifts.

" 'NAMBO-ROKU'—TREATISE ON TEA CEREMONY." TRANSLATION FROM THE JAPANESE, INTRODUCTION AND COMMENTARY BY A. AM. KABANOV

The tea ceremony is one of the most specific and refined arts developed by the Japanese in the Middle Ages. This art achieved its summit by the mid-16th century through

efforts by Sen no Rikyu (1520-1591). The Rikyu's "secret tradition" called *wabicha* was transferred orally from a master to his most devoted disciples. No works by Rikyu himself are known, and one may wonderif they ever existed at all. The main principles of the wabicha tradition were expounded by a certain Nambo Sokei in his work "Nambo-shu" (or "Nambo-roku"). No information about the author is available, and some Japanese scholars even considered the text as a later forgery.

The "Nambo-roku" text came into light in 1686 when Tachibana Jissan obtained a manuscript of Rikyu's "secret tradition." Puzzled by its content, Jissan searched for information about the mysterious master. As a result, he collected seven scrolls written by Nambo's hand, each piece under a separate title. Later this series of texts was entitled "Nambo-roku." The first scroll ("Kakusho") describes the history of the tea ceremony and its main rules and patterns. Other scrolls provide a more detailed information on ceremonies held by Rikyu, peculiarities of some other traditions, some esoteric devices, etc. According to the colophon the work of Nambo Sokei was completed at the second year of the Bunroku era (1594).

All the existent manuscripts of "Nambo-roku" are copies from Jissan's copy; the original is now lost. Nowadays the manuscript from the Engakuji temple is considered to be the standard piece and all the modern editions follow it. For the Russian translation of extracts from the first scroll of "Nambo-roku" the text included into Kumakura Isao's book "Nambo-roku o yomu" was used (Kyoto, 1983). Kumakura's numeration of fragments remained unchanged.

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State-Capitalist Structure in Capitalist Evolution of Colonial Economy

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[Article by O. Malyarov: "The State-Capitalist Structure in the Capitalist Evolution of the Colonial Economy"]

[Text] State, state-cooperative, and "joint" (state-private) sectors of the economy represent a social and economic structure that is substantially different from other structures. While it is a form of public production, it is an expression of the socioeconomic policy of the state and an instrument for its implementation at the same time, and it combines basis as well as specific superstructure functions. A change in the state's role at different stages in a society's evolution has a direct effect on this structure.

In former colonial and semicolonial countries, where the bourgeoisie or some combination of classes which are evolving in this direction are in power, the state's basic role is to assist the growth of the private-capitalist structure and the national bourgeoisie. The necessity for extensive state intervention in the economy is determined primarily here by the general backwardness and deep-seated deformation of the socioeconomic structure stemming from the specific nature of the colonial stage in its evolution and resulting in almost insurmountable obstacles to the widespread development of capitalism. The market mechanism that has been deformed by this structure has not been capable of ensuring that the necessary internal and external conditions for development are provided for the economically weak national capital.

Strictly speaking, the state's large role in the economy of these countries is not determined by the features of "Eastern," "African" or "Latin American" capitalism, but by the specific nature of the transition (very protracted) from a colonial socioeconomic structure to a capitalist one. The role of the state in this transition period is changed to the extent that it passes through two basic stages. The first stage is a stage of radical transformations and a structural breakup aimed at eliminating the colonial and feudal obstacles to development, as well as at laying the foundations for the infrastructure and the most important Classification I [I podrazdeleniye] sectors and to ensure that material and financial conditions are provided for the development of national business undertakings. This is a stage of "clearing" the paths for the formation of capitalist production relationships and building up an appropriate system of bourgeois standards and institutions, including through the implementation of antifeudal reforms and protectionist measures. The complexity of these tasks with a weak national bourgeoisie (a substantial part of which has not been definitively separated from the petty bourgeoisie yet) presupposes the necessity of expanding the state sector and state regulation of the economy, and the impetus for their development comes as if it were from the state itself, as if "from within." The state's activity in this stage has an objectively antifeudal and anti-imperialist nature, but it often is shaped by conceptions of "noncapitalist development" or even "socialist" slogans adopted at the official, state level.

The second stage is a natural result of the first stage, for the creation of conditions for the growth of national business undertakings inevitably accelerates the spontaneous development of capitalism. At the same time, impetus for economic activity by the state comes more and more "from outside"—from different elements of the private capital structure, the requirements of which are specifically expressed in the demands of the corresponding strata of the bourgeoisie and their parties and organizations, and determine more and more directly the basic directions and forms of state participation in the economy, reducing its relative independence. The infrastructural and service functions of the state are brought to the forefront more and more, and direct regulation yields more and more to indirect, administrative regulation—credit and financial regulation.

During the period of transition from a colonial to a capitalist socioeconomic structure, the state's direct participation in the economy and the state regulation which limits the role of the market mechanism represent the sphere of state capitalism, and the state capitalist structure is embodied in the enterprises associated with state ownership and management. It is not an independent formative structure, and exists as part of the system of two structures—the state capitalist structure (SCS) and the private capitalist structure, which is the formative one. The extent, nature, rates and direction of the SCS's development are determined in the final analysis by the interests of national private capital.

The place of the SCS within the system of private capitalist and state capitalist structures is determined by its two interrelated functions: the first one is to "supplement" the private capitalist structure and to develop the sectors of the economy which it needs, but which are inaccessible or insufficiently attractive in a given stage in view of the high capital-intensiveness, long periods to recover investment, low profitability, and so forth; the second function is to regulate relationships among the different groups of capital within the private capital structure in the interests of the politically dominant groups of the bourgeoisie or in the overall interests of this class. The second function is manifested most typically in the establishment of state enterprises, resulting from the need to limit the positions of foreign capital. The emergence of state enterprises may also be dictated by the inclination to restrict the positions of big and monopoly capital (both foreign as well as local) which is impeding the growth of small-scale or middle-level national capital. It is called upon primarily to prevent the predominance of private monopolies in the sectors which play a vital role in providing private capital with the most important conditions and means of production.

While the first function "supplements" the private capitalist structure, the second one appears to "restrict" it; however, this "restriction" is extended only to individual groups of private capital and in the final analysis, it promotes the development of the private capitalist structure as a whole. Inasmuch as the SCS is the subordinate element in the system (the private capitalist structure, personified by the national bourgeoisie, is the formative one in it), its role in the economy depends on the extent to which the private capitalist structure is developed.

The relative independence of the SCS is expressed more in the early stage of the colonial economy's capitalist transformation, when the private capitalist structure is undeveloped, the national bourgeoisie is small in size and economically weak, and it is either represented by petty capital alone or divided by a dualistic socioeconomic structure into two polarized groups, one of which is linked with big joint stock business and the modern technology of machine production, while the other has not completely detached itself from the traditional and basically primitive industry and the different strata of petty bourgoisie associated with it. In the first case, the stratum which is capable of assuming the task of developing the basic capital-intensive sectors of the economy which it needs is absent in the structure of national capital, and this role is entrusted completely to the SCS. In the second case, this role may be partly filled by local big business, although consolidation of its positions in the base sectors and in the sectors which compete with small industry runs counter to the interests of the lower strata of the national bourgeoisie. A struggle between them may lead to nationalization of large-scale industry and its development basically within the framework of the SCS. Certain compromises are brought about between these two strata of the ruling class; in this case the state assumes the role of arbitrator. On the whole, the weakness and separateness of the national bourgeoisie have a tendency to reinforce the role of the SCS and its position in the economy. At the same time, however, they may weaken this class' degree of control over the state and increase the influence on it of both foreign monopoly capital and local comprador and feudal-landowning strata.

With the growth of the national bourgeoisie, expansion of the private capitalist structure, and the development of integration processes within it, the relative independence of the SCS has a tendency to diminish and its servicing role with respect to the private capitalist structure is advanced to the forefront. Its sphere is more and more restricted by the infrastructural and service sectors, and at a certain stage the partial or complete sale of the most profitable state enterprises to private investors and their privatization is possible. By contributing to the capitalist transformation of the colonial socioeconomic structure and by being one of the principal instruments in this transformation, the SCS inevitably creates conditions at the same time which lead to the weakening of its relative independence and its place and role in the economy. In its functions it approximates the state sector in developed capitalist countries, resulting in a tendency to evolve from state capitalism into state monopoly capitalism.

* * *

The basic function of the SCS—stimulating the growth of the private capitalist structure, including by income redistribution in favor of the latter through a system of prices—is responsible for state enterprises having substantially less profitability. The average gross profit of state factories in India, for example, was 3.3 times less in 1975-1976 and 3.4 times less in 1981-1982 than that of private factories.[1] A survey conducted in 24 developing countries showed that that the average gross profit of unfinanced state enterprises amounted to only 1.3 percent of the VVP [GNP]. If the interest, taxes, amortization deductions and subsidies are excluded, a considerable number of state enterprises turn out to be unprofitable.[2] Thus, opportunities for the self-financing of SCS development are limited. During the Sixth Five-Year Plan period in India (1980-81 to 1984-85), enterprises of the central government financed only 28 percent of their allocations for development through their own internal resources, and the enterprises of state governments financed only 3.5 percent through their own resources.[3]

True, the SCS is directly supported in its development by the state budget resources. In India, 56 percent of the planned allocations for enterprises of the central government and a substantial part of state governments' allocations were financed through state budget resources.[4] According to data from a survey conducted in 27 developing countries in the 1976-1979 period, the net budgetary payments to state enterprises (the subsidies granted to them, remittances and net loans, allowing for the interest and dividends they paid to the state) amounted to an average 3 percent of GNP.[5]

On the whole, by mobilizing the assets of wide sections of the population, the state then redistributes them for the SCS and the private capitalist structure. However, owing to the dynamics of development inherent in this system, with the growth of the private capitalist structure and the class of national bourgeoisie associated with it, the state capitalist structure's share in the resources has a tendency to decrease, and this inevitably limits the opportunities for its development.

* * *

The tendencies toward development of the SCS are linked with the nature of production relationships within it and the forms and extent of support for it from the different classes and social strata.

The specific nature of the SCS has a definite effect on the status of the workers and employees in state enterprises. Inasmuch as these enterprises belong to the state, the

persons that manage them are only its representatives and do not have a property relationship with the enterprises being managed. Under the dynamics of the SCS interrelationship with the private capitalist structure that are characteristic of the direction of evolution cited, their attachment to state ownership has a tendency to weaken. In the first place, when the large-scale private enterprises emerge and begin to grow, they entice skilled management personnel with higher wages and provide them with shares of stock in an enterprise and other benefits. Secondly, in the general atmosphere of incentive and stimulation for private business undertakings, some of those who manage the state enterprises embark on their own business. Thirdly, in striving to increase their incomes, certain managers (especially those in charge of bringing in high profits for state enterprises) begin to support the complete or partial sale of their stock shares, and under conditions where the shares are sold preferentially and on favorable terms to individuals who work at the enterprises mentioned.

The specific nature of the SCS provides objective prerequisites for certain work conditions that are better for those employed in a state enterprise. Inasmuch as maximization of profit for the capital invested is not the principal motivation in a state enterprise's activity, the overall standard of operation is usally lower here and the level of wages and social security is higher. For the sake of maintaining a high level of employment, state enterprises not only resort less frequently to employee dismissals (sometimes even when the number of employees exceeds actual work force requirements), but as already noted, they often provide for unprofitable plants and factories to operate, even by staving off closure of the ones that previous private owners had brought to the brink of bankruptcy. Support by state budget resources, including budgetary subsidization, extends the financial capabilities of state enterprises. While the remuneration for managers of these enterprises is usually lower than remuneration for the managers of similar enterprises in the private sector, the wage level for the former's employees is higher than the wage level for the latter's employees, as a rule. On the whole, the average wage level for an employee in the processing industry and electric power generation in India in the second half of the 1970s was 40 to 45 percent higher at state enterprises than at private enterprises, and this figure rose to 50 percent in 1981-1982.[6]

Since conditions are more favorable for employees at state enterprises, the class conflicts at these enterprises are less critical as well. Thus, the number of man-days per employee that were lost as the result of strikes and lockouts in India during the 1960s and 1970s was roughly 10 times lower in the state sector than in the organized private sector.[7] All the same, however, qualitative changes in the status of the working class are not taking place under the conditions of capitalist evolution in the state capitalist structure. It essentially represents a hired work force opposed not only by a "combined capitalist" in the form of the state, but by private capital functioning in the private capitalist structure, which plays a formative role in the existing system, as already pointed out.

Nevertheless, both the workers' short-term and long-term interests determine their concern for every possible development of the state sector. Essentially, it is precisely the working class that is potentially the social force that is consistently interested in maintaining and expanding it. However, the number of workers employed in the state sector in developing countries is small. The high capital-intensiveness of enterprises in the state sector and the relatively low potential of the employment they provide limits them even further. A survey conducted in 23 developing countries from 1979 to 1982 showed that the proportion of those employed in general nonagricultural work at unfinanced state enterprises amounts to 13.9 percent, including 18.7 percent in Africa, 15.7 percent in Asia, and 5.5 percent in Latin America.[8] True, this proportion is higher in developing countries than in developed capitalist counties. However, taking into account that the agricultural population makes up the greater part of those employed in most developing countries, the proportion of state enterprise workers in the gainfully employed population is significantly lower. Thus, employees of state industrial and power generation enterprises comprised 1.3 percent of India's gainfully employed population in 1981.[9] The weakness of the social base for development of the state sector connected with this is intensified by the dualistic nature of the labor market in developing countries, in which the wage level for workers in large-scale industry here is several times higher than the incomes of workers in small enterprises, agricultural workers, and the bulk of independent producers in cities and the countryside. This creates substantial obstacles in bringing about worker unity and impedes consolidation of a union between this most organized part of the working class and the basic working masses, including in the development of a common position with respect to the state sector.

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Direct and reciprocal ties between the SCS and the pre-capitalist and early capitalist forms of economy, where most of the population in developing countries is employed, are extremely weak. The transportation and power engineering infrastructure and capital-intensive production facilities for a number of industrial materials, as well as the production of machines and equipment for these sectors, are the areas of this structure that are most typical. They form a kind of complex of interrelated sectors, and many of their products are sold and their requirements for capital goods are met within the SCS itself to a significant extent. Thus, the proportion of output by industries in which the state sector predominates or prevails in the overall physical inputs of industries which make up the basic sphere of this sector in India in 1973-1974 amounted to 72 percent for the coal

industry, 65 percent for the iron ore industry, 50 percent for the oil drilling industry, 56 percent for chemical fertilizer production, about 100 percent for the oil refining industry, 90 percent for ferrous metallurgy, 61 percent for the machine tool industry, 73 percent for the electronics industry, 74 percent for shipbuilding, 39 percent for aircraft manufacturing, 80 percent for railroad equipment production, 96 percent for electric power generation, and 91 percent for railway transport proruction. India's state enterprises sell 65 percent of their overall output within the state sector itself or to state organizations.[10] The figures cited attest to the fact that the complex of these enterprises meets its own requirements to a high degree and is relatively independent, regardless of the private sector. It can be developed, relying on the production base of the SCS to a considerable extent and by providing a substantial part of the market for the sectors which are part of it at the same time (especially in the import substitution stage).

The feedback in relations between these industries of the state sector and the other structures is significantly less intensive. The case is somewhat different with direct ties, for most of the end product of the sectors of the SCS is consumed outside of it. Consequently, although the growth of the market needed for development of the SCS is provided for by increased demand within the structure and the requirements of the structure itself, in the final analysis the SCS depends on outside demand (that is, the demand being created by other structures).

Inasmuch as the state sector turns out goods that are primarily for production purposes, the personal demand of the population plays a relatively small role in expanding the market for the sale of its products. The external demand for SCS output is primarily production demand. Under the conditions of extreme poverty of the masses of independent producers, effective purchasing demand for producer goods comes basically from the national bourgeoisie and the strata which are making a transition to it and from the private capitalist structure and the forms of economy which are shifting to it, including the landowner and kulak elements.

The SCS has its closest direct and reciprocal ties with the large private enterprises—the basic consumers of the output it produces and the suppliers of the industrial commodities which it purchases. They are precisely the ones that gain from redistribution of the resources and incomes through the mechanism of these ties, which promotes the growth of the large private enterprises. But opportunities for their business undertakings in the capital-intensive sectors where the SCS operates are also expanded as a result of this growth. For this reason, it is precisely the owners of the large private enterprises who begin in time to advocate greater restriction of the spheres and rates of growth of the state sector and the redistribution of spheres of activity and resources in favor of the private sector.

Direct links between the SCS and small-scale industry are significantly less intensive. The small and medium-size enterprises, chiefly the mechanized ones of the modern capitalist type, benefit from this policy only to the extent to which a certain part of the output or purchases is reserved for small-scale industry and the state is limited by large-scale private industry as a whole. In particular, they include 550 subsidiary enterprises established in India by the end of the 1977-1978 period under state plants and factories, as well as roughly 2,500 small enterprises from which these plants and factories make purchases. The share of small industry as a whole in state purchases on the country's domestic market amounted to 3 percent in 1959-1960, 6 percent in 1961-1962 and 1963-1964, 10 percent in 1969-70 and 1973-1974, and 11 percent in 1974-1975 and 1975-1976.[11]

Direct links between the state sector and the private sector in agriculture are even weaker. The basic complex of infrastructure and heavy industry sectors typical of the state sector has practically no reciprocal ties with agriculture. Direct ties are basically limited to electric power and deliveries of fertilizers, and occasionally tractors, for agriculture. In a number of countries, India in particular, the state sector takes part in seed growing and deliveries of high-quality seeds and water for irrigation. However, in most of the developing countries where the national bourgeoisie (or a coalition of this class with the large landowners) is in power, the bulk of these deliveries are concentrated in relatively prosperous farms. In other words, the ties of the SCS are restricted by the private capitalist and transitional forms of economy. At the same time, as India's experience shows, the kulak-landowner leadership in the countryside not only pays the lowest prices, often subsidized, for the state enterprises' products which they need, but avoids timely payment for it on an even broader scale (in particular, their overdue debts are especially high for electric power and water); as a result, the financial base for development of the SCS is limited.

What has been stated also applies to a large extent to the state capitalist structure in the area of finances. The bulk of financial assistance provided to the private sector also is provided mainly to the private capitalist structure, with extremely limited assistance to the rural and urban poor associated with the pre-capitalist structures.[12]

In certain developing countries which are evolving in the direction of capitalism, the state sector also exists in the textile and food industries, chiefly in the cotton, jute and sugar industries. This is a result either of a particular weakness of the national bourgeoisie, which does not possess sufficient capital to establish manufacturing enterprises in even these fields, or of the state's effort to prevent the closing of unprofitable private enterprises (as in India, for example), or because the SCS has been entrusted with the task of modernizing the stagnant areas of the economy. In the sectors mentioned, the reciprocal ties between the SCS and agriculture are significantly

more extensive, for many of them are based on agricultural raw material. However, these ties have practically no effect on the bulk of the small-scale and marginal peasant masses. This is explained first of all by the small number of state mills in these sectors, and secondly by the fact that the bulk of the commodity production of industrial crops is being turned out by the largest farms; third and finally, this is a consequence of the distressing state of most small agricultural producers, who have been forced to market their products through the merchant-moneylender middlemen. This circumstance also hampers direct ties between the SCS enterprises which deliver raw material for handicraft workers and the pre-capitalist structures of industry where the merchant-moneylender middlemen are active.

Such middlemen activity neutralizes the very small role played by the SCS in providing the poor with the basic necessities to a significant extent anyway. The noted Indian economist B. B. Pradhan, who studied the situation in India, Bangladesh, South Korea, Sri Lanka and Thailand under the aegis of the IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development], UNIDO [UN Industrial Development Organization] and ESCAP, wrote: "Surveys show that the contribution by state enterprises to supplying the poor with basic consumer goods is very insignificant and incidental. The state sector seldom takes responsibility for producing such commodities in order to meet the needs of the poor. All the enterprises in the state sector which turn out basic consumer goods came into existence more by chance than intentionally."[13]

The establishment of low and often subsidized prices for the products of state enterprises also provides little for the rural and urban poor. Based on materials from UNIDO, the IBRD and the IMF, M. M. Shirley notes: "State enterprises are often expected to contribute to the achievement of the broad objectives of government policy. The opposite results may be achieved. For example, prices for the output of state enterprises may be controlled in the name of aid to the poor or an anti-inflationary policy. But those who consume the output of state enterprises are often large industrial enterprises, wholesale merchants, or the upper and middle classes; for this reason, it is precisely they, not the poor, who are gaining the most. In Egypt, for example, nearly two-thirds of subsidies for energy consumption in 1979 went to the urban areas and only about one-third went to the poor rural areas; nearly 40 percent of the subsidies for the urban population went to the wealthiest 20 percent of the population."[14] The situation in India is similar. The Indian Government's economic survey for 1975-76 stressed that the rates for the power provided by state electric power stations are extremely low and that "as a result medium- and large-scale industry...which is responsible for two-thirds of overall power consumption is being subsidized." In a similar manner, "the prosperous strata of the peasantry have gained the most from the large capital investments in agriculture (including the state irrigation and power system for agriculture—O. M.) made in accordance with state plans."[15]

Within the framework of the overall socioeconomic policy of a national bourgeois state, the activity of the state capitalist structure, including subsidization of the consumption of its output, objectively leads to intensified inequality and may even worsen the situation of the broad masses of the poor. "The burden of subsidies," M. M. Shirley writes, "is shifted from the consumer to the taxpayer or, if the deficit is financed by extending monetary inflation, to the population as a whole. With the regressive nature of taxes in many developing countries and (the negative—O. M.) effect of inflation on the poor, an increase in the disparity of income levels may become a result."[16]

Thus on the one hand, the SCS contributes to the growth of the bourgeoisie and the private capitalist structure, whose interest in the development of the SCS diminishes in the final analysis, however, and the role of the SCS in the economy declines more and more; on the other hand, the SCS is very weakly linked with the rural and urban poor and does not play an important role in improving their socioeconomic situation, which limits the support which these strata give to it.

* * *

The nature of the interrelationships between the SCS and other structures and social strata which has been described is determined not only by its sectorial structure and the policy to which the interrelationships are subordinate, but by its institutional system itself. In this context, the forms of state capitalism through which direct links between the state and the private sector are established are particularly important.

"Joint" (state-private) and state-cooperative enterprises are a specific form of interaction between the SCS and the private sector of the economy. They occupy an intermediate position between state business and state regulation and financing of the private sector, demonstrating a distinctive unity between these two functions of the state.

In joint enterprises, the state interacts mainly with the higher forms of private business undertakings, and its partners are chiefly the representatives of big and monopoly capital. Their formation is basically related to three processes. The first one is the partial nationalization of enterprises. The state has resorted to this most often for the purpose of establishing greater control over the activity of foreign monopolies—this was often a transitional step to their complete nationalization. The second process is the attraaction of foreign capital to finance the projects being developed by the state. This form of association is usually dictated by requirements for the importation of foreign equipment and technology, as well as to finance the non-currency part of the expenditures; for this reason, foreign monopolies are usually the state's partners here as well. The third process is state support for and financing of private enterprises. This is usually done to provide incentive for a business

undertaking in new and capital-intensive sectors; for this reason, representatives of local big business become the state's partners in a given case, as a rule.

Joint enterprises are an extremely mobile socioeconomic form: the distinctions which determine its affiliation with an SCS or a private capitalist structure are very relative and flexible and depend on the overal socioeconomic policy of the state. In the event that an antimonopoly movement is intensified and broad sections of the population, including the lower strata of the bourgeoisie, are involved in it, the joint enterprises may become a form of reinforcing state control over private enterprises—by the state acquiring controlling shares in the largest enterprises and taking part effectively in their management. Such an attempt was undertaken on the wave of the antimonopoly movement in the late 1960s by progressive forces in India; under their influence, an article was included in the agreement to grant long-term state loans to large private enterprises on the convertibility of these loans to stock shares.

On the other hand, where there are shifts in the state's policy in the opposite direction, joint enterprises may become a form for privatization in stages and denationalization of the state sector's enterprises.

Privatization is a natural stage in capitalist evolution. It was characteristic of certain states that are now developed capitalist countries, Japan in particular, which were lagging in their development in the capitalism formation stage and utilized the establishment of state enterprises to overcome the lag and the limited nature of private capital accumulation and business undertakings. In a number of developing countries, such as Pakistan, the Philippines and Thailand, the transfer of state enterprises to private investors when the former have acquired the necessary level of viability and profitability was directly proclaimed as a state objective. Open attempts to carry out a policy of privatization were undertaken in the 1970s and 1980s in Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, Bangladesh, Brazil, Peru, Chile, Jamaica, and so forth. However, in most developing countries private capital is still too weak in the present stage of development to acquire the large state enterprises. For this reason, relatively small state enterprises are put up for sale in countries where the buyers are limited to local businessmen. For the same reason, this process often takes the form of an expansion of the sphere of joint enterprises initially as a means to create new enterprises, as well as a way to sell part of the shares of the state enterprises (that is, by partial privatization).

In Bangladesh, for example, of the sectors previously reserved for the state sector, the following were included in the sphere of joint enterprise: ferrous metallurgy; shipbuilding; heavy machine building; the oil, gas, chemical, petrochemical, pharmaceutical, cement, and paper industries; shipping; and mechanized timber processing. In this case, while it was directed in 1975 that the majority of shares should belong to the state, by 1976 this restriction was removed—this makes it possible to establish private enterprises with merely symbolic participation by the state; at the same time, in the sectors assigned to private business, an increase in the size of enterprises that had been established earlier began to be authorized.[17]

Sale of the property of state enterprises leads objectively to reinforcement of private business' positions in a country's socioeconomic structure. M. M. Shirley writes in this connection: "Only a very small number of persons and companies have had the means at their disposal to buy these enterprises—the majority of them have been purchased by large industrial groups which had access to foreign credit directly or through the banks belonging to them."[18] For this reason it is no wonder that private capital, in opposing the state's acquisition of controlling shares in their enterprises, welcome the formation of "joint" enterprises by partial privatization of the most profitable ones at the same time. Development such as this would inevitably reinforce the trend toward transformation of the SCS into a state monopoly structure.

Indian monopoly capital, in particular, has supported the development of joint enterprises. In addition, it has secured a limitation of the real role of "the article on convertibility" (exemption from this article of loans for modernization, loans up to 10 million rupees, the establishment of a "ceiling" of 40 percent on state participation in capital, and so forth). "The joint sector," according to a statement by the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), "possesses significant potential opportunities... It is necessary that neither the government nor state financial organizations interfere in the daily management of joint enterprises."[19] In its "Minimum Program of Economic Activity" presented to the government in 1980, the FICCI essentially suggests that the "combination of private management and state ownership" be made the principle for activity by most of the enterprises in the state sector: "Their board of directors should have the deciding authority and include representatives of the state and the private sector...and part of the shares have to be sold to the public at large; and management of certain enterprises in the state sector may be offered to firms in the private sector on the basis of a long-term contract."[20]

* * *

In the state cooperative enterprises, the state interacts mainly with the small-scale commodity structure and the lower forms of capitalism growing out of it; independent small-scale commodity producers and representatives of the petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie being formed predominate among its private partners. As with joint enterprises, the development of state cooperative forms also stems from the state's inherent function of assisting in the capitalist transformation of the colonial socioeconomic structure. They become a form of mobilizing savings and accumulations, and they are entrusted with

distributing organized credit, improved capital goods and basic necessities, with the production and sale of products to be marketed, and so forth.

This function of the state significantly extends the limits and scope of cooperative activity in the economy on the one hand, for in the former colonial and semicolonial countries (where the overwhelming majority of independent producers were poor and commodity and capitalist relationships were undeveloped) the socioeconomic base for cooperatives was extremely limited; cooperatives can be developed on a wide scale (especially in the initial stages of the colonial economy's transformation) only with the direct participation, support and guidance of the state, like a semi-state institute, an offshoot of the SCS.

But on the other hand, the same function sets definite limits to the development of cooperation, for it is based on support mainly from the private capitalist structure. This limits the scope of cooperative activity and its social role, and leads to a situation in which cooperation is developed primarily in the area of turnover, not production, in which private ownership and exploitation is maintained within the cooperatives, and in which the bourgeois strata and the transitional strata predominate in cooperative activity. As cooperative activity draws the bulk of these strata into its orbit at a certain stage in the capitalist transformation of the colonial economy, the rate of growth in the cooperative movement has a tendency to slow down, leaving aside the broad masses of independent small-scale producers and the rural and urban poor. This is accompanied by a tendency to reduce the state's share in cooperative ownership and capital and by intensification of the cooperatives' transformation from the SCS to the private capital structure.

An example of this may be found in the history of the cooperative movement in India. It was begun with the adoption in 1904 of the Law on Cooperative Credit Societies. However, it did not become wide in scope during the colonial period. A qualitative change was made in the approach to cooperation in independent India—a decision on state participation in the cooperative movement was adopted. In the 1958-59 to 1976-77 period alone, state participation in the share capital of cooperative societies increased from 0.2 to 7.1 billion rupees, and its share increased from 17 to 42 percent; the number of members of the primary societies increased from 13.6 million in 1950-51 to 106.2 million in 1980-81. The average annual growth rate in the number of members rose from 5 percent in the 1951-52 to 1955-56 period to 11 percent in the 1956-57 to 1960-61 period, and then it dropped to 8 percent in the 1961-62 to 1965-66 period and 5 to 6 percent in the following years. At the same time, the proportion of credit cooperatives in overall membership rose from 56 to 82 percent in the 1950-51 to 1977-78 period. This included an increase in the number of members in agricultural credit societies from 40 to 67 percent, although these members make up only 14 percent of the rural families and only about 36 percent of them make use of the cooperatives' credit.[21]

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The SCS plays a key role in accelerating the process of capitalist transformation of the colonial socioeconomic structure. Moreover, at a certain stage in its development, this process itself inevitably results in the tendency of the SCS growth rate to be retarded and its independent role to be weakened. At the same time, an opposite tendency, resulting from intensification of the contradictions in such development, is forcing its way through. A model of the evolution based on growth of the system of the SCS and the private capitalist structure, which is grounded primarily on modern capital-intensive technology and which leaves the broad sphere of pre-capitalist small-scale production outside the limits of state support, has a depressing effect on the traditional institutions of employment without resolving the problem of involving the bulk of the population associated with it in the process of development. In the final analysis, it intensifies the process of pauperization, restricts the growth of the domestic market, aggravates the contradictions of the capitalist path of evolution, and slows down the rate of economic growth. The intensified social tension forces the state to resort to the extension of special social stabilization programs aimed at providing assistance to the rural and urban poor employed in the pre-capitalist structures.

The effectiveness of these programs is reduced, however, by the absence or lack of development of institutional support for them, primarily the weakness of the ties between the SCS and state capitalism as a whole and the poor from the pre-capitalist structures, mentioned above. The cooperatives which are not differentiated by social strata and the other state capitalist institutions, which are based on bourgeois principles borrowed from developed capitalist countries, do not play an important role in improving or even stabilizing the situation of the poor, inasmuch as a predominant position in them is held by the representatives of prosperous kulak-landowner and merchant-moneylender strata and since these institutions do not take the specific needs of the poor into account. Thus, in India only 14 percent of the loans from rural credit societies went to the owners of plots of land of up to 1 hectare (53 percent of the rural families) by 1977-1978, 2 percent of the loans went to leaseholders, and 1 percent to agricultural workers; handicraft workers received only 2 percent of the loans made to small-scale industry by the state banks by 1979-1980.[22]

All this makes it objectively necessary to set up a parallel system of multipurpose state cooperative organizations especially oriented toward aid to the poor as an institutional base to effectively implement an entire complex of programs to aid these strata, to organize them, and to carry out progressive socioeconomic reforms.

Footnotes

1. "Annual Surveys of Industries," Central Statistical Organization, New Delhi (for the corresponding years).

2. M. M. Shirley, "Managing State-Owned Enterprises," State Enterprise, New Delhi, April-June 1984, p 121.

3. "Seventh Five-Year Plan, 1985-1990," Vol 1, New Delhi, 1985, p 51.

4. Ibid.

5. M. M. Shirley, op. cit., p 124.

6. Calculated according to "Annual Surveys of Industries..."

7. O. V. Malyarov, "Gosudarstvo i chastnyy sektor ekonomii Indii" [The State and the Private Sector of India's Economy], Moscow, 1984, p 148.

8. M. M. Shirley, op. cit., p 129.

9. "Basic Statistics Relating to the Indian Economy," Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy, Bombay, 1984, Table 9.4; "Government of India Economic Survey, 1982-83," New Delhi, 1983, pp 114-115.

10. "A Technical Note on the Approach to the Fifth Plan of India (1974-1979)," New Delhi, 1973, pp 37-47; Baren Ray, "Public Enterprise and the Bourgeoisie," State Enterprise, April-June 1983, p 200.

11. See O. V. Malyarov, op. cit., pp 301-305; B. B. Pradhan, "Public Enterprise: An Instrument of Policy," State Enterprise, April-June 1982, p 140.

12. For details, see O. V. Malyarov, op. cit., pp 244-312.

13. B. B. Pradhan, op. cit., p 140.

14. M. M. Shirley, op. cit., p 129.

15. "Govei (for the corresponding years); "Statistical Abstract, India, Annual," Delhi (for the corresponding years); "Report of the Finance Commission, 1981," Delhi, 1979. pp 174-176; "Sixth Five-Year Plan, 1980-1985," New Delhi, 1981; "Statistical Statements Relating to the Cooperative Movement in India, 1977-1978," Part 1, Bombay, 1979.

22. "Statistical Statements Relating to the Cooperative Movement in India, 1977-1978," Part 1, pp 105, 127-131; "Report on Currency and Finance, 1980-81," Bombay,i (for the corresponding years); "Statistical Abstract, India, Annual," Delhi (for the corresponding years); "Report of the Finance Commission, 1981," Delhi, 1979. pp 174-176; "Sixth Five-Year Plan, 1980-1985," New Delhi, 1981; "Statistical Statements Relating to the Cooperative Movement in India, 1977-1978," Part 1, Bombay, 1979.

22. "Statistical Statements Relating to the Cooperative Movement in India, 1977-1978," Part 1, pp 105, 127-131; "Report on Currency and Finance, 1980-81," Bombay, 1981, pp 134, 272.

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Reforms and Social Development of Arabian Oil Monarchies (1960's-1980's)

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[Article by A. I. Yakovlev: "Reforms and Social Development of the Arabian Oil Monarchies (1960s to Early 1980s)"]

[Text] Significant changes have taken place in the socio-economic structure of Arabian society over the past decades, especially during the oil boom (1973-1983) which attest to its movement on the path of capitalist evolution. The state has played an important role in this process. A specific and active role by the state in modern development is typical for all states in the East, but in the region being examined it has been especially extensive because of two circumstances: the immense oil incomes at the state's disposal and the implementation of a policy of reforms.

The ruling monarchical regimes have utilized and continue to utilize various means for their preservation under conditions of rapid—although retarded and unequal—capitalist evolution. In the past, the experience of such monarchies as Iraq and Libya demonstrated that the acquisition of vast incomes from oil in itself does not guarantee the regimes' stability. The Iranian revolution attests to the fact that the ruling clique's policy of reforms does not always ensure preservation of a monarchy either, because of a certain combination of objective and subjective factors. The rulers of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman have been able not only to maintain the relative stability of their regimes, but to strengthen them to a certain extent in the course of rapid economic and social development, utilizing both the oil factor and a policy of reforms.

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Reforms do not come into existence by themselves; the need for them appears only in crisis situations. This was precisely the situation in Arabia (in the Saudi kingdom, Kuwait and Bahrain) at the beginning of the 1960s.[1]

The potential importance of the crisis situation for social development was not too great in itself. Arabia in those years was going through a crisis that was not one of "a society that is becoming capitalistic, but a feudal society that is decaying," in the words of N. A. (Simoni).[2] However, the crisis made itself felt particularly strongly in light of the trends of world development. It should be kept in mind that the gain demonstrated by the societies which had gone much further in their development than the neighboring Arab countries, to begin with, began to exert a powerful influence beginning in the second half of the 20th century. This could not help but provoke strong irritation among certain social forces and sharp dissatisfaction with the existing situation among others. Retention of the rigid standards of medieval life looked like an obvious anachronism. Attempts to overcome the crisis with the aid of partial changes in the economy and the social area (the policy of King Saud or Sulman, the sheikh of Bahrain) or else closing their eyes to it completely (the behavior of the Sultan Said ibn Taymur in Oman) only made the situation worse.

Let us note two important features in the oil monarchies' development by the time the reforms were begun: unlike countries in the West, the reforms were begun practically in the absence of positive internal social and economic preconditions for them; the political precondition—the initial motivation for reforms—originated amidst political activity in society that was insignificant, as a rule, not as a reaction to any real threat of an internal revolutionary crisis, but at the will of the authorities themselves. The reforms begun by the oil monarchy rulers in the 1960s and 1970s were aimed at preventing possible social cataclysms.

With common consent concerning the objective of the reforms (expanding the opportunities for capitalist development), a struggle took place in the ruling circles of each country to establish their limits. The limits of the reforms have been determined from the beginning by the social outlook of the reformer, his objectives, and domestic and foreign conditions,

In the crisis situation, the ruling dynasties were able to produce energetic leaders from their ranks who were true to the interests of their class and sufficiently flexible at the same time to bring the society out of the blind alley of feudal development. At the beginning of the 1960s, Faysal came to power in Saudi Arabia and Abdallah al-Salim in Kuwait, and in the early 1970s Qaboos came to power in Oman and (Sulmin) in Qatar.

When the reforms were made (Faysal proclaimed a program for them before the others in 1962)[6] the similarity in their basic features became apparent: development of society in the social area (the establishment of modern systems of education, public health, and social insurance and an information network), development of the national economy (stabilization of the financial situation, the establishment of national organizations to make use of oil and mineral resources, a more independent oil policy, construction of national industrial enterprises and an infrastructural network, and incentive for the development of national capital), and the development of an efficient administrative system and elements of a secular legal procedure; in the area of foreign policy, the features included a course which responds to national interests to a greater extent and reaffirms the break with their semicolonial status in relationships with Western companies and states. In addition, Faysal's program included demonstrative confirmation of faithfulness to the teachings of Islam and readiness to "defend it by word and deed." Faysal's adherence (both demonstrative and real) to traditional values makes it possible, in our view, to define his policy of reforms in the social sphere as protective in nature (unlike the reorganizational reforms by the leader of another oil monarchy—Mohammed Reza Pahlavi—who broke with traditional principles in his policy of modernization and Westernization).

It is notable that Faysal's reforms were opposed by traditonalists from the tribal aristocracy and some of the religious figures, as well as representatives of left-wing movements, who viewed the reforms that were begun as an attempt to wrest the initiative from the patriots and divert the people's attention by concentrating it on minor problems."[4] Nevertheless, objectively Faysal's program, despite the reformer's subjective aspirations, essentially meant the beginning of the break with feudalism. The protective and anticipatory nature of the reforms he carried out defined the incompleteness of this break, but the course of the comprehensive reforms in all parts of the society led to changes of a scope and intensity unanticipated by the Arabian monarch-reformers.

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Economic development has been one of the main objectives of the Arabian reformers. A large part of the growing oil incomes has been channeled into development of an infrastructure and industrialization. Bringing about an industrial revolution in the midst of absolutism involves important social changes. Thus, the industrial revolution in West European countries, in the words of F. Engels, "produced the real bourgeoisie and the real proletariat of large-scale industry, advancing them to the forefront of social development."[5] But in Arabia, under the conditions of a belated industrial revolution and limited industrialization with elements of the scientific and technical revolution, the course was set toward establishment of large industrial enterprises in the state sector with a high degree of fundamental capital formation. The industrial enterprises built during the years of industrialization (primarily highly automated oil drilling and oil refining enterprises) have been equipped with the latest word in technology and do not require a large number of workers. In the private sector, development of medium-size and small industrial enterprises using both

local and foreign manpower is being encouraged by the government. All this has determined the relatively limited nature of the formation of both the working class and the bourgeoisie.

The social aspects of the limited Arabian industrialization are distinctive. In most countries the source of the capital accumulation necessary for industrialization has been the agrarian sector, as a rule. The state's oil incomes have been the only principal source in the Arabian oil monarchies. The fundamental difference in them is that they have been rental in nature, created outside the national economy. Psychologically this has meant a great deal: "the profits falling from the sky at Allah's will" are the main reason for the emergence of the national consumption psychology. In addition, the spirit of bourgeois business enterprise began to be developed in the society with the beginning of activity by Western companies. The state has encouraged business undertakings and has guaranteed financial assistance and every possible privilege. At the same time, it has proclaimed its adherence to the Islamic principles of social justice (providing each person with minimum subsistence and opportunities to obtain work on an equal basis).

Thus in the 1960s, at the very beginning of industrial development but especially after the oil boom started, artisans, merchants, the urban poor, and the impoverished nomads acquired the chance to choose between working for hire and working for themselves; workers in other countries in the East, and not only the East, had been deprived of such a choice. The rapidity and extent of the development of capitalist relationships and its smoothness at first could not help but have an effect on the society. While its efforts in the 1930s and 1940s were aimed basically at survival, in the literal sense of the word, since the early 1960s its objective has become consumption in accordance with the standards of the Western world. Hopes for success and illusions of equal opportunity within the framework of the existing system, under conditions of "universal prosperity," have emerged not only in the property-owning strata but among the workers as well.

The reformers' main objective was to maintain the existing political system and the power of the royal family and their personal power. The basis of the reform policy has been accelerated and stable economic development, aimed also at raising the standard of living of broad sections of the population. The implementation of different kinds of social measures was to eliminate the very basis for public dissatisfaction under the conditions of capitalist development. In the final analysis, both the economic and social measures had the objective of maintaining and extending the regime's social support. To a large extent, objective circumstances contributed to this as well.

The evolution of the Arabian societies led to qualitative changes in their structure, the development of new classes and strata, and the erosion and decline of the traditional ones. However, the monarchies' social policy complicated the social structure and gave rise to certain specific phenomena which emerged against a background of social forms, traditional and new, which differed by stages at the same time.

Bedouins made up a sizable proportion of the population in the 1970s and early 1980s. The country's rulers did not abandon them as the traditional support for the regime. At the same time, one of the directions in the reform policy (primarily in Saudi Arabia) was to shift the nomads to a settled way of life. The state assigned special plots of land and developed them, built houses and dug wells, and provided financial assistance. The government was interested in providing some stability for a substantial part of the work force and steadily integrating it into the national economy; politically, the shift to a settled way of life was an important means of detribalization, strengthening national unity, and activating the process of molding the Saudi people under conditions in which a widespread foreign element continued to be present (in connection with insufficient manpower of their own).

The bedouins developed agricultural and stock-raising under exceptionally favorable conditions, using hired labor. Nevertheless, in spite of the stable high prices and demand for local mutton, the Saudi monarchy has been compelled to import meat, since the nomads of yesterday are not selling it. The bedouins do not understand why they should sell livestock. They have enough money and their contacts with the settled population have traditionally been limited. The young bedouins, who make up most of the unskilled Saudi workers in the monarchy's oil regions, are working "only to acquire a bride or a truck."[6] At the same time, the bedouins are closely linked with the state—more than 30 percent of the adult males in the basic tribal groups are employed in the service of the state in the police, Army, and National Guard.

Each year the process of migration from the rural areas to the cities is intensified, since the urban residents' living wage is appreciably higher.[7] The tribal ties still play an important role in the cities; the social status of the nomads of today is low here, though. During the oil boom years there was an absolute and relative decrease in the number of "pure" nomads, but at the same time, the system of traditional tribal values and viewpoints that had been taken to the cities was preserved. What became a specific feature of Arabian society was not a "dissolution" of the tribes into new classes and strata, but reinforcement of the tribal nature of the society itself. The reason for this lies not only in the fact that the social conditions are changing much more slowly than the economic conditions, but in the peculiar stability of the pre-capitalist social ties. This also explains the long period of time that Arabian absolutism has been maintained.

The first generation of the Arabian bourgeoisie came from the merchants, the moneylenders, and the owners of the fishing and pearl businesses. During the years of the oil boom, which led to an industrial boom, the ranks of the bourgeoisie were substantially expanded; the local partners of Western companies, land speculators, every possible type of middleman, tribal sheikhs and university graduates went into business. The founders' characteristic slogan, "Earn as rapidly as possible, as much as possible, from whatever you wish, and with the least possible amount of work!" became their motto. At first the monarchies' policy, which was aimed at developing and extending new social support, led to the desired results. But it soon became apparent that the upper bourgeoisie was gaining the most. During the formation of the new class, the upper strata in it, closely linked with the state and Western capital, were quickly distinguished.[8]

National monopolies of a special type already hold a conspicuous position in the Arabian countries' economic life (motor transport, sugar, cement, and bakery monopolies in Saudi Arabia; foreign trade monopolies in the UAE; and so forth). The stratum of national bourgeoisie whose activity is impeding the predominance of big national and Western capital in economic life is growing slowly, although the potential opportunities for this stratum to grow are high. The state is providing the middle-size and small businesses with assistance through special funds. Thus, of the nearly 50,000 loans granted by banks in Kuwait in the mid-1980s, 90.7 percent were for small amounts averaging about 2,500 Kuwaiti dinars. Privatization of the largest oil industry company in Arabia, ("Sabik"), is under way in the Saudi kingdom. A reduction of up to 25 percent of the state's share in its capital is being planned. At the beginning of 1984, 30 percent of the shares of its capital, amounting to 10 billion Saudi riyals (2.667 billion dollars), were sold to Saudis and Arabs from the Gulf monarchies. The kingdom's rulers counted on turning a few more of their subjects into owners by limiting the maximum number of shares which one person has the right to own to 1,000 and setting the minimum price for them at 1 Saudi riyal. However, under the conditions of a recession the price of the shares began to drop. At a meeting of the ("Sabik") stockholders in May 1986, a decision was made to increase the maximum value of shares held by one person to 50,000 Saudi riyals.[10]

To the extent that economic development is stabilized and the founding families [gryunderstvo] become extinct, crystallization of the bourgeois class will evidently take place. Its upper stratum, which is made up practically entirely of the ruling families of (Saudids, Sabahs, Nahayans), and others, has already acquired considerable power and experience.

There have been hundreds of bankruptcies in the second half of the 1980s in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE; the petty and middle-level bourgeoisie, deprived of the opportunity to maneuver and simply to hold out against the blows of the crisis, were the ones that suffered. Nevertheless, neither the economic recession nor some reduction in state expenditures for social objectives resulted in any serious demands from the bourgeoisie for their rights or protests against the regime, and they could not lead to them. The Arabian bourgeoisie realizes that it has not received everything from the state yet.

During the years of reform, an entire generation of educated Arabian subjects grew up. They learned the Western way of life and adopted the system of values and philosophy of the capitalist world; a considerable number of Arabians became familiar with the ideas of scientific socialism. The young "technocrats" sometimes express dissatisafaction with the stagnation of public life and the autocracy of the ruling family. Nevertheless, the young intelligentsia does not want a break with the traditional foundations and "roots," especially as extraordinarily favorable economic conditions for work and everyday life have been established for this stratum by the regime.

The so-called urban middle classes, especially the "petty bourgeoisie in services" (employees, bureaucrats, officers in the Army and police, every possible type of middleman, and so forth) are growing at the fastest rate in both numbers and influence in Arabia. In Qatar, for example, 13.1 percent of the gainfully employed population was working in management in 1970, but 22.5 percent of the population was employed in this capacity in 1980. In the UAE, employees in the services field comprised mabout 45 percent of the gainfully employed population by the early 1980's.[11] The state, that is the ruling dynasty, remains the basic source of income (salaries, subsidies, benefits) for this broad social stratum, even with their "business." Thus both the traditional and the modern social strata and groups have been turned into social support for the monarchical regimes to a considerable extent.

* * *

The social policy of the ruling dynasties with respect to the working class deserves particular attention. During the decade of the oil boom, labor legislation on many matters was revised in favor of the workers in most of the Arabian countries. The right to work and receive unemployment and disability benefits has been guaranteed for native residents, for example. In a number of countries, this has also been extended to foreign workers whose work and residency conditions have been regulated by special government decrees as well. Steps have been taken to ensure labor safety and to establish normal working conditions. Special organs (a mediation chamber, a labor arbitration chamber) which have been created to settle labor disputes in the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs system in all countries resolve disputed matters with the participation of management, workers' representatives and the state. In Kuwait and Bahrain, registration of unemployed persons has been provided for in the Ministry of Labor, which is further responsible

for their job placement. Bureaus or agencies for job placement, which provide work for local residents at no cost and for foreigners at a fee, have been set up in all the countries. Labor legislation everywhere provides for hiring preference to be given to local residents.

Strikes and lockouts are forbidden in all the countries. In Saudi Arabia, those taking part in any illegal assembly face the threat of imprisonment for a period of 6 months to 2 years. A call to stop work is punished by 1 to 3 years' imprisonment. Trade unions are prohibited everywhere except Kuwait. Though in Qatar and Bahrain, provision has been made to set up committees at enterprises for workers and employers to resolve disputed matters, and for training organization, observance of safety procedures, and so forth.

By the early 1980s, workers made up one-tenth of the entire population and from one-third to one-half of the gainfully employed population of countries in the region, including foreigners. The proportion of local residents among the workers is small, and this is explained primarily by the fact that local Arabs regard physical labor with disdain and they have been spoiled by the high standard of living that is artificially maintained and all kinds of benefits and privileges; they are attracted more by the chance to engage in commerce or speculation, to enter an educational institution or receive a salary for nominal work; and finally, they lack the knowledge and skills. Because of these and a number of other circumstances, the influx of foreign workers in the oil monarchies was unprecedented in scope during the oil boom years; they made up from 40 to 50 percent of all workers in industry, construction, and the services field. High wages have attracted the foreign workers to Arabia: the average annual earnings of a skilled worker is about 200 dollars in Jordan and about 500 dollars in Kuwait; even an unskilled Egyptian worker, hired legally, has been able to earn up to 30,000 Egyptian pounds (36,000 dollars) in 2 to 4 years.[12]

The nominal wage level for local workers has been set appreciably higher. Wages have been the principal channel for partial redistribution of oil profits. In addition, the aftereffects of the increase in the cost of living and inflation have been compensated to a significant extent by state subsidies for the local population. Many workers among the native residents have begun their own "business" with the money they earned, establishing a small store or workshop, and this has changed their property and social status considerably.

According to data from the Arabian researcher Fuad Khuri, skilled workers are equidistant from groups with high incomes and groups with low incomes in the social structure of Bahrain society.[13] In their level of financial security, they are completely part of the middle-level urban strata, along with administrative personnel, officers in the Army and police, teachers, clerks and merchants. This situation is more or less typical of all the oil monarchies.

* * *

The unprecedented social experiment to raise the standard of living of an entire native population from a primitive, medieval level to the modern level by preserving stability in the society and maintaining "social peace" has turned out well for the oil monarchies. By taking advantage of the unique oil factor, they have been able to create a high standard of living for the broad masses of working people and good working conditions by all world standards.

At the same time, the decrease in the excessive and artificially maintained high standard of living with the slump in the oil boom may become grounds for social conflicts and for protests primarily from the low-paid workers. The growing polarization within the Arabian society cannot help but contribute to this.

The fact that large detachments of foreign workers living temporarily or permanently in Arabia who are enjoying the various social benefits, but to a lesser extent than the local workers, are becoming active in a struggle for an end to discrimination and equal rights cannot be ruled out. The public statements by Pakistani, Somali and South Korean workers in different Arabian countries in the 1970s are well-known, for example.[14]

The ruling regimes have long considered the foreign workers to be the main threat to their stability. The authorities use repression against the foreigners without hesitation for the slightest reason. In the summer months of 1982 alone, 2,000 foreign workers were arrested in the UAE and deported after being charged with violation of the passport procedure; there were 25,000 foreign workers affected in Kuwait.[15] Steps are being taken to reduce the number of foreign workers. In December 1985, the Gulf Cooperation Council adopted a decision to introduce restrictions on job replacement by foreign workers in all member countries of the council and to send them back to their home countries immediately after completion of their contract. In the mid-1980s, about 60,000 persons left Saudi Arabia and about 30,000 left Kuwait each year.[16] The steps taken by the Arabian governments lead to protests at times. For example, foreign workers at the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation refinery held a 4-day strike in February 1986 to protest the decision to gradually replace them with Kuwaitis, and they kept their jobs. Nevertheless, foreigners will not be accepted at this enterprise in the future.[17] Housing construction for foreign workers has been discontinued everywhere, and Kuwait has announced a ban on acceptance of foreign workers' children in the schools beginning in the 1986-87 school year.[18]

In their social policy, the authorities are using the presence of large numbers of foreign workers to dissociate their own proletariat. Trade union leaders in Kuwait call Asian workers "the fifth column of imperialism," and union leaders in the UAE call them "the hidden reserve of the United States and Israel." Here is the view

of a Bahraini: "There are more Indians (workers—A. Ya.) every day; they come here to work, earn money, and share this small island with me. They say that India is large and spacious; if that is so, why do Indians come here? Why can't I share what I have with my fellow countryman who is less well off than I am?"[19] In 1983, scientists at the University of Kuwait conducted a survey of 22,883 persons in different Arab states in the Gulf on the attitudes of native residents toward the foreign workers. Of those polled, 44 percent said that emigrants and expatriates represent "a threat to their economic well-being." The majority demanded that expatriates not receive rights and privileges equal to theirs.[20]

The wave of dissatisfaction and animosity toward the foreign work force, which is being stirred up from the top, has gained considerable momentum in a number of the Arabian countries. In the summer of 1982, the Kuwaiti Ministry of Information even issued a special statement which called upon local residents to show restraint and pointed out that it is extremely necessary for foreign workers to be present.[21]

A situation such as this stems not only from the fact that they often look upon Indian or Bangladesh workers as slaves in conformity with their traditional psychology (slavery was abolished in Saudi Arabia only in 1962). Apprehension results from the belief by many that the foreign workers who have made a vast contribution to development of the economy may demand an equal share of the "oil pie" with the native Arabians "one terrible day."

The conclusion drawn by West German researchers from materials in the FRG and other countries of Western Europe are completely applicable to the worker policy of the Arabian oil aristocracy as well, in our view: the encouragement of an influx or presence of a foreign work force is profitable for the ruling class, which "gains both from the opportunity to take advantage of a cheap labor force as well as from the opportunity to provide a more privileged position for local workers, developing in them a false sense of their own superiority."[22]

This is not a new phenomenon. In 1870 Karl Marx wrote about the working class in England being split "into two *hostile* camps: the English proletariat and the Irish proletariat. The ordinary English worker hates the Irish worker"... and considers himself a representative of the *ruling* nation relative to him, and it is precisely for this reason that he becomes a tool in the hands of its aristocrats and capitalists... *The secret of the impotence of the English worker* class lies *in this antagonism.*"[23] The Arabian workers' urge to protect their privileges rallies them around the regime. The majority of Arabian workers are convinced that the level of prosperity and the nature of the existing political system are closely related, and they do not want changes. A nationalistic wave has swept over the Arabian proletariat. Will it last for long? The slump in business activity, together with introduction of the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution and intensified exploitation of the workers, evidently, will once again aggravate the contradictions between labor and capital in the region.

* * *

The characteristics of the formation of new classes and the adaptation of the traditional social communities to the new conditions also explain the gap that is apparent between the accelerated course of socioeconomic development and the extremely retarded course of political development.

Thus, over the past decades in Saudi Arabia, the objectives set forth in Faysal's program in the economic area were reached long ago: the population's standard of living has increased explosively; a national industry based on the extraction and refining of oil and gas has been created and is being developed, a considerable number of processing industry enterprises have made their appearance, and a developed network of highways, oil and gas pipelines, and telephone communications has been laid out; in the social area, a large number of elementary schools have been built, elementary education has become compulsory, secondary and higher education has been widely extended, all subjects have access to free medical attention, the state is retaining the responsibilities it has assumed with respect to the disabled, the elderly and the infirm; and finally, slavery has been abolished. A secular juridical system and state organs for the management and supervision of economic life have been established. All this has corresponded to the country's interests and the aspirations of the various strata and groups in the population and has enhanced the authority of the rulers and the ruling dynasty.

However, two points in Faysal's program have not been carried out in practice—in the part in which they relate to political matters. A Basic Law (constitution) has not been introduced to date and the rights of the king's consultative council have not been significantly extended, not to mention the creation of a parliament (for which a building has already been erected, though), and the rights of local administration have been extended little.

This is partly related to the fact that any bourgeois reformer promises more of what he is capable of and wants. A certain amount of blindness by the reformer himself, who sometimes does not realize how far his plans will lead when they are fully realized and how great the difficulties will be on the path to their realization, has to be taken into account.

Under the conditions of an economic crisis and a definite threat to the regime from certain opposition forces supported from the outside, Faysal proclaimed a considerable number of liberal reforms. As soon as the threat to the regime from the opposition was eliminated and as soon as a certain dangerous independence by individual Saudi employers (who had established contacts with

socialist countries) became apparent, Faysal discarded his promises. It became clear to Faysal and his successors that full realization of the reform program might place the lawfulness of the ruling family's authority in question or substantially infringe upon it (as happened in the "parliamentary experiments" by the amirs of Kuwait and Bahrain), and in the final analysis it might disrupt the balance between the traditional and new social forces, which the (Saudids) saw as their main objective to reach. Nevertheless, implementation of the tasks set forth in the reform program did not involve public dissatisfaction on a broad scale and this is not explained by the oil factor alone.

Antigovernment demonstrations by the native residents sometimes were broad in scope (the seizure of the Great Mosque in Mecca and demonstrations by Shiite groups in the eastern province of the Saudi kingdom, Bahrain and Kuwait), but they took place mainly under religious or traditionalist-religious slogans. The ruling families were able to channel social activity into capitalist business undertakings and personal success, and they took steps to ensure that the activation of social and political life which could accompany the changes in Arabian society was not tolerated.

(Yusuf al-Hasan), member of the leadership of the National Liberation Front of Bahrain, wrote that the availability until recently of large amounts of savings held by the population (including by some of the workers and small proprietors) enabled them to make large capital investments which yield a quick and easy profit. This gives cause for the official propaganda to hold forth about the notorious "people's capitalism," under which thousands of people supposedly can "own" an enterprise, and to inspire the local residents and the foreigners living in the region with the illusion of prosperity.[24]

The fact that the traditional social and ideological values continue to predominate in Arabian society is also of no small importance. The practice of tribal democracy has been maintained in in many of the monarchies. The Amir of Bahrain, for example, receives any of his subjects who wish to make a request or complaint every Friday. The amirs of the (Saudid) family often stay with the nomadic tribes for weeks and visit industrial enterprises, where they chat with the workers. Such demonstrations that tribal and Islamic principles of equality and democracy are being followed impress most of the residents, who are at a low level of political development.

After the Iranian revolution in 1979, a considerable number of speculative predictions about the likely "collapse" and "imminent downfall" of the Arabian monarchies following the Pahlavi regime appeared in the Western press. These prophecies were substantiated by the close similarity of economic development in these countries, primarily the importance of the oil factor for them, and the similarity of the form of political power—an absolute monarchy, as well as by the presence in Arabia of large masses of people who were dissatisfied with the rapid modernization, the emergence of Western bourgeois society's values and the depreciation of the importance of traditional Islamic values. However, the fact that sizable social groups which not only oppose individual measures taken by the regime but the regime itself do not exist in Arabia was not taken into account.

In carrying out a policy of reforms, the rulers of the oil monarchies in the Persian Gulf have taken full advantage of the peculiarities of Arabia's social structure. They have not had to take the mood of the peasant masses into account. They not only have not speeded up the process of nomadic life's demise, but on the contrary, they have established conditions for the artificial preservation of the nomads' traditional way of life under the new conditions. A great deal has been done in the cities to ensure that the largest possible number of native residents receive a share of the "oil pie," at least to some extent. The comparatively sparse populations of the Arabian countries has enabled the ruling regimes to grant a "boon" to practically every subject.

The state in the Gulf monarchies plays a very active reform role not only in legislation, the social sphere, and normative regulation of the economy, but in economic life itself, clearing away the medieval obstructions and creating opportunities for development of the national economy on a modern material basis. The authorities in the Arabian monarchies, in collaboration with Western monopolies, have taken part themselves in the multilateral development of their countries.

F. Engels' definition of a West European state is well-known: it is "nothing more than an organized joint authority of the propertied classes, landowners and capitalists directed against the exploited classes, peasants and workers."[25] It is also common knowledge that in most the Eastern countries that are following the capitalist path, the state retains its functions of protecting the interests of the ruling strata and carries out national functions in many spheres of public life at the same time. In Arabian society, the situation is even more specific, and the "classic" opposition of the state and the exploited lower classes has been expressed much more weakly. The many benefits provided to the native residents by the state, as well as the use of the labor of hundreds of thousands of foreign workers who are subjected to rigorous exploitation and discrimination—all this contributes to mollification of the contradictions within Arabian society and thereby provides conditions for political stability when socioeconomic reforms are carried out. This accounts for the masses' allegiance to the institution of monarchy. The monarchy is even more effective as both an instrument of political rule and a regulator of public life, a means of mollifying social contradictions. It retains its role as a symbol of religious orthodoxy and arbitrator in the traditional system of tribal and family relationships.

For an Eastern society whose main objective is to accelerate economic and social development and reach the advanced frontiers of science and technology under conditions in which the society itself is fundamentally backward and traditions and religion have a tremendous influence, strong authoritarian rule is necessary not only to carry out reforms but to defend them as well—by forcible methods in a number of cases—from forces which resist the innovations. King Faysal, the first Saudi reformer, used military force unhesitatingly not only against striking workers, but against religious fanatics who raided radio stations and girls' schools as well. He acted no less decisively in the economic sphere by strengthening the kingdom's independent policy in oil affairs and shifting it to more equitable relationships with Western companies.

The condition of the society itself has contributed to the preservation of monarchies in Arabia. It was still united and undivided on the eve of the reforms. With all the differences in economic and social status, the residents of Arabia have lived within the framework of a unified system of civilization in which they shared a common traditional system of social relationships as well as adherence to customs. The opportunity to adopt elements of modern Western civilization without great effort eliminated the need to develop a new style and way of life in the process of which the society could have been disintegrated. The reforms were not accompanied by indiscriminate repudiation of the past; on the contrary, the reformers brought about a combination of the traditional and the modern. The society has not given up its traditonal foundations; it has been modernized and Westernized to only a small degree and the residents continue to live in their customary environment (whether in the palaces of kings or workers' quarters). A great deal separates the subjects and the rulers, but many things unite them as well; the concept of "a community of national interests" which inspired the first ones because of objective social reality is perceived favorably; contradictions between the upper and lower classes have not yet assumed a distinctly expressed antagonistic nature.

Thus, the loyalty of most of the residents of Arabia to the institution of monarchy for many reasons, the objectively important role of the monarchical state in socioeconomic development, and finally, the capacity for development—all this attests to the considerable viability of the monarchies.

The reforms carried out over the two decades are important in two ways. Subjectively for the ruling monarchies, they have become a means of making a leap forward in development and of raising the people's standard of living in order to preserve the existing regime. Meanwhile, the objective role of the reforms is to shift the semifeudal Arabian society to the path of capitalist development, that is, the reforms are formative in nature. Although no fundamental change in the monarchies' political structure has taken place in the course of the reforms, they have been turned into a "revolution from the top," a partial break with the feudal structure in the socioeconomic area. Establishing the foundations of a national economy on the basis of oil refining and petrochemicals, that is, creating a material base for a capitalist society, the emergence of new classes and strata, and finally, turning the traditional ruling and predominant strata into a bourgeois class objectively attest to the revolutionary importance of the reforms of the 1960s to the 1980s.

At the same time, it is becoming more and more obvious that the era of reforms in the Gulf countries is practically coming to an end and that objectively its positive potential in the socioeconomic sphere has been nearly exhausted. Rapid shifts in the material basis against a background of stagnancy in the superstructure threaten the ruling dynasties with an impasse. The internal contradictions, the conflicting nature of the path considered for development after the oil and industrial boom has ended, and the economic difficulties which are becoming more acute, as well as the disparity between Arabia's political strcutures and the realities of today, place in question the monarchies' capability of surviving without fundamental political changes.

Footnotes

1. For details, see I. A. Aleksandrov, "Oman," Moscow, 1979; V. L. Bodyanskiy, "Vostochnaya Araviya" [Eastern Arabia], Moscow, 1986; A. M. Vasilyev, "Istoriya Saudovskoy Aravii" [History of Saudi Arabia], Moscow, 1982; and A. I. Yakovlev, "Saudovskaya Araviya i Zapad" [Saudi Arabia and the West], Moscow, 1982.

2. "Evolyutsiya vostochnykh obshchestv: sintez traditsionnogo i sovremennogo" [The Evolution of Eastern Societies: A Synthesis of the Traditional and the Modern], Moscow, 1985, p 396.

3. See A. M. Vasilyev, op. cit., Chapter 9; "Prince Faysal Speaks," Ministry of Information of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (S. l., s. a.).

4. PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA, No 4, 1968, p 94.

5. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Sochineniya" [Works], Vol 22, p 535.

6. "Social and Economic Development in the Arab Gulf," London, 1980, p 111.

7. See A. G. Georgiyev and V. V. Ozoling, "Neftyanyye monarkhii Aravii. Problemy razvitiya" [The Arabian Oil Monarchies. Problems of Development], Moscow, 1983, p 158.

8. For details, see A. I. Yakovlev, "Osobennosti razvitiya krupnoy burzhuazii v stranakh Araviyskogo poluostrova. Burzhuaziya i sotsialnaya evolyutsiya stran zarubezhnogo Vostoka" [Characteristics of the Development of the Upper Bourgeoisie in Countries of the Arabian Peninsula. The Bourgeoisie and the Social Evolution of Countries in the Foreign East], Moscow, 1985; and J. I. L. Carter, "The Leading Merchant Families of Saudi Arabia," London. 1979.

9. THE MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIC DIGEST (MEED), 4 January 1986, p 9.

10. MEED, 7 June 1986, p 24.

11. V. L. Bodyanskiy, op. cit., pp 151-152, 189.

12. "Employment and Manpower Problems and Policy Issues in Arab Countries: Proposals for the Future," Geneva, 1984, p 21; MEED, 18 February 1983, p 62.

13. F. I. Khuri, "Tribe and State in Bahrain," Chicago-London, 1980, p 144.

14. See A. M. Vasilyev, "Persidskiy zaliv v epitsentre buri" [The Persian Gulf in the Epicenter of the Storm], Moscow, 1984.

15. MERIP Reports, May 1985, p 4.

16. MEED, 31 May 1986, p 9.

17. MEED, 1 March 1986, p 20.

18. MEED, 15 March 1986, p 25.

19. Quoted from F. I. Khuri, op. cit., p 188.

20. THE MIDDLE EAST MAGAZINE, February 1983, p 30.

21. THE MIDDLE EAST [sic], February 1983, p 30.

22. S. Castly and G. Kosack, "Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe," London, 1973, p 481.

23. K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., Vol 32, pp 557, 558.

24. PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA, No 2, 1985, p 73.

25. K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., Vol 18, p 253.

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Turkey: Islamic Factor in a Secular State

18070122f Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 2, Mar-Apr 88 pp 25-34

[Article by G. I. Starchenkov: "Turkey: The Islamic Factor in a Secular State"]

[Text] The religious situation in Turkey has undergone striking changes over a comparatively short historical period. The upsurge of the national liberation movement (1918-1923) and the proclamation of the republic led to the abolition of religious institutions and currents. Turkey became the first and only Muslim country where religion was separated from the state. Important reforms were carried out in the republic which undermined the influence of Islam and reinforced the secular nature of the new regime.

However, a gradual reanimation of Islamic activity has been begun in the country since the 1940s, especially with the shift to a multiparty system. The army officers who brought about three coups d'etat and the adoption of two new constitutions have formally sought to restrict the use of Islam in the country's political life and a return to the "principles of laicism" (secularism). Nevertheless, under the influence of the domestic and foreign situation, political parties and even state organizations are striving to make use of religion for their purposes more and more actively. In acquiring new aspects, the struggle between the Islamists and the supporters of laicism has become an integral part of the political life of modern Turkey.

* * *

In the spring of 1920, participants in the national liberation movement in Eastern Anatolia convoked the Grand National Assembly (GNA—the parliament), which announced the overthrow of the sultan's government and charged its leader, M. Kemal, with forming a cabinet of ministers. Soon afterward the GNA announced its repudiation of the Treaty of Svres.[1]

Initially, M. Kemal and his supporters acted extremely carefully with respect to the caliph, Mohammed VI (Vakhid ed-Din). For example, the GNA adopted the following declaration: "We, your deputies, swear in the name of the almighty Allah and his Prophet that allegations that we have risen in revolt against the sultanate and the caliphate are utter fiction. May the curse of Allah fall on the heads of those traitors who help the enemy and the mercy of Allah not forsake those who are trying to save our caliph and sultan."[2] This declaration was needed by M. Kemal to win over those Muslims who sincerely believed that the sultan-caliph, who was in Istanbul, which was occupied by troops of the Entente countries, had to be released from captivity. Certain Kurdish sheikhs provided the Kemalists with support right after M. Kemal spoke of "the religious nature of the national liberation movement and promised them that a number of privileges would be preserved."[3]

Naturally, such statements were not able to have an effect on the sultan-caliph and the command of the occupation troops. At the direction of Mohammed VI, the shariat court then passed death sentences on M. Kemal and other leaders of the national liberation movement. An "Army of the Caliphate" formed with the help of the occupation forces was sent to Eastern Anatolia to annihilate the mutineers.

Soviet Russia provided considerable political-moral and material support for the national liberation movement in this difficult situation. As far back as 1917, the Soviet of People's Commissars of the RSFSR published an appeal to "To all Muslim workers in Russia and the East," in which it declared the Soviet Government's repudiation of the aggressive policy of tsarist Russia with respect to Turkey and the abrogation of all the agreements which it concluded with other imperialist states on the partition of Turkey. In the summer of 1920, diplomatic relations were established between the RSFSR and Turkey, and in March of 1921, they signed a treaty of friendship and fraternity. The Soviet state was not only the first to recognize the government of the new Turkey, but also provided it with money and arms.[4]

The Kemalists succeeded in routing the "Army of the Caliphate" in April 1920. Then blows were delivered against the French division and the Greek troops suffered a decisive defeat. The GNA abolished the sultanate at the end of 1922. Mohammed VI was forced to flee on on English ship. Prince A.-Mejid, a member of the sultan's family, was chosen to be the new caliph, who had no political power. The Treaty of Lausanne, which recognized Turkey's integrity and independence, was convoked in the summer of 1923. After evacuation of the foreign troops, Turkey was proclaimed the Republic of Turkey on 29 October 1923 and M. Kemal became its first president.[5]

In 1924 the GNA abolished the caliphate, which was able to become the center of domestic and foreign opposition and obstruct the implementation of secular reforms. Caliph A.-Mejid, as well as members of his family and his retinue, were exiled from Turkey and deprived of their citizenship rights. All property of the last representatives of the Ottoman dynasty was transferred to the state. In conformity with the law that had been adopted, the shariat courts were dissolved. At the same time, the Religious Affairs Administration was established, and management of all the *(tekke)* and *(zaviyye)* (religious cloisters) and the right to appoint and dismiss imams, sheikhs, and others were transferred to it. The (medrese) (Islamic schools) were closed and a new unified system of education was introduced. Boys and girls began studying together in state schools. So the Islamic figures were deprived of the right to interfere in the country's political life, as well as to train religious personnel.[6]

However, several concessions were also made in order to mollify the reaction of religious society as a whole.[7] Thus, along with articles which reinforced the secular nature of the government, the Constitution of 1924 preserved a formula (Article 2): "the state religion of Turkey is Islam." This obligated the GNA and government institutions (Article 26) to take the shariat standards and other customs into account in settling legal matters related to the country's Muslim population. Besides this, the closure of the (medrese) was compensated by the introduction of a course on Islam in the primary and secondary schools.[8]

The implementation of a number of laicist measures stemmed primarily from the fact that M. Kemal considered religion to be the initial cause of backwardness and the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, he felt that many Islamic objectives continued to be almost the principal obstacle to Turkey in reaching the Western states' level of development. For this reason, in striving to clear the way toward "Western civilization," he continued to conduct a struggle against what in his view were the most reactionary tenets of Islam by relying upon the Republican People's Party (RPP), which he established.

In 1925, the (tekke) and (zaviyye), as well as all the *(tyurbe)* (burial vaults) in which the remains of the sultans and popular sheikhs were interred, were closed, and the *(tarikaty)* (mystical orders) and Muslim sects were abolished and their property was transferred to the state. These bans undermined the influence of the Islamic charismatic individuals appreciably.[9] Then came a ban on wearing the fez, an obligatory attribute of every Muslim for centuries. In 1926, extensive changes took place in jurisprudence: first the *(mejelle)* (the sultan's civil codes) and the standards of shariat civil law were abolished, and then civil, criminal and commercial codes were adopted, eliminating the rest of the medieval legal standards. The criminal code, for example, prohibited polygamy, which was permitted by Muslim legal standards, and introduced monogamy; and a civil marriage became obligatory instead of a religious one. For the first time, women acquired equal rights with men when property was inherited. Wearing of the chador ceased to be obligatory. In addition, Article 163 of the civil code provided for imprisonment for those who exploit the religious sentiments of believers and incite the masses to carry out actions which represent a threat to state security, and Article 242 provided for punishment of religious figures who use Islam to achieve political objectives.[10]

The status of women was changed substantially in the following years. In 1927 they acquired the right to work in state institutions. Courses of study, pedagogical schools and institutes for women were opened in the country. When the Arabic alphabet was replaced by the Latin alphabet, it became possible to eliminate literacy among the population, especially among the women, in very short periods of time. Women received the right to take part in elections to local organs in 1938, and elections to the Grand National Assembly in 1934.[11]

In 1928, the parliament removed a number of articles from the constitution which conflicted with the new directions, particularly the one stating that Turkey's state religion is Islam. The ruling Republican People's Party introduced laicism in its charter of principles in 1931, and this principle has been one of the articles in the constitution since 1937. From then on, criticism of the principle of laicism was viewed as a crime against the state.[12] Turkey became the first Muslim country where this principle of laicism is in force.

Islam, which played an important role in the public life of the empire for several centuries, could not be removed from it by a number of decrees. The Kemalists' secularist measures brought fierce resistance from various social forces. Hostility was displayed primarily by the feudal-clerical reaction, which gave up part of its property, incomes and privileges. These exploiters attempted to take advantage of the ignorance and religiousness, mainly of the rural strata, in order to restore their positions. There were a particularly large number of demonstrations and protests, some of which grew into uprisings, from 1925 to 1928, as well as in the mid-1930s. As a rule, they were held under the slogan "Back to the caliphate."[13] Different religious organizations, whose activity was restricted at first and later banned, also came out against the measures instituted by the government. Thus, the dervish order of (Nakshbendi)[14] revolted in the city of Menemen in 1930. The order's leadership demanded restoration of the shariat, as well as repeal of the ban on dervish orders, a return to the Arabic alphabet, the right to wear the fez, and so forth. The Army's defeat of the reactionary movements created the opportunity to eliminate further religious obstacles on the Republic of Turkey's path toward capitalist developoment.

K. Ataturk's death in 1938, a cooling of relations with the Soviet Union, the rapprochement with fascist Germany, and other factors changed the situation in Turkey. During World War II, the pan-Islam (and pan-Turkish) organizations began making wide use of Islamic slogans for the purpose of uniting all Muslims (or all Turks) under Turkey's leadership, not without the assistance of German agents. However, when the outcome of the war became apparent, the ruling circles gave up using Islam for the purpose of expanding its influence on other states. The government once again began supressing the activity of pan-Islam (and pan-Turkish) associations.

An extremely tense situation developed in postwar Turkey. Democratic figures who were impressed by the radical socioeconomic changes in Eastern Europe demanded substantial reforms in the country's economic and sociopolitical life. Under these conditions, the Republican People's Party made an attempt to use Islam against its domestic opponents, basically the progressive movements. They abandoned a number of their laicist lines for this purpose. A law was adopted in 1946 which, as Turkish historian M. A. Agaogullari wrote, "began the regime's liberalization," since the development of different societies (but not on an Islamic foundation) was allowed after that. The law "put an end to the use of extreme laicism" and made it possible for Islam "to come out from the underground into the political arena." The next year private religious schools were opened. Then the government restored the teaching of Islam in the primary school as an elective subject. The hajj to Mecca has been permitted since 1948. Accelerated courses to train imam-(khatibs) were organized in 10 cities. Since 1950, 20 burial vaults have opened their doors again for visitors.[15]

The inability of the Republican People's Party to control the complex situation in the country led first to a split in this party, then to the establishment of a new one, the Democratic Party (DP). In connection with the law on societies, a large number of other parties had accused the Republican People's Party of "atheism and amorality." They demanded that it "repeal the secular laws and end interference in religious affairs."[16] Nearly all the opposition parties began using Islam for political purposes as the most effective weapon in their struggle against the ruling party.

A certain deviation by the RPP from its laicist positions proved to be ineffective, inasmuch as they continued to view it as an "antireligious party." At the next elections to the Grand National Assembly in 1950, the RPP yielded power to the Democratic Party after losing a substantial number of votes. The new government quickly authorized reading of the Koran and the (azan) (call to prayer) in Arabic. The teaching of religion in primary and secondary school bevcame obligatory, schools for training imams were restored, and a theology department was opened at the University of Ankara. Construction of new mosques and the repair of old ones was begun everywhere. As Soviet historians have noted, "the policy of concessions to the clergy was in keeping with the aspirations of the Turkish reaction, which saw in the spread of religious fanaticism a means of distracting the workers from the struggle for their social rights."[17]

In referring to the need to extend "religious tolerance," the Democratic Party government did not seek strict limitation of the dervish orders and sects that been reactivated (the Nakshbendi), (Tijani), (Nurju), Suleimanji, and others). The Islamic fanatics, which had a semilegal status, accused K. Ataturk and the RPP which he established of deviation from Mohammedanism, atheism, having a pernicious effect on morality and the morals of Turkish youth, and they demanded that women wear the chador once again. The overwhelming majority of religious figures openly expressed support for the Democratic Party.[18]

Implementation of important socioeconomic reforms was begun in Turkey after the war. Factories and plants were built at an accelerated pace (primarily to process

agricultural raw material), accompanied by the expansion of hired labor. Land and agricultural reform was begun which set the task of shifting the basic sector of the economy to the path of captialist enterprise. Because of the pauperization of the rural population, a substantial part of it began moving to the cities. The unstable status of many strata and classes created favorable conditions for the revival and expansion of Islamic traditions.

There was a coup d'etat by the Army in 1960, as the result of which the Democratic Party government was overthrown (the prime minister and two ministers were executed), and the growth of Islamic tendencies was stopped. The constitution adopted in 1961 forbid all parties and public organizations from utilizing Islam for political purposes. Muslim societies and organizations whose activities were at variance with the constitution were outlawed. However, the base for expanding the dissemination of Islamic ideas was preserved, inasmuch as most of the population were believers.

Before long, most of the parties began to display a desire to enlist the support of the believers in the population ("the hunt for votes"). Even those organizations which had hurriedly declared their adherence to laicism after the coup gradually began using Islamic slogans once again. During the pre-election meetings, leaders of the principal parties appeared on the platforms in the company of mullahs.

The Party of National Order (PNO), established by N. (Erbakan) in 1970, became the most active supporter of Islam. Though as soon as it began a campaign against laicism it was banned, but it was reestablished at almost the same time under a new name—the Party of National Salvation (PNS). The previous objectives were actually retained in its program. Only with respect to laicism it was limited by the requirement not to use it "as a means of pressing certain convictions on others."[19] This party was able to impart a more timely ring to the Islamic slogans. In particular, it came out in support of the weak "provincial" bourgeoisie of Anatolia and against the large "Westernized" business in Turkey's western regions (including Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir). In the area of foreign policy, the PNS called for rapprochement not with the imperialist states, but the Islamic countries "which are closer to Turkey historically and culturally."[20] By utilizing Islamic slogans, the party attempted to lead the religious masses to take practical steps. The political line of the PNS was objectively aimed at destabilizing the domestic political situation.

The Nationalist Movement Party (NMP), headed by A. (Turkesh), did not turn as sharply toward Islam in its program directions as the PNS. A combination of very diversified Islamic, nationalist, pan-Turkist, and even neofascist elements was observed in them. However, in order to achieve its political objectives, the party's leadership continually appealed to Islam. The NMP took the part of the initiator of terrorist activity in the country in the late 1970s. The detachments of fighters which it created (often recruited from those with religious sentiments who had migrated to the cities) organized a bloody massacre of the Alaouites in the city of (Kakhramanmarash) (the Alaouites here are basically Kurds). M. Agja, a member of this party, was accused of the murder of A. (Ipekchi), the editor of a bourgeois newspaper, and an attempt against the pope. Members of the party have resorted to terror in order to seize power, by relying on the fighters, and organizing prosecution for the terrorist activity has turned out to be impossible, since A. (Turkesh), who was a member of the different coalition governments, put obstacles in the way of investigations.

Thus, conditions took shape in the country which were very favorable for increasing the role of the Islamic factor. The international situation also contributed to this. The ruling circles in Turkey sought to establish friendly relations with the Muslim oil-producing states. Since Turkey had disregarded the community of interests with Muslim countries for a long period of time, the government's desire to improve relations with them was received with considerable distrust. Many Arab leaders pointed to a number of circumstances which were a barrier to the rapprochement that was proposed: Turkey's participation in imperialist blocs and the presence of foreign military bases on its territory, maintenance of friendly relations with Israel, and the country's continued laicist objectives.[21]

Turkey took an important step toward rapprochement with Islamic countries in 1967 when Israel unleashed a war against Egypt, Syria and Jordan. For the first time the government moved away from full support for Israel by declaring its neutrality. Moreover, it associated itself with those states that were demanding the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories. After this, in 1969, Turkey was able to take part in the first Muslim conference in Rabat, and in subsequent years it became a member of practically all the Islamic organizations.

The fourth Arab-Israeli war broke out in 1973, and the Arab oil-producing countries stopped deliveries of oil for the United States and the Netherlands. They cut back the drilling for oil and repeatedly obtained an increase in world prices for it. Turkey, which imported 80 percent of the oil consumed in the country from the Middle East region, began improving relations with the Islamic states out of necessity. The following circumstances played a special role in this. First of all, during the period when Turkey's domestic consumption of oil was increasing rapidly, the country had a certain opportunity to purchase it in countries in the Middle Eastern region at prices below the world level (from Iraq, for example, inasmuch as the pipeline from Kirkuk to the Mediterranean Sea passes through Turkish territory) or under preferential conditions (by paying for it with its exported commodities, for example). Naturally, the Turkish Government sought to extend such an opportunity. In the second place, the crisis situation in the economy of the Western states led to a reduction in the number of

Turkish workers they accepted and even their deportation to their homeland. On the one hand, this increased the level of unemployment in Turkey (roughly 15 percent of the total number of workers were unemployed at the end of the 1970s), and on the other hand, it led to a reduction in foreign currency receipts at a time when the country was experiencing a critical shortage of foreign exchange. For this reason, the Turkish Government made a special effort to obtain loans and credits from the Arab oil-producing countries, which had become major world creditors for a brief period, as well for the placement there of their excess manpower resources.

In addition, the crisis in the Cypriot state, where one-fifth of the population are Turks, became aggravated. The Turkish Government, referring to the growing danger that Cyprus would be joined with Greece, landed its troops on the island and took 40 percent of its territory under control. Turkey has done everything possible to promote the division of the island and the formation of "an independent Turkish Cypriot state." The Turkish Government's actions aroused the dissatisfaction of the United States and certain NATO allies (France, Italy, and others). In the situation that developed, Turkey was forced to rely upon the solidarity and support of Islamic states to a greater extent.[22]

The 1979 revolution in Iran had a definite effect on the Islamic movement in Turkey as well. The overthrow of the shah's "westernized" government and the anti-imperialist slogans of the Iranian clergy were welcomed with satisfaction at first by the democratically inclined strata of the population. Later on, the suppression of the Iranian democratic movement by Shiite fanatics, the establishment of a rigid dictatorship of the higher clergy, and the attempts to export the revolution to Muslim countries evoked a negative reaction among most of Turkey's population. In September 1980, there was a third coup in the country. The Army generals headed by K. Evren spoke of the necessity of "restoring the principles of Kemalism" and declared that "resorting to Islam for political purposes cannot be tolerated." A number of articles in the constitution adopted in 1982 categorically forbid use of the religious factor by political parties and public organizations. Thus, Article 2 again stressed the secular nature of the Republic of Turkey, and Article 136 directed the "Religious Affairs Administration...to perform its duties in conformity with the principle of laicism." At the same time, Article 24 provided for "freedom of conscience, religious beliefs and convictions" and compulsory "teaching of religious culture and morality" in primary educational institutions, to be carried out "under the control and supervision of the state."[23]

The carelessness and contradictoriness of a number of the articles in the constitution attest to the fact that the persons who drew up the basic law were far from the point of fully restoring the laicist principles of the republic's founder. The religious figures took advantage of this to attempt to bring about an "Islamic renaissance" in the country. New mosques are being built and old ones are being restored in Turkey. The propaganda of the Koran, which is being published in a large number of copies, is broadcast on the state radio and television. Religious education, especially secondary education, has become unprecedented in scope. Thus, while 100 schools of the imam-(khatibs), with 1,548 teachers and 42,443 students, were in use in the 1969-1970 academic year, there were 715 schools, 10,537 teachers, and 219,931 students in the 1982-1983 academic year.[24] In addition, there are several Islamic departments in the universities. A large number of students are studying in Islamic institutions in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and other countries in the Middle East.

The sects that had been banned—the (Nurju), (Nakshbendi), (Suleimanji), and (Tijani), organizations that are quite large and militant—resumed their activities in the 1980s. Certain fundamentalist sects which are under the mullahs' influence are active as well: the (Hezb-ul Islam), (Islami Jihad), (Hezb-ul Takhrir), and others. They all are highly active, although they exist under semilegal conditions. The secular press classifies these sects, based on the content of their sermons, as *(irtija)* (reaction, obscurantism). For example, Sheik M. (Hoja) of the (Nakshbendi) sect, in holding prayers in the (Fatiha) mosque in Istanbul, called upon 3,500 women, dressed in *(charshafi)* (the black shawls which are common in Iran and almost forgotten in Turkey), not to watch television and not to read the newspapers. "Whoever dares to do this," the speaker said, "will not see the light of Allah!"[25] From time to time, members of sects, but basically those of the Shiite persuasion, are prosecuted rather vigorously in the country. For example, in 1986 those taking part in tbe (Hezb-ul Takhrir) organization, who were planning to carry out a revolution like the one in Iran, were brought to trial. Members of this organization believe that those who have turned away from Islam have to be killed, that those who do not take part in prayers have to be put in jail, that *(zakyat)* ("purifying" alms for the poor) have to be taken by force from those who do not give them voluntarily, and that those who use alcohol have to be punished by lashing. They call K. Ataturk "an agent of the exploiting and godless West," since he knelt before England and removed the caliph." Members of the sect have disseminated appeals for "an uprising against the current laicist regime of Turkey."[26] However, such court examinations are quite rare, since the adherents of practically all the currents of Islam are subjected to sharp criticism. And even more importantly, they evoke a negative reaction from the ruling circles of a number of Middle Eastern states with which Turkey is very interested in developing multilateral ties.

After the coup d'etat (1980), the country reactivated contacts with the Muslim world. In 1981, the Center for the Study of Islamic History, Culture and Art, the Center for Statistical, Economic and Social Research attached to the Islamic Development Bank, and other institutions were opened in Ankara and Istanbul. Conferences of the

leaders of Islamic countries which were held in these cities were presided over by both the president and the prime minister of a laicist republic for the first time. In accordance with the resolutions which were adopted, Turkey pledged to provide assistance to the Islamic centers and institutions of Asian and African countries.[27] Turkey has also extended into the ranks of the "Organization of the Islamic Conference." The government has enhanced the importance of the call for "Islamic solidarity," extending it to the economic field as well. In particular, it has managed to involve a large number of Muslim businessmen in building not only charitable institutions, but economic facilities as well. By 31 December 1984, 246 foreign companies, 69 of which were from Islamic countries (28 percent of the total number) were operating in the country. From 1981 to 1986, the number of joint Turkish-Arab firms increased from seven to 67 (nearly 10 times as many). Over the years cited, the proportion of investments by Islamic countries in overall capital investment increased from 9 to 16 percent.[28] Saudi Arabia turned out to have the most privileged status.

The ruling circles do not conceal their intentions to turn the country into the financial center of the Islamic world. They believe that the appropriate conditions have taken shape at present. Lebanon, formerly one of the world's major bankers, has lost importance for a long time as the result of Israeli aggression and internecine ethnic and religious dissension. Iran and Iraq have drained theor resources so much for 8 years that they cannot lay claim to substantial role. A number of Muslim states are scaring away foreign financial magnates with their conservatism or progressivism. There has been a favorable response, both in the West and the East, to Turkey's appeal to hold capital in its territory. At present, 20 foreign banks (there were only four until 1980) are now operating in the country, including some from Muslim countries.[29] In 1986 Turkey took part in one more joint organization—the Union of Islamic Exchanges. A. (Nezhat), the general secretary of this organization, said at that time that all members of the union see Turkey as a leader in the economic sphere, taking into account those potentials which it has at its disposal.[30] So the secular state is turning into one of the major centers of Islamic activity.

By taking advantage of the slogan of "Islamic solidarity" and by relying on its relatively developed industry, Turkey has made an attempt in recent years to penetrate the markets and the economy of Muslim states. In 1981, imports from these states totaled 3,6 billion dollars, and in 1985 they were increased slightly, up to 3.7 billion dollars (mainly in connection with the drop in world oil prices). But exports rose from 2.0 billion to 3.3 billion dollars, respectively. At the same time, exports to Iraq rose from 559.0 million to 961.4 million dollars, and exports to Iran rose from 233.7 million to 1,078,900,000 dollars.[31] Expansion of the market in Muslim countries served as an important stimulus for development of the Turkish economy, industry in particular (industry's share in total exports was 36 percent in 1980 and 75.3 percent in 1985).[32]

At the same time, by relying on these same slogans, Turkish contracting firms began to actively penetrate the countries in the Middle East. In 1980, only 62 firms were operating in them (contracting work valued at 3.5 billion dollars), but there were 296 firms operating (15.5 billion dollars) in 1985.[33] During this period the number of Turkish companies in countries in the region increased by 4.8 times as many and the value of contract operations increased by 4.4 times as much. In addition, the Muslim countries of the Near and Middle East (including North African countries) have assumed particular importance for Turkey since the mid-1970s as markets for their surplus manpower. It was precisely at this time that countries in the West began reducing the number of Turkish workers accepted, and later they began sending them back to their native country. The return of vast numbers of citizens (some workers lived abroad with their families) at a time when there were over 2 million unemployed in the country could have led to unforeseen social shocks. Under these conditions, changing the direction of migration for the Turkish labor force assumed particular importance. In 1985, for example, only 236 workers left for countries in Western Europe, while 35,100 workers left for Saudi Arabia (though other Islamic countries had sharply reduced the number of foreign workers being accepted as the result of the decline in oil incomes).[34]

Reactivation of the Islamic communities in Turkey and the process of the country's rapprochement with Islamic states are reinforcing the Islamic trends among the population. Nevertheless, it appears that Turkey does not intend to repudiate laicism completely. However, there is no unity of views on this matter in the country's ruling circles. The positions of the president and the prime minister are of definite interest in this sense.

President K. Evren considers religious belief to be a matter of each citizen's freedom of conscience. Being the son of an imam, he has met more than once with the highest religious figures in the city of Konya, considered to be Turkey's religious center. At the same time, by proclaiming himself to be the successor to Ataturk, the president insists that freedom of religion not exceed the bounds established by articles of the constitution. K. Evren said in 1985 that "reaction and religious organizations have increased the level of their activity under various pretexts." And in early 1987 he warned about the "existence of the danger of Turkey's Islamization."[35]

This position by K. Evren has created dissatisfaction not only among Islamic figures in Turkey, but in a number of Muslim countries as well. High-ranking officials in Saudi Arabia are speaking about the need to extend the freedoms of a religious nature in Turkey. The Ayatollah Khomeini has spoken even more frankly: "Could the Prophet Mohammed have commanded us to follow after

Ataturk (and consequently, his successors—GS), who did not observe the laws of the shariat and said 'Do not pray!'"[36] In connection with the campaign in Iran against the "godless" Westernized intelligentsia in Turkey, as well as against K. Evren personally, the Turkish president was compelled to call off his visit to Iran, set for the beginning of 1987.[37]

A somewhat different point of view is held by Prime Minister T. Ozal, who previously was a member of the Party of National Salvation and continues to maintain ties with religious figures. When the question of taking steps to limit the growth of the fundamentalist movement was discussed in the parliament, T. Ozal said: "This movement is not brought about by an "excess" of freedoms, but because of the infringement of freedom of religion."[38] The Turkish press often calls him "the most pro-Islamic of all Turkey's prime ministers." They also note that all the Islamic states give him a cordial welcome.[39]

At a time when a theoretical dispute on the limits of "freedom of conscience" is under way in the highest echelons of the government, the Islamic movement in Turkey is continuing to become more active. Leaflets are appearing in the cities with the slogans "Salvation in Islam!" and "Let us unite on the religious path!" On the eve of 1987, deputies in the parliament received "congratulations" from the organization "Turkish Islamists—Fighters for Truth," in which it was suggested that a jihad be begun against those who attempt to stand up for an atheistic system. Muslim cells have begun to emerge in the highest organs of state administration (for example, in the State Planning Organization) and even in military units.

A struggle between the Islamists and the supporters of laicism has continued throughout republican Turkey's entire history. All this time the opposition religious figures have come out for retention of their property, incomes and privileges, as well as against enlightenment of the masses and the modernization of society. The position of the ruling circles has been changed frequently. In recent years the Islamic movement, by taking advantage of the population's difficult economic situation for its purposes and relying upon the moral and political support of a number of Muslim states, has been drawing more and more new followers into its ranks and winning back more and more new positions. The Islamic factor has now become a pressing problem in the secular state.

Footnotes

1. "Sovremennaya Turtsiya" [Modern Turkey], Moscow, 1958, pp 134-138.

2. Quoted from I. L. Fadeyeva, "Islam v stranakh Blizhnego i Srednego Vostoka" [Islam in Countries of the Near and Middle East], Moscow, 1982, p 86. On the evolution of secular trends in the sociopolitical development of Turkey. A statement of the problem.

3. M. A. Agaogullari, "L'Islam dans la vie politique de la Turquie" [Islam in the Political Life of Turkey], Ankara, 1982, p 121.

4. A. D. Novichev, "Turtsiya. Kratkaya istoriya" [Turkey. A Brief History], Moscow, 1965, pp 142, 156, 159.

5. "Noveyshaya istoriya Turtsii" [The Modern History of Turkey], Moscow, 1968, pp 19-65.

6. S. Mardin, "Religion et laicit en Turquie. Ataturk fondateur de la Turquie moderne" [Religion and Laicism in Turkey. Ataturk, the Founder of Modern Turkey], Paris-New York, 1984, pp 201, 207.

7. More than 95 percent of Turkey's population is made up of Muslims, the overwhelming majority of whom are Sunnites (they recognize the sanctity of the Sunna along with the Koran) and the minority of whom are Alaouites (Nusairi), which represent the Shiite sect. The Alaouites revere the caliph Ali as God incarnate and retain certain elements of the astral cults and Christianity.

8. "Noveyshaya istoriya Turtsii," p 85; M. A. Agaogullari, op. cit., pp 49, 58.

9. S. Mardin, op. cit., pp 201, 207.

10. "Noveyshaya istoriay Turtsii," pp 87, 91; M. A. Agaogullari, op. cit., pp 52-53.

11. A. D. Novichev, op. cit., p 186.

12. M. A. Agaogullari, op. cit., p 49.

13. A. D. Novichev, op. cit., p 175.

14. The Sunnite sect, established in the 14th century, played an important role in the political life of Ottoman society. After the ban it functioned underground.

15. M. A. Agaogullari, op. cit., pp 155-167.

16. "Turetskaya Respublika (Spravochnik)" [The Turkish Republic (A Handbook)], Moscow, 1975, p 50.

17. M. A. Gasratyan, S. F. Oreshkova and Yu. A. Petrosyan, "Ocherki istorii Turtsii" [Outlines of the History of Turkey], Moscow, 1983, p 222.

18. A. D. Novichev, op. cit., p 213; F. Bahrampour, "Turkey: Political and Social Transformation," Brooklyn-New York, 1967, p 63.

19. V. I,. Danilov, "Politicheskaya borba v Turtsii" [The Political Struggle in Turkey], Moscow, 1985, p 230.

20. "Islam v sovremennoy politike stran Vostoka (konets 70-nachalo 80-x godov XXX veka)" [Islam in the Modern Politics of Eastern Countries (Late 1970s to Early 1980's)], Moscow, 1986, pp 199-200.

21. G. I. Starchenkov, "Turkey: Between the Minarets and the Missiles," AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA, No 4, 1986, p 33.

22. I. I. Ivanova, "Turetsko-arabskiye otnosheniya i ikh mesto v sisteme mezhdunarodnykh svyazey na Blizhnem Vostoke (1945-1983)" [Turkish-Arab Relations and Their Place in the System of International Ties in the Middle East (1945-1983)], Moscow, 1985, pp 67-68

23. "Anayasa" (The Constitution), Ankara, 1982, pp 2, 5, 21.

24. "Turkiye istatistik yilligi 1977 [Turkish Statistical Annual, 1977], Ankara, 1977, p 109; "Turkiye istatistik cep yilligi 1985 [Turkish Pocket Statistical Annual, 1985], Ankara, 1985, p 52.

25. THE MIDDLE EAST, London, January 1986, pp 12-13.

26. CUMHURIYET, 13 February 1986.

27. I. I. Ivanova, op. cit., pp 129, 130.

28. "Almanac. Turkey 1986," Ankara, 1986, p 260; MILLIYET, 5 October 1986.

29. THE MIDDLE EAST, May 1985, p 51.

30. MILLIYET, 23 October 1986.

31. "Iktisadi rapor 1986" [Economic Report, 1986], Ankara, 1986, p 215.

32. Ibid., p 204.

33. Ibid., p 225.

34. Ibid., p 45.

35. THE MIDDLE EAST, January 1986, p 12; MILLIYET, 12 January 1987.

36. NOKTA, 5 December 1986.

37. CUMHURIYET, 13 January 1987.

38. CUMHURIYET, 10 December 1986.

39. MILLIYET, 9 January 1987.

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Export Industrialization in East Asian Countries

18070122g Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 2, Mar-Apr 88 pp 66-73

[Article by N. A. Mostovaya: "Export Industrialization in the East Asian Countries"]

[Text] It is now possible to sum up some of the results of export industrialization in the liberated countries which have chosen the capitalist path of development. It has become apparent that export strategy is one of the effective alternatives in overcoming backwardness. The East Asian group of "new industrial countries" (Singapore, Hong Kong [rendered by source throughout as "Xianggang", Taiwan and South Korea) has adhered to this strategy most consistently. Their economic experience and ways of resolving the difficulties and problems which arise are of interest to other liberated states.

An export strategy could not have been carried out here in a relatively "pure" form if there had not been very important preconditions for this. Some of them are more or less permanent in time (the population, geographical position, availability of natural resources), but the effect of others (the availability of an abundance of cheap labor, the foreign policy factor) has changed significantly over a comparatively short period of time. Their conflicting influence has been reflected in the heterogeneity of the export sector and has caused shifts in its sectorial, production-technological, and socioeconomic structure. The export specialization and paths of industrial development have been determined on the basis of them, in combination with subjective factors (primarily the government's economic policy).

The advantages of geographic location are the least changeable prerequisite. They (as well as the sizes of the countries) have had a substantial influence on the nature of the economy, particularly of Singapore and Hong Kong, which have gone through the age-old school of intermediary activity: the first was the central point for trade among India, China, and Southeast Asia; and the second carried out this role (and continues to do so to this day) with respect to continental China. Because of their activity as intermediaries, they became continuously stronger as regional centers, which played an important role in the shift to an export strategy: the skills in selling commodities in foreign markets, the trade network, and the corresponding infrastructure had already been developed (and it is precisely this that often becomes a stumbling block for liberated countries in carrying out an export strategy), and it remained for them only to set up their own export production.

Inasmuch as the countries under consideration lacked sufficient natural resources which could become a source of foreign exchange receipts, the availability of relatively cheap manpower formed the basis for the export strategy. For a long period of time, wages in industry in Asia's "new industrial countries" have remained at a considerably lower level than in Japan, for example (*Table 2*), not to mention Western Europe and the United States. At the same time, there have been little or no differences in the levels of labor productivity. The management of foreign firms in Taiwan's export zones, for example, has noted that the physical productivity of a worker engaged in assembly operations here is no lower, and perhaps even higher, than his counterparts in an American plant.[1] The diligence, industry and discipline of Korean and Chinese workers are well-known, and they also have an initial level of education that is high enough, which contributes to their receptivity to industrial training.

In addition, the activity of trade unions is strictly controlled here, and in Taiwan 's export zones they, as well as strikes, are prohibited in general. Employers in these countries receive additional savings because of the low level of social secuirty. A work week of 48 hours or more is common. A 10-hour work day, a 7-day work week, overtime, work on days off, short vacations, and the lack of unemployment benefits are frequently encountered. Minimum expenditures for wages, as well as a surplus in labor supply, have made it possible to maintain competitive prices in world markets.

Nevertheless, the wage level has been rising gradually here, and to the extent that it has risen, it is more preferable to set up simple labor-intensive production in other developing countries in Southeast Asia. Thus, the expenditures for workers' wages to produce the same quantity of products in the sewing industry were 1.4 to 2.5 times less in Indonesia and the Philippines in the mid-1970s than in the "the Four" countries.[2] In order to retain the positions won in the world markets, it became necessary to increase the skills of workers and technical perosnnel and to train engineers, managers and scientists here. The expenditures for a skilled work force in "the Four" countries are less than in the developed capitalist countries. According to some reports, experimental design work is performed three or four times less expensively in Taiwan than in the developed industrial states.[3]

In social terms, the fact that sizable groups of people from China and Korea who were "most receptive to bourgeois development" had accumulated here by the beginning of export industrialization is also of no small importance.[4] Thus, the influx of emigrants into Hong Kong in the late 1940s was impressive in scope (from 1946 to 1954 the colony's population rose from 600,000 to 2.4 million), and many manufacturers from Shanghai fled here. Their business experience and capital formed the basis for the textile industry here. The various ties (especially commercial and financial) with the so-called Chinese business community (emigrants of Chinese extraction living in the region's many countries) also played a positive role in this regard.

The overall level of economic development of the countries under consideration was an important prerequisite for export specialization. By the beginning of the 1960s it had substantially exceeded the average level in the developing countries of Southeast Asia (See *Table 1* on the per capita income), including the level of development of the production infrastructure. It took shape a long time ago in Singapore and Hong Kong, and during the 1950s and 1960s in South Korea and Taiwan with assistance from the United States and Japan (the projects developed were oriented mainly toward the interests of the "donors"). Later on, the state assumed more and more of the financing to develop the infrastructure. The basic efforts here were directed at developing power generation, transportation and communications. Different types of government and quasi-government organizations whose activity was aimed at mobilizing resources to implement an export strategy were established; considerable attention was devoted to increasing the skills of the labor force and stimulating scientific and technical progress.

Table 1: The proportion of commodities exported and per capita income in "the Four" countries

Countries	Export Quota (in percent)			GNP Per Capita (in dollars)	
	1960	1970	1980	1958	1980
Singapore*	161.8	81.9	176.3	464	4,525
Hong Kong*	74.6	97.4	92.8	275	4,503
South Korea	3.0	15.0	36.6	141	1,534
Taiwan	10.5	29.8	52.1	125	2,250
Developing countries as a whole	15.2	14.3	26.8	90**	944

Sources: UN Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, Vol 1, 1980; UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, 1967; Vol 3, 1974; Vol 1, 1980, p 1; Yearbook of the Republic of China, 1975, 1981; UNCTAD Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics, 1983.

* Export quota taking re-exports into account.

** Developing countries in Southeast Asia only.

Table 2: Average hourly wage rate in the manufacturing industry in Southeast Asian countries, in dollars

Countries	1963	1969	1975
Singapore	0.30	0.30	0.62
Hong Kong	0.16	0.25	0.56
South Korea	0.10	0.16	0.36
Taiwan	0.12	0.19	0.49
Japan	0.43	0.90	3.28

Source: "ASEAN in the Changing Pacific World Economy," Canberra, 1980, p 386.

Political factors have been of no small importance in forming an export strategy and providing it with material resources. The need to strengthen the social base of the pro-imperialist regimes in South Korea and Taiwan required a vast infusion of material resources. In Taiwan, for example, the assistance provided by 1965 amounted to 1.5 billion dollars (not counting military aid).[5] From 1954 to 1968, the influx of foreign capital in South Korea reached 4.7 billion dollars, 3.7 billion of which was received in the form of uncompensated subsidies from the United States.[6] South Korea's orientation toward the U. S.-Japan military-political bloc makes it attractive for foreign investors.

The poliical conditions in Hong Kong, favorable for foreign investments until recently, have changed perceptibly. It is common knowledge that Hong Kong will be transferred to the control of the PRC on 1 July 1997 in accordance with the English-Chinese Declaration. And although the Chinese authorities promise to retain the inviolability of its economic system, the forthcoming changes are arousing noticeable uncertainty in international industrial and financial circles.

* * *

Export industrialization in "the Four" was accomplished in several stages. The first stage (roughly from the first half of the 1960s) may be defined as a transitional period to export industrialization. The development programs of South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan began setting the objective of accelerating economic growth on the basis of rapid establishment and development of export production facilities. (As far back as the 1950s, Hong Kong succeeded in penetrating the markets for consumer goods in the developed industrial states, practically without competition from other developing countries). The second stage (the second half of the 1960s to the first half of the 1970s) involved an accelerated course toward the development of labor-intensive export production facilities, relying on cheap labor; this was a period of chiefly extensive growth. The third stage (from the mid-1970s) was marked by the beginning of thorough restructuring in the export sector and the economy as a whole and the shift to primarily intensive growth.

Implementation of the export strategy was accompanied throughout by an increase in the proportion of exported products in individual export sectors and industry as a whole. Significant diversification took place in the export production facilities. *Table 3* shows the rapid growth of export production during these years in Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan. (Hong Kong continued to remain at a high level in the manufacturing industry over these years.)

Table 3: Proportion of the manufacturing industry output of Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan going for export (in percent)

Country	First Half of 1960s	Second Half of 1960s	1970's	End of 1970s to Beginning of 1980s
Singapore	33 (1961)	—	54 (1973)	65 (1978)
South Korea	6 (1965)	11 (1968)	25 (1975)	45 (1981)*
Taiwan	25	—	—	65 **

Sources: M. Bruch, "Kleinbetriebe und Industrialisierungspolitik in Entwicklungslandern," Tubingen, 1983, p 174; J. Donges, "Die Entwicklungslander als Anbieter industrieller Erzeugnisse," Die Weltwirtschaft, 1971, H. 1, pp 53, 57; L. E. Westphal et al., "Foreign Influences on Korean Industrial Development," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Vol 41, 1979, No 4, p 364; A. Galli, op. cit., p 65.

* Heavy industry only.

** Machine building only.

The trade policy of developed countries which limit imports, the protectionism of developing countries, national producers' lack of experience in operating in a foreign market, and the poor quality of many products are obstacles in putting the national commodities of all the countries mentioned on the world market. Before the beginning of industrialization, the predominant direction of the export strategy of these countries was a search for markets which would not be of particular interest to the monopolies in the developed industrial states and where they would not encounter competition from them, that is, markets for the sale of products that are quite scarce and in steady demand in developed countries or are not being produced in other developing states (such as raw silk, knives, and wigs from South Korea, certain precious stones and jewelry items and toys from Hong Kong, and individual types of canned goods—mushrooms, asparagus, and so forth; all these are primarily

simple items which do not require advanced scientific and technical knowledge to produce).

During those years the export sector relied mostly on a local raw material base and did not have the distinct nature of an enclave. Agrarian reforms were conducted in South Korea and Taiwan a decade earlier which gave impetus to the production of agricultural raw marerial for the export sectors. Thus, an important place in Taiwan's exports has been held by canned vegetables and fruits, and imported raw material (cotton, wool) has been used together with local raw material (silk) in the textile industry. South Korean exports have included products of the fishing and rice refining industry, and crude ores have been exported in small amounts.

In the second stage, "the Four" countries began consolidating their position in the rapidly expanding markets for finished consumer goods (especially in Japan). Individual types of labor-intensive production facilities (within the framework of TNK's [transnational corporations]) were shifted en masse to the countries under discussion. In making efforts to stimulate the development of national export production facilities, the state attached particular importance to the attraction of foreign capital, however. Since the 1960s, direct foreign investments in these countries have been expanded, which has exerted considerable influence on the entire sectorial structure of the export sector. Export zones isolated from the local economy, where the basic export sectors have been concentrated, have been expanded. The trend toward use of imported raw materials (primarily cotton) in production has become more and more apparent. Thus from 1973 to 1980, South Korea advanced from ninth to second place among importers of cotton in the world capitalist market, whereas over 75 percent of the cotton came from the United States in the 1970s.[7]

The export production facilities have been undergoing a process of diversification. Thus, along with products of the textile and sewing industry, South Korea has begun exporting electrical machine building products, transportation equipment, various metal products, and shoes. Its share of exports in the manufacturing industry quadrupled in a decade (1965-1975). And although the production of consumer goods has predominated in it, the process of forming export sectors for the production of secondary commodities has been under way.

Even then, Taiwan's manufacturing industry was operating for export to a much greater extent than South Korea's industry. The rapid growth of metallurgy in Taiwan formed the basis for the development of metal working and machine building. It was precisely here that new export production began emerging first of all in the 1970s (household electronics and electrical appliances, high-voltage and refrigeration equipment). The United States is becoming the basic market for Taiwan's exports (previously it was Japan), but Japan is the basic supplier of raw materials.

In Singapore, products manufactured on the basis of complex modern technology occupy a substantially larger position in the export structure because it has been better provided with material and financial resources and the level of economic development is quite high. Technical re-equipment of the manufacturing industry, extensive use of marketing, restructuring of the technical education system, and an increase in the contribution of "the human factor" as a whole have formed the basis for this trend in specialization.

The sectorial profile of Hong Kong's export specialization (textiles, electronics, clothing, domestic appliances, plastic products), the foundation for which was laid as far back as the 1950s, was practically unchanged in the 1960s and 1970s. Intraorganizational ties in the textile and sewing industry were expanded. Development of export specialization was oriented toward intrasectorial restructuring and increased capital intensiveness and science intensiveness in production without substantial changes in the sectorial structure.

In the 1970s (the third stage), important structural changes began to develop in the economic strategy of the East Asian "new industrial countries." Serious obstacles had appeared on the path of the previous direction of export industrialization. It turned out that the unilateral policy of relying on cheap labor in assembly production was short-lived. They began encouraging the production of secondary and capital goods and the development of international services (banking, commercial, and consulting services). Sectors of secondary import substitution (heavy industry) gathered momentum in South Korea and Taiwan, and new forms of international services made their appearance in Singapore and Hong Kong. They began moving certain production facilities (enterprises belonging to foreign as well as domestic capital) from here to other developing countries in Asia, since they avoided payment of taxes and strict currency controls this way, and the head enterprises of the firms remained here and conducted marketing operations.

But the effect on developing countries of a global factor involving many plans—the scientific and technical revolution—became the main consideration in revising strategy. The new factor of the NTR [scientific and technical revolution] and the turning point in market conditions in the world capitalist economy were accompanied by serious reexamination of "the Four's" industrial strategy. Under conditions in which the expansion of exports continued to be the most important strategic objective, the effort to retain and expand their positions in the foreign markets was linked with the need for thorough restructuring of the export sector and the economy as a whole—toward the production and utilization of microelectronic technology. Since the second half of the 1970s, the basic accent in export strategy (retaining the value of labor-intensive export sectors) has been to shift to the establishment and development of more advanced and capital-intensive production facilities, utilizing labor with higher skill. At the same time,

the kind of role played by these production facilities in the structure of the world productive forces being created in the course of the scientific and technical revolution is of considerable importance.[8] Inasmuch as definite production, organizational and scientific and technical experience had been accumulated and the production skills of the work force had increased in these countries during the course of industrialization, there were definite objective prerequisites for a shift to specialization with more complex production facilities, as well as by increasing production efficiency in the "old" export sectors.

Diversification of export production has been taking place now through the base sectors (metallurgy, shipbuilding, the chemical industry). Their establishment has relied upon imports of technology which has come from nearly all the developed countries, and the output produced has been exported to many countries in the Pacific region. The sectors mentioned were developed so dynamically that they soon managed to hold strong positions in the world capitalist economy (for example, the South Korean ("Posco") company has become one of the eight largest steel casting companies in the capitalist world). Although advanced types of items (special steels, for example) are found in their output, it has to be stressed, nevertheless, that the traditional base production facilities, which are not the key ones from the standpoint of establishing advanced productive forces, are predominant. For this reason, their development in the course of the scientific and technical revolution is encountering certain difficulties (in particular, because of the trend of gradually discontinuing the use of traditional metals in favor of light alloys, new plastics, ceramics, and glass).

In the following years enterprises in the advanced "high tech" sectors (production of semiconductors, integrated circuits, fiber-optic cable, and so forth) will also make their appearance. Their proportion in the production structure is very negligible, but it is continuously increasing. These production facilities, as a rule, are closely linked with foreign capital and are subordinate to their interests. Diversification of export production facilities is also taking place through expansion of the range of products and the emergence of new commodities in the export sectors that have already been developed (especially in electronics and the sewing and textile industry) in conformity with current consumer and production demand.

* * *

As the result of export industrialization, the East Asian "new industrial countries" have succeeded in maintaining relatively stable positions in the international capitalist division of labor. They have reached first place in the developing world in the product range of goods exported. Under this indicator, Singapore and South Korea may be grouped with the developed capitalist countries. Thus, in the early 1980s Singapore exported products in 173 commercial subgroups of the International Standard Trade Classification of the United Nations (ISTC), holding first place in the developing world in accordance with this indicator (this is only seven places lower than the United States); South Korea exported products in 151 subgroups.

There has been a substantial shift in the structure of exports; highly technical industrial exports have begun to accompany the traditional exports. *Table 4* shows how rapidly the number of newer and newer groups of commodities have grown, the extent of the shift in favor of advanced science-intensive sectors, and the extensive restructuring that had to be carried out in the export sector of the countries under consideration in order to maintain stable positions in the foreign markets.

The shifts in Taiwan's export structure are similar to those that have taken place in the other countries of "the Four" (Taiwan is not included in the table because of the lack of periodic data on its exports). While foodstuffs made up over 90 percent of the exports in the early 1950s, nearly nine-tenths of the exports were industrial products in the early 1980s. The traditional exports (canned vegetables and fruits and products made of paper, leather, wood, and textiles) made up 42 percent of all exports in 1970. Since the late 1960s, the proportion of metal items and electronics (radios and television sets, sewing machines, calculators, and so forth) has increased, "pushing aside" textiles and clothing in 1983 to become first in export earnings. Computers in the Chinese language, electronic components, video equipment and electronic games have already come into the foreign markets.

The competitive positions of the countries under consideration have been consolidated in the world capitalist markets; three of them (Singapore, Hong Kong and South Korea) held first to third place in 22 commodity groups (the ISTC commodity subgroups) in 1980; this rose to 32 groups in 1984, practically preventing other developing countries from passing ahead in industrial exports.

Table 4: Traditional and specialized exports of South Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong from the 1960s to the 1980s (in percentage of export value) *

Countries and commodities	1962	1968	1977	1981	1984
South Korea					
Traditional exports (fresh fish, rice, vegetables and fruits, raw silk, sulfur, iron pyrite, iron ore and concentrates, nonferrous metal ores, plywood, cotton fabrics)	68.9	33.9	12.2	5.8	3.1
Specialized exports, 1965-1975 (noncotton fabrics, electrotechnical machine building, clothing, other finished products)	2.5	43.8	40.3	38.1	24.1
Specialized exports, late 1970s (ships, footwear, steel, steel plate, television sets, electronic bulbs and microcircuits, office machines, radios)	—	—	15.7	29.7	62.8
Singapore					
Traditional exports (uncured rubber, petroleum products, textiles, machine building, highway transportation facilities)	54.5	52.6	50.4	38.0	32.3
Specialized exports, 1965-1975 (office machines, clothing, small batteries, bulbs, electric appliances)	1.3	11.8	11.8	3.9	8.2
Specialized exports, late 1970's (communications equipment, electronic microcircuits, and so forth)	—	2.8	4.0	15.2	17.1
Hong Kong					
Traditional exports (cotton fabrics, electrotechnical machine building, clothing, footwear, toys, sporting goods)	49.3	51.8	54.2	51.8 (1982)	34.7
Specialized exports, 1965-1975 (communications equipment)	1.9	3.4	6.1	5.7 (1982)	4.5
Specialized exports, late 1970's (radios, electronic bulbs, microcircuits, office machines, watches)	—	—	—	8.4 (1982)	22.3

Sources: UN International Trade Statsitics Yearbook, 1984, Vol 1; UN Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1964, 1965, 1969, and 1977, Vol 1; UNCTAD Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics, 1976; B. Stecher, "Erfolgsbedingungen der Importsubstitution und der Exportdiversifizierung im Industrialisierungsprozess," Tubingen, 1976, p 90.
* Specialized exports include those commodities (in accordance with the International Standard Trade Classification) which made up no less than 3 percent of the value of total exports in the period indicated, with the exception of machine building, where the "threshold" was lower.

While South Korea was the number one exporter in the raw silk and plywood markets, retained prominent places in the markets for a number of consumer goods, and had only begun to penetrate the markets for machine building with relatively simple products in 1973, in the early 1980s it already held well-defined positions in the markets for semimanufactures (ferrous metals and items made with them, tires, and synthetic fabrics) and had significantly expanded the range of machine building products and finished consumer goods for export. And by the mid-1980s it had already advanced to one of the top three for three subgroups of industrial items and semimanufactures and four subgroups of machine building (televisions, radios, trailers, and ships). Singapore became significantly stronger over this period in the markets for complex machine building output, the export of which increased by 3.5 times as much in 7 years. By the mid-1980s, it ranked high in 13 markets for machine building output (including electronic microcircuits, computers, and so forth) and practically left the markets for finished consumer goods. Thus far, Hong Kong remains in first or second place for many of these (cotton fabrics, clothing, toys, bags, and radios). As with Singapore, Hong Kong actively penetrated new markets over these years for machine building output (office machines, sewing machines, radios, tape recorders, transistors, bicycles, and so forth). In the 1981-1984 period it advanced to important positions in the markets for industrial items and machine building output in 27 more commodity subgroups.

In recent years there have been more and more signs that "the Four" countries will succeed in fully penetrating the markets for the most advanced science-intensive output—of the developing countries, possible only for them at present. Thus, South Korea is already selling color televisions, personal computers, and economy cars to the United States, and according to some figures, it will be producing about one-tenth of the video recorders sold in

the world in the mid-1980s.[9] It has not been ruled out that these countries will make progress in mastering microelectronic technology; this will enable them to come closer to the developed industrial countries in this regard—with increasing scientific and technical dependence on them by the developing world as a whole.

Thus, export industrialization in the countries under consideration has encountered considerable difficulties; the directions of this process have been substantially revised. The capabilities for such restructuring have been based on a multiplicity of factors which were combined each time in a new way, in conformity with the objectives and features of the particular stage in export strategy. Owing to their broad diversification and well-defined flexibility, "the Four" have succeeded in meeting international competition. To what extent is it possible for other developing countries to duplicate the experience of the countries under consideration? Time will answer the question.

It was noted in the Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th party congress that "new capitalist 'centers of power' will announce themselves...in the coming decades."[10] The increasing importance of Japan in the world economy is already apparent. It seems to us that we cannot rule out the possibility that the Far East's "new industrial countries" may also turn into a center of international rivalry in the future.

Footnotes

1. Lin Ching-yuan, "Industrialization in Taiwan, 1946-1972," New York, 1973, p 145.

2. "ASEAN in the Changing Pacific World Economy," p 386.

3. NEWSWEEK, New York, 12 March 1984.

4. "Razvivayushchiyesya strany: ekonomicheskiy rost i sotsialnyy progress" [The Developing Countries: Economic Growth and Social Progress], Moscow, 1983, p 60.

5. A. Galli, "Taiwan: konomische Fakten und Trends," Munich, 1980, p 127.

6. Sovremennaya Koreya" [Modern Korea], Moscow, 1971, p 365.

7. "UN Yearbook of International Trade Statistics," 1974, Vol 2; 1981, Vol 2.

8. See "Rzvivayushchiyesya strany v sovremennom mire: yedinstvo i mnogoobraziye" [The Developing Countries in the Modern World: Unity and Diversity], Moscow, 1983, p 146.

9. BUSINESS WEEK, 23 December 1985.

10. "XXVII syezd Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza. Stenograficheskiy otchet" [The 27th CPSU Congress. Stenographic Minutes], Moscow, 1986, p 37.

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Academy of Sciences Research Plans on Asia, Africa, Latin America

18070122h Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 2, Mar-Apr 88 pp 94-103

[Unattributed article:"Long-Range Complex Scientific Research Program 'The Historical Paths of Development of the Peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America'"; first two paragraphs are footnote to article title]

[Text] Plans for long-range complex programs on the most important, priority directions for the development of science have been worked out for the purpose of combining the scientific potential of Soviet orientalists, Africanists. and Latin Americanists in the main areas for the development of science and coordination of scientific research. The plan being published was compiled by a collective of scientists under the direction of G. F. Kim, corresponding member of the AN SSSR [USSR Academy of Sciences], with the participation of N. Simonii, L. B. Alayev, K. Z. Ashrafin, Yu. V. Vanin, V. F. Vasilyev, K. O. Sarkisov, V. I. Pavlov, and V. P. Nikolayev (all members of the USSR Academy of Sciences Oriental Studies Institute); V. I. Glunin (USSR Academy of Sciences Far East Institute); I. V. Sledzevskiy (USSR Academy of Sciences Africa Institute); and Yu. N. Korolev (USSR Academy of Sciences Latin America Institute).

Remarks and suggestions on the project should be sent to this address: 103031, Moscow, Zhdanov Street, Building 12, Oriental Studies Institute, director of the complex program.

The significance of the area of complex research under consideration is defined primarily by the immense role being played in the modern world by the peoples who have been liberated from colonial or semicolonial dependence that inhabit Asia, Africa and Latin America. The Afro-Asian and Latin American regions include a large number of developing countries that are at a crossroads at the present time, and the question of how their evolution will continue still has not been resolved. In spite of considerable progress in national construction and in the economic and cultural fields, the traditional institutions and forms of social ties and the traditional cultural and ideological complex have not lost their importance. Regardless of the relationship of the model for development—socialist or capitalist—chosen by these countries, they are united by the important economic, social and political tasks ahead of then—putting an end to backwardness and the aftereffects of their

dependent colonial status, strengthening national sovereignty, and the struggle for a new economic system, against imperialism and neocolonialism, and to strengthen peace.

Thus the practical significance of the direction under consideration lies in the fact that it should provide a scientific basis for Soviet policy with respect to the national liberation and anti-imperialist movements, support for progressive regimes, and development of cooperation with the socialist countries in these regions.

The principles of Soviet internationalism infer equal respect for all cultures and equal familiarity with them and assimilation of world culture and the experience of world history as a whole. We have to strive to ensure that the Soviet person is aware that he is heir to the highest achievements of culture not only of the peoples of Europe, but Asia and other regions as well. At present, European material completely dominates all forms of education and training—in schools and VUZes, in the activities of museums, libraries, and the "Znaniye" Society [Society for Knowledge], in Soviet encyclopedias, and in most of the fields of knowledge—in the teaching of history, literature, esthetic education, and so forth. Apart from the customary conservatism and force of inertia in the Eurocentrism that is maintained, the fault lies with the inadequacy of previous study (compared with Europe) of the history of non-European peoples, their spiritual contribution and culture. Orientalists, Africanists and Latin Americanists have a responsibility to the Soviet people to develop the appropriate research. This is the second aspect of practical significance of the area under consideration.

The development of "Third World" peoples is the result of the complex interaction of a number of historical stratifications. Distorted by colonialism and complicated by the need to follow a strategy of "catching up" after winning independence, development of the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America is characterized by its lack of balance and the persistent retention of many different patterns and contrasts in combining advanced and antiquated techniques, ways of life and thinking.

Any scientific analysis of the present is inconceivable without thorough knowledge of history and without taking into account the factor of continuity in the ages and patterns of history. This is especially necessary in analyzing the problems of Afro-Asian and Latin American countries, where the past lives in the present and tradition still relinquishes its positions with difficulty, even experiencing a kind of upswing at times. Bearing in mind that most of the research will be devoted to specific periods of history, orientation is necessary at the same time toward a complex approach to the history of Asia, Africa and Latin America, as to a single, continuous historical process based on assimilation of all the specific historical material that has already been accumulated and that is continuing to be accumulated.

Non-European societies have something in common in the past, in particular, the fact that they have been located outside the region where capitalism made its initial appearance. Compared with Europe, all non-European societies were retarded in their phased formative development to one degree or another by the beginning of the modern era, and they became the object of the European countries' colonial expansion. Only the United States and Japan have succeeded in turning themselves from the objects of colonialism into its subjects. The migrant colonies of Canada and Australia, as well as South Africa, followed a special path of capitalist evolution.

Under conditions in which the colonial and dependent countries are turned into a source for raw materials and a market for the sale of commodities, and then into a sphere for European capital investment, these countries take on additional features associated with the common nature of their historic destinies. An important sign of the similarity in development of countries in these regions has been the conception and maturing of an anticolonial liberation movement which, to the extent that new classes of bourgeois society developed and became stronger and the broad masses of the cities and urban areas were drawn into the struggle, took on the features of national liberation movements, the victory of which marked a new stage in the development of the entire world.

The "catch-up" and unbalanced development of practically all these countries today has been dictated by their colonial or semicolonial status in the past. Being an important feature of their socioeconomic and political evolution, such development requires both profound empirical research as well as theoretical understanding. Thus, it is completely logical and justified to single out the direction cited as one of the basic ones in Soviet historical science.

All the complexities in the structure of modern mankind are not exhausted by breaking down the world into three groups of countries—the developed capitalist, socialist, and developing countries. Along with this division of the world in accordance with socioeconomic criteria, the former limits of civilization determined by history retain their importance and will continue to do so for a long time. Even outdistancing the United States in economic potential, Japan will remain a country of the East. Socialist China also retains specific features which are a consequence of the historical path it followed. Failure to take this into account sufficiently may indicate only that dogmas are accorded more attention than reality.

The scientific research effort "The Historic Paths of Development of the Peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America" involves study of the dynamics of social processes from ancient times to the present. A great deal has been done for this in world science. The history of individual countries and civilizations has been studied

on the basis of a wide range of sources. Several conceptions of the precolonial social system in these countries have been advanced, as well as theories which explain their backwardness, the difficult nature of their bourgeois evolution, and modernization of social consciousness in the postcolonial period. Among these conceptions and theories, which are primarily bourgeois-objectivist, there are also some that are frankly racist and colonialist.

Soviet science has a number of achievements in study of the historic past and present development of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Significant amplification of the facts being utilized and their analysis from the positions of Marxism-Leninism have to be considered an important feature in its development in recent decades. In studying the history of the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, Soviet historians have approached and continue to approach it as part of a world historical process, subordinate to the common laws of human society's development. In conformity with a materialist understanding of history, scientists have developed the conception of mankind's forward—although far from straightforward—movement, a process expressed in the progressive replacement of socioeconomic formations.

An essentially new conception of ancient society in the East has been advanced and substantiated in a number of basic works. Proceeding from the fundamental Marxist thesis on the unity of the world historical process, Soviet orientalists have pointed out a significant typological distinction between ancient Eastern civilizations and an ancient world which has long been considered (and is still being treated in textbooks) as basically slave-owning in nature.

Medieval society in the East, which is viewed in Soviet historiography as "Eastern feudalism" or a state form of feudalism, had significant characteristics as well. A number of types of feudal relationships in the East have been distinguished.

With the advent of the era of colonialism, the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America acquire a new characteristic. "Tertiary" capitalism is superimposed on the typological and civilization distinctions. Its characteristics and the limits of its development have been studied carefully by Soviet scientists, using the classic governing principles of the origin of capitalism, but with the understanding that these principles cannot function under the new conditions as in the past. In this connection, orientalists have advanced the theory of a synthesis of the modern and traditional processes of traditional structures' adaptation to growing capitalism. However, questions concerning the destinies of the periphery of the bourgeois structure, about whether the periphery can give new breath to the world capitalist system after surmounting the difficulties of dependence, or whether the uneven bourgeois transformation of societies in the current stage will aggravate social conflicts to such an extent that selection of a noncapitalist path and an alternative to capitalism will become a historic inevitability for the majority of liberated countries—these problems need further study.

It has to be acknowledged, moreover, that theoretical questions on the specific nature of the historical non-European path have not been elaborated satisfactorily at present.

The basic objectives of research have been a search for the common governing principles of social development. Scientists' attention has been concentrated mainly on the phenomena and institutions that have been common to Europe, on the one hand, and to non-European societies on the other hand. This approach has yielded definite positive results. However, it has not been able to provide an exhaustive explanation of the specific nature of the historical path. And inasmuch as this specific nature has been unquestioned, alternative theories which absolutize the specific nature of the two basic regions and contrast the two paths of evolution—the European on one hand and Afro-Asian and Latin American on the other hand—as incomparable have acquired certain popularity in Marxist historiography both in the Soviet Union and abroad. Absolutization of the specific features of development in the countries of the East and Latin America has been reflected most vividly in the historical conceptions which utilize K. Marx's term "the Asian method of production" to one degree or another.

In connection with the foregoing, it appears that the tasks confronting orientalists, Africanists and Latin Americanists in the forthcoming five-year plans involve a marked increase in the theoretical level of the studies being prepared. We have to develop fundamental scientific concepts on the complexity of the world historical process, develop a theoretical model of the movement of the various contingents, bridge the gap between science and actual processes in the countries under study in the past and the present, and reject the schemes that are speculative and isolated from practice more boldly. The basic themes set forth below have become ripe, and in this sense they are determined by the logic of contemporary development in oriental, African, and Latin American studies and more broadly by the logic of the development of humanitarian knowledge in the USSR. At the same time, the advancement of these themes is an attempt to contribute to the development of Soviet science in a specific area and to a shift in priorities to precisely these themes.

The problem of what is common and special in the development of countries in the region should become the basic theoretical problem for study within the limits of the direction cited. The question of the correlation of common sociological laws and specific historical laws and governing principles in Marxist science has not been worked out sufficiently. As already noted, Marxist thought in the field of history in recent decades has been devoted mainly to demonstrating the applicability of

common sociological laws and to demonstrating the unity of mankind and the basic stages in its history. At the same time, what is European has sometimes been taken to be what is universal and common to all mankind. Searches for European forms and institutions and the phenomena of economic and sociopolitical activity and culture in Eastern societies have become synonymous with searches for what is general and common to all mankind.

It follows from what has been stated that working out the problems of formative regions or of regional, civilization, and continental paths of socioeconomic, political and cultural development is one of the most important tasks in historical materialism and one of the fundamental tasks for all regional research.

Lately it has become fashionable to contrast the formative and civilization approaches to history. Some persons see a definite threat to historical materialism in this. Meanwhile, these two approaches can and should supplement each other as synchronous and diachronous approaches, as a combination of the stages of development common to mankind and the specific historical paths of development in these stages.

The mechanical transfer of the governing principles brought to light in the materials of European countries or—at present—in the materials of developed countries to other areas of civilization makes for a distorted understanding of the historical process and is fraught with serious political miscalculations. This thesis is also correct with respect to the problems of building socialism in non-European countries. The experience accumulated by Asian and Latin American socialist countries is extremely specific, unique, contradictory in many respects, and not unequivocal. It provides an abundance of material for new general conclusions and is of immense theoretical importance. In particular, this experience is important for the countries which have chosen a socialist orientation or which are standing at the crossroads.

The transition by a number of backward countries which have their own specific civilizations to the path of socialism is a lengthy and difficult process. The low initial level of development in the economic, political, and cultural-ideological fields, in national relations, and so forth; the lack of organization and passivity of the masses and their attachment to tradition; their distrust of everything new and unknown, which brought them only the burden and aggravation of exploitation for centuries; and the lack of professional leadership of certain parties—all this has contributed and is continuing to contribute to delay and distortion in the process of building the foundations of socialism.

An important theoretical problem which arises in this connection is the problem of "bypassing" the capitalist structure or a major stage of this structure. "Bypassing" a stage of evolution is theoretically impossible in all other natural evolutionary processes. Consequently, advancement of the thesis of "bypassing" is linked with a more clear-cut division of the global and country levels of the historical process and with understanding of the qualitatively different role of the external factor in shaping the historical path of a region or an individual society. In addition, the "bypassing" of the phased formation stage in the history of a society, even under the influence of an external factor, involves large expenditures and is far from always carried through successfully; many countries still go through the stage being "bypassed" anyway, although in weakened or distorted forms. In any case, it is clear that this problem requires fundamentally innovative and unbiased methodological study.

The methodological problems of what is common and special in the current five-year plan and the beginning of the next plan are reflected in the following planned themes:

Oriental Studies Institute, AN SSSR:

—History of the East from ancient times to the present (6 volumes);—The state in countries of the Ancient East;—The social protest movement in traditional societies of the East;—Important theoretical problems in the history of Japan;—The history of Japanese culture (modern times and today);—What is common and special in the socialist development of Asian countries (the transitional period) (the Economics of the World Socialist System Institute, AN SSSR, will also take part in developing this theme); and—Revolution and reform in the social development of Eastern countries.

Far East Institute, AN SSSR:

—The traditions and political culture of China.

Latin America Institute, AN SSSR:

—Problems of the transitional period in Central American and Caribbean countries.

Africa Institute, AN SSSR:

—The contemporary history of Africa; and—Capitalism in Africa: its origin, contradictions, and limits of growth;

The Oriental Studies Institute, AN SSSR, proposes that the following themes be studied over a longer term:

—Multiple socioeconomic structures in the East in ancient times, the Middle Ages, modern times, and currently;—Typology of the origin of feudalism in the East;—Phased formation characteristics of the nomadic societies of the East in ancient times, the Middle Ages, and modern times;—The origin of Japanese capitalism; and—The Meiji revolution and problems in Japan's formative development.

The Africa Institute, AN SSSR intends to study the following themes, among others, over the 13th and 14th Five-Year Plans:—The common and the particular in the evolution of social structures in African countries (comparative historical analysis of regional and intraregional types).

An important objective of scientific research work by the collectives of scientists of the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Oriental Studies, Africa Institute, and Latin America Institute in the 13th and 14th Five-Year Plans will be research in extensive historical materials on the theoretical problems of economic, social, political, national and cultural construction in postcolonial societies in the East, Africa and Latin America. The results of the research on individual countries and groups of countries will form the basis for a generalized work on the typology of postcolonial development.

The creative group developing the scientific direction cited proposes that preparation for the publication of a collective work devoted to the governing principles of the shift from capitalism to socialism, using materials on all socialist countries, as well as by taking into account the negative experience of a number of socialist-oriented states, be begun in the 13th Five-Year Plan using the resources of the USSR Academy of Sciences' Oriental Studies Institute, Africa Institute, Latin America Institute, Far East Institute, Economics of the World Socialist System Institute, and the History of the USSR Institute.

Man in the history of non-European societies is one of the most important components of the methodological theme of what is common and particular, examined above. The importance of the human factor is making itself felt more and more strongly, not only in culture in the narrow sense, but in economics and politics as well. Historians also are becoming aware of the vital importance of this factor to a certain extent.

A great deal has been done for study of the evolution of socioeconomic systems. Historians—orientalists, Africanists and Latin Americanists—are oriented much less strongly in matters of cultural traditions and spiritual life in general. When we speak of preserving the past in the present, we do not mean slave-holding or feudal relationships, which have either disappeared or play an extremely insignificant role. A much heavier burden of stagnation and conservcatism is carried by the consciousness of modern man in the East—the burden of a religious world view, fatalism, and social passivity.

The process of the masses' increasing consciousness in the East is obvious—progressive ideas are gaining more and more popularity. But the scope of this process should not be exaggerated. The many scientific and political errors permitted in assessing the situation in the East have usually resulted from moving ahead too fast, "compressing" the stages of historical development, and unintentionally overstating the extent to which the broad masses of people have been "brought up to date."

It is especially important to study the evolution of the masses' religious consciousness. A great deal has been done lately for the study of Islam as a religious-social system and the history of Islam as an ideology, although far from everything has been accomplished in this respect. Other religions of the East which are no less important than Islam are still being studied inadequately, in a dissociated and amateurish manner. Study of the Buddhist orientation must be reinforced organizationally, and research on Hinduism, Sikhism, and Far East philosophical-religious systems must be expanded.

The theme cited is not advanced as culturology, although it makes provision for the close relationship between the study of history and culturology and social psychology. The course of this theme is marked by study of the role of living and embodied labor in the system of productive forces in the East; relationships between the individual and the community and the person and the state; the relationships of an individual in Asia, Africa, pre-Columbian America, and Latin America to the world, to progress, and to time; and characteristics of his reactions to the world around him, particularly forms of social protest, the evolution of consciousness, and so forth.

Thorough exposure of this theme presupposes the need to expand the study and publication of sources and ancient and medieval works by scientists and writers, and source study in the field of modern and contemporary history as well.

The Oriental Studies Institute AN SSSR is planning the following themes in connection with this problem for the current five-year plan:

—Characteristics of reproduction in the traditional societies of the East;—The contemporary East: the countryside in the formative process;—Social and class structure of countries in the foreign East;—Nationality-state integration in the liberated countries of the East (the IV AN GSSR and IV AN AzSSR [Oriental Studies Institutes of the GSSR and AzSSR Academies of Sciences] will also take part in the development of this theme); and—Religion and secularism in social thought and the political struggle in countries of the East (the Oriental Studies Institutes of the Georgian, Azerbaijan, and Tajik SSR Academies of Sciences will also take part in the development of this theme).

In the long term up to the year 2000, it is necessary to make provision for themes which reveal the many-sided characteristics of traditional consciousness in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, which will make itself felt for a long period of time.

The economic, political and cultural contacts and reciprocal influence of civilizations and cultures in the history of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America: This problem could also be called "The role of exogenous factors in history." Like the preceding one, it serves as a specific elaboration of the methodological problem

which was brought out by the first one. Mankind does not develop uniformly, the various ethnic groups develop civilizations that are different from each other, and the spread of cultural values or the negative effect of the more backward cultures substantially modify the evolution of practically all societies.

These influences have played a very important role in the history of the non-European world. The Middle Eastern civilization has an exceptional role in the history of all mankind. India's influence on Central Asia, China, Japan and Southeast Asia and China's influence on Korea, Japan, Vietnam, and other countries—these are all processes which are of vast significance not only in the history of the countries concerned, but the history of the world as well. The expansion of world religions in Asia and Europe is in the channel of these influences.

The cultural opposition and reciprocal influence of East and West has been acquiring more and more importance. The problem of the subordination of the non-European world to Europe—the political, economic and cultural world, the problem of struggling against this subordination and discarding it, the problem of the influence of this gigantic struggle on both sides, and the problem of the synthesis of West and East—all these aspects in analyzing the world process are now timely in scientific and political relationships and serve as an arena for a fierce "three-sided" struggle—among imperialist, progressive, and local chauvinistic historiographies.

It should be acknowledged that these problems have been studied extremely inadequately in Soviet science lately, although the logic of extending an ideological struggle itself should place these questions among those that most timely. In particular, the theme cited above—contacts between civilizations and cultures—will be the topic of the next International Congress for Asian and North African Research in Ottawa in 1989.

The Oriental Studies Institute AN SSSR is planning the following themes for research on the problems cited for 1986-1990:

—The ancient East and the traditions of antiquity and the pre-Christian era; and—Central Asia in ancient and medieval times;

"The history of colonialism," which would combine the efforts of the academic institutes for oriental studies, Africa, Latin America, and general history, is suggested as the theme for an overall fundamental work over the long term in this area. The traditional focus for the study of colonialism (the formation of empires) will be supplemented by a new one in this work—the study of colonial societies as a special ("combined," "synthesized") type of social organization. The study and exposure of colonial policy, that is, basically those objectives which the colonizers set for themselves, should be supplemented by illustration of the actual results of colonialism for the colonies, semicolonial formations, and the centers of empire.

The difference between capitalism and preceding formations is that it creates a world system in which a dichotomy not only is developed between the center and the periphery, but it is reproduced in each of the subsequent stages. Colonialism has to be viewed as a mechanism for the development of capitalism as a whole, as a mother country-colony system. It is clear that the function of colonies in this system was not only a passive one; their role cannot be interpreted simply as the role of sources of raw material and material assets being pumped into the mother country. The outflow of population to the colonies, which created a demographic situation favorable for industrialization in Europe, was no less important for the formation and development of Western capitalism. At the same time, the entire economy of the colonies was not bound rigidly to the mother country and the world capitalist economy by any means. Processes of synthesis between colonial and precolonial structures were taking place in the colonies, as a result of which that vast socioeconomic structure which is now usally called "traditional" was formed.

Such a multivolume work, based on a large amount of factual material and having ideological emphasis at the same time, will be an important contribution not only to science, but to the process of regeneration and overcoming the past which is now under way in the Afro-Asian and Latin American world.

The Oriental Studies Institute AN SSSR plans to develop the following fundamental themes for thr 13th and 14th Five-Year Plans:

—The East and the initial accumulation of capital in Western Europe;—The East and the industrial revolution in Western Europe;—The transformation of traditional structures in the East into modern ones;—The formation of bourgeois nations in countries in the East under conditions of colonial and semicolonial dependence; and—The origin and development of bourgeois nationalism in colonisl and semicolonial countries in the East; the features and stage of development of national liberation movements.

The relationship between Asian, African and Latin American countries and Russia and the USSR and the influence of Marxism and the world socialist system on these countries. There is no question about the timeliness of this problem. It will be elaborated in complex works (the current five-year plan):

Oriental Studies Institute, AN SSSR:

—Historical and cultural contacts between the population of southern regions of the USSR and the peoples of the foreign East in ancient and medieval times;—A

series of works: Russia and Eastern countries and the USSR and Eastern countries;—Russia in international relations in Central Asia from the 19th century to the beginning of the 20th century; and—Russia and India in the 19th and early 20th centuries. A collection of documents.

Far East Institute AN SSSR:

—Russian-Chinese relations in the 18th century, Vols 1 and 2;—Russian-Chinese relations in the 19th century, Vol 1; and—The diplomatic stereotype of the Russian state in the Tsin empire.

Over a longer term (the 13th and 14th Five-Year Plans), the Oriental Studies Institute, AN SSSR, is planning a basic work on a major theme: "The historical experience of mutual relations between the USSR and socialist countries in Asia (achievements, problems, and prospects)."

The Far East Institute of the AN SSSR will continue work to prepare a series of documentary collections on the theme "Russian-Chinese relations in the 19th century" (Vols 2 and 3) for publication during the 13th and 14th Five-Year Plans.

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All the themes cited above touch on problems which are the object of idoelogical battles. Complete critical use of the results of foreign research is unquestionably necessary. At the same time, the criticism of bourgeois, petty bourgeois, and revisionist conceptions of history and the vulgar notions about Marxism will be an integral part of all the works by Soviet historians that have been mentioned. Serious attention should be devoted to criticism of the bourgeois apologia for colonialism and the conceptions which postulate the thesis of the inherent immobility and stagnation of Eastern societies.

Taking into account the growth of bourgeois and petty bourgeois nationalism in a number of countries in the modern East, criticism of the nationalistic, "nativist" conceptions which absolutize and idealize the originality and specific character of Asian structures will unquestionably be of considerable scientific and political significance in the coming decades. In speaking of the need for criticism of bourgeois theories, it should be taken into account that theoretical thought in the field of history has not been standing still in the West. The qualitative development of the individual disciplines of cultural anthropology, social anthropology, economic anthropology, sociology, social psychology, and culturology, the extensive use of individual tenets of Marxism in these fields, and the independent elaboration of a number of theoretical theses by Western Marxists and neo-Marxists—all this has created a huge bank of ideas directed at the multidimensional study of mankind. A situation has developed in which Soviet social sciences lag to a certain extent behind achievements in the corresponding fields in the West. As a consequence of this, the opportunities for offensive activity by Soviet scientists in the world ideological struggle have been substantially narrowed at present. In many cases, in encountering new ideas, they react to them only from the positions of whether they are consistent with Marxism or not, and in a number of cases, with a dogmatic interpretation. Such a position is defensive and conservative. Thus, the "importing" of individual elements of advanced Western bourgeois science—although it is often a hostile rival—on the "Third World" is becoming necessary for the study of certain aspects of the themes formulated above.

Disregard for the questions set forth above provides the enemies of Marxism with the opportunity to ascribe economic "one-sidedness," an unwillingness to study cultural and spiritual phenomena, and being "locked" in a formative approach to historical materialism. One of the fundamental tasks of Marxists is finding a theoretically verified relationship in the actions and interactions of all the important factors in history, taking into account that the focus of all social relationships—economic, political and cultural—is the human personality. Thus, the interaction of domestic science with foreign science should be dialictical and considered.

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Themes involving the study of countries are fundamentally important in working out the program outlined. They determine the level of science and serve as the basis for summarizing work. Selection of the study of Japan as a subject field is related to the fact that the governing principles and features of a certain type of historical-formative and cultural-civilization development are graphically traced in the example of Japan. Research on the Japanese example of a unique synthesis between modern and traditional structures is of considerable scientific and methodical importance.

Work on the research and publication of sources has also been planned.

The long-range complex program has been based on the logic of developing science. It has not been provided with the personnel, however. Mastery of new specialties and marked reinforcement of the culturological and sociological fields in history are required, as well as the replacement of personnel who will leave active scientific work during this period because of their advanced years. In order to carry out the tasks being outlined, it is necessary to expand the training of specialists in historical subjects. The Oriental Studies Institute of the AN SSR, in particular, needs to expand the admission of graduate students and scientific research workers for historical problems (17 or 18 persons for each of the three five-year plans under consideration). A corresponding extension of admissions for graduate study in

history is also necessary for the Africa Institute, the Latin America Institute, and the Far East Institute of the AN SSSR and the oriental studies intitutes of union republics.

Steps must be taken to maintain those disciplines and areas which are represented by an extremely small number of specialists. The organization of oriental studies education must be restructured for the proper replenishment of personnel. The quality of education received by oriental studies specialists in higher school has declined in recent years. The Institute of Countries of Asia and Africa attached to the MGU [Moscow State University] is basically training translator-reviewers. The oriental departments of universities in Tbilisi, Yerevan, Baku, Tashkent and Dushanbe are basically providing a philological education. Only the oriental department at the LGU [Leningrad State University] is performing the task of training specialists who may be used in scientific work. Serious restructuring must be carried out. Training of specialists on the Far East must be expanded in the MGU history department; the ISAA [Institute of Countries of Asia and Africa] under the MGU should train specialists in medieval and modern history in addition to practical workers. The oriental departments in other universities have to be transformed into departments specializing in history and philology which provide sound preparation in history and country studies. The oriental departments of universities in union republics should train specialists in accordance with a given republic's capabilities. Higher educational institutions have to attract more specialists from the academies of sciences and other scientific institutions on a detached-service basis for the purpose of this restructuring. The practice of holding two positions with the proper administrative and social supervision should be expanded considerably, especially in those areas for which there are few specialists. All bureaucratic obstacles on the path of developing collaboration between scientific and educational institutions have to be eliminated.

Considerable expansion and qualitative restructuring of foreign contacts are necessary: the organization of regular work in foreign archives, participation by foreign scientists in archeological expeditions and sociological field surveys, participation by historians in national forums in the countries being studied, and coauthoring works with foreign scientists.

Work on the publication and translation of memoirs should be expanded. Not only the replenishment of highly skilled personnel but the expansion of printing capabilities are of considerable importance in this regard.

Work on the themes set forth above, as it is clear from their substantiation, is impossible without close contact with the representatives of other social disciplines—economists, philosophers, jurists, sociologists, and so forth.

The solution of fundamental problems in the science of oriental studies is also impossible without close coordination and division of work among the country's oriental studies centers. Participation in carrying out the long-range complex program by scientists from the republics in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus, where oriental studies were developed a long time ago, is important, especially in connection with the increased attention given to the traditions and spiritual life of peoples in the East and their culture. Oriental studies specialists of republics whose peoples are culturally and historically close to the peoples of the foreign East can make an invaluable contribution to extend collective understanding of the historical process in the East.

Certain specialization of scientific centers exists in practice. The Oriental Studies Institute of the AN SSSR in Moscow conducts research on all periods of history for all regions of Asia and North Africa, but it also has a definite specialization: common problems of the historical process in the East, contemporary history and problems of the present day. The Leningrad branch of this institution specializes in the study and publication of memoirs and in research on ancient and medieval history and the history of culture. The greatest accomplishments of orientalists in the Transcaucasian and Central Asian republics relate to study of the history of peoples in the Near and Middle East who live in adjacent countries. The study of India is also represented in Uzbekistan. Orientalists in the Kirghiz and Kazakh republics are studying the problems of peoples living in adjacent regions of China. Scientists in Ulan-Ude give strongest emphasis to study of the problems of the Tibetan-Mongolian culture. The history and economy of China and Japan is the basic field of research for orientalists in the Far East. A good school for the study of Sanskrit has been developed in Tartu. This natural specialization, or one which has taken shape historically, requires further improvement and refinement. Tradition does not have to be broken to meet with false and unneeded universalism, in spite of the materials and personnel that are available. There is no need to neglect philology and the study of manuscripts and medieval documents in such cemters as Leningrad, Tashkent, Dushanbe and Tartu for the benefit of subjects that are more timely in a purely political sense.

Much broader use has to be made of the intellectual centers situated outside Moscow in carrying out the complex programs, and scientific research workers from oriental studies institutes in union republics should be enlisted in work on themes such as collective monographs, and so forth.

Improvement in work organization, concentration of personnel on the most important themes that are timely in a scientific sense, and cooperation with specialists in union republics and VUZes—these are important aspects of the work to ensure that the long-range complex program is carried out.

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Conference: Eastern Countries' Economic Problems in Mid-1980s

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[Report by V. N. Lavrentyev and V. M. Nemchinov on conference of scientists held at the USSR Academy of Sciences' Oriental Studies Institute in May 1987: "The Scientific Conference 'Eastern Countries' Economic Problems in the Mid-1980s (New Trends)'"]

[Text] Scientists from the IV AN SSSR, IMEMO AN SSSR, Institut Afriki AN SSSR, IEMSS AN SSSR [the USSR Academy of Sciences' Oriental Studies Institute, World Economics and International Relations Institute, Africa Institute, Economics of the World Socialist System Institute], the NIISI AN SSSR (Academy of Sciences scientific research institute, specialization not determined], and representatives of a number of other scientific research institutes, VUZes, and practical organizations in the country took part in a conference held in May 1987 at the Oriental Studies Institute. The conference participants devoted their main attention to analysis of a number of general and specific aspects of liberated countries' economic development under the conditions of the shift by the centers of the world capitalist economy (MKKh) to a new system of scientific and technical productive forces, as well as to discussion of a theoretical model of the origin and development of capitalism in the East.

In opening the conference, *A. I. Dinkevich,* (Oriental Studies Institute) stressed that research on the world economic situation in the 1980s, including on the periphery of the world capitalist economy, which in many respects is not comparable with any situation in the past, is necessary not only to understand the current condition, but the prospects for development of the Eastern countries as well.

The world capitalist economy at the beginning of the 1980s is characterized by a deep cyclical recession and intensified structural crises which have exerted considerable influence on the entire course of reproduction both in the center and on the periphery. The decline in the economic growth rates in the liberated countries and the intensified deformation of their economic and social structure demonstrate how thoroughly the periphery has been incorporated in the world capitalist economy. In this connection, we have to take into account both the important shifts in the material basis for the movement of cycles in the centers of the world capitalist economy as well as the fact that the developing countries, being an integral part of that economy, have thereby been turned into organic integral parts of the reproductive process on an international scale. As far as the movement of fixed capital is concerned, the internal material preconditions for a cycle take shape only in the large and medium-sized countries which are capable of establishing national full-sector reproductive complexes for themselves. The overwhelming majority of "Third World" countries (75 to 77 percent), which are represented by small states, have the kind of resource potential at their disposal which rules out the possibility of developing reproductive complexes.

The reproductive process and the structural reorganization of the economy in the centers and on the periphery are carried out on different technical grounds. In the centers, it is a model based on the NTR [scientific and technical revolution], and on the periphery it is a model which embodies a shift to a system of industrial productive forces with greater or lesser elements of the new system of scientific and technical productive forces. These differences have been the material basis for substantial deviations in the dynamics of productivity of national labor and overall efficiency, and in the final analysis, of intensification of the periphery's lag behind the centers. The resource model being realized in the liberated countries, in turn, rules out the possibility of resolving the combination of complex problems facing them.

The 1980s have revealed an important phenomenon in the center-periphery system: the increasing structural gap between the level and conditions for integration of developing countries into the system of international division of labor (MRT) and their place in the process of money and loan capital reproduction and the level of efficiency in utilizing foreign credit resources in the national economies. On the national level, this is amplified by further misalignment in economic and social dynamics which are based on the contradictions of a new type of industrial revolution and the social form of its implementation.

A system of distribution functions within the framework of these disturbances on the international and national levels. Thus, while shifts in the proportions of distribution have taken place in favor of the former colonies and dependent countries over the period of independence as a whole, imperialist exploitation of them has been intensified during the 1980s. *G. K. Shirokov* (Oriental Studies Institute) directed his attention to the tendency to narrow the area in which there is a coincidence of interests between capitalist and liberated states. Up to the late 1970s and early 1980s, imperialism as a whole was interested in economic and social progress on the periphery of the world capitalist economy. In the first place, it sought to compensate for the weakening of labor's formal subordination to capital—the consequence of eliminating a constraint outside the economy; secondly, it sought to increase deliveries of mineral raw materials and fuel from the liberated countries; and thirdly, it sought to expand markets for the sale of durable goods by restructuring the consumption fund on the periphery. Realization of these objectives should have contributed,

in particular, to a greater influx of loan capital into the developing countries (from the 1960s to the 1980s, up to 14 percent of the periphery's imports were financed by it). However, the fuel and energy crisis of the 1970s speeded up the shift by developed capitalist states to a new model for production and consumption, in which the rapid growth of science-intensive sectors is a central element. At the same time, their interest in obtaining raw materials from the liberated countries, as well as their interest in locating part of their production facilities in them, declined. This makes it clear why any realistic strategy for development of the liberated states should rely primarily on internal resources and expansion of intraregional ties. It is inevitable that the strategy will be characterized by moderate growth rates and slower structural changes in the economy, compared with the preceding period.

V. M. Kollontay (World Economics and International Relations Institute) agreed on the whole with G. K. Shirokov's thesis on the decline in the imperialist centers' interest in the periphery's economic development. He noted at the same time that, although a considerable number of liberated countries have now realized that it is impossible to implement the old model of catch-up development, a number of states, as well as individual components of economic systems at the country level, are capable as before of reaching the average level of capitalism's development and of occupying "niches" formed in the international division of labor during the restructuring of the West's production organization. The place held by these countries in the system of the world capitalist economy will not be determined by the present structure of their economies; establishment of a flexible and maneuverable economic mechanism, continuing replacement of technological models, and—what is especially important—identification and maximum utilization of the available economic and social potential are necessary now.

R. M. Avakov (World Economics and International Relations Institute) pointed out the transitional nature of the current period of development in the East's liberated countries. Its basic feature is discontinuation of "the independence effect," which acted as a stimulus in speeding up the economic development process until the end of the 1970s. External factors lie at the basis of the disastrous situation in the liberated countries, including Asian ones: their unequal and subordinate position in the system of the world capitalist economy. At the same time, we cannot lose sight of a number of internal factors as well. On the whole, despite the intensified process of differentiation on the periphery of the world capitalist economy, even the liberated countries that have advanced the most are not capable of entering the category of developed capitalist states. In the speaker's opinion, they need a strategy of "judicious development" which is based on the nation's historical experience and its cultural values and which relies upon the resources it has available.

In the view of *N. Z. Volchek* (Leningrad), it is incorrect to explain the slowdown in the liberated countries' economic growth by the unfavorable influence of external factors alone; they have only reinforced this trend. The principle role in the process has been played by internal factors, especially in the structural system, and the industrial and agrarian crises which have characterized the considerable differences among states. Thus, while the agrarian crisis which gripped the production facilities oriented toward both the domestic and foreign markets became apparent in its most acute forms in African countries, the industrial crisis has been most decisive in destabilizing economic growth in Latin America. It is obvious that even with a improvement in the market conditions in the world capitalist economy, the decline in growth rates in countries on the periphery can be eased only when archaic forms of production are modernized and the national economy is adapted to requirements of the scientific and technical revolution. However, in the liberated states themselves, implementation of this policy encounters barely surmountable difficulties, especially under the conditions of capitalist development.

L. Z. Zevin (Economics of the World Socialist System Institute) described the effect of the law of inequality of economic development in the current stage. On the one hand, its features include a tendency toward equalization of the levels of development within the framework of both the world socialist system and the group of developed capitalist countries, and on the other hand, extension of the gaps between the imperialist centers and the liberated states in the nonsocialist area of the world economy. To the extent that the socialist countries' positions are strengthened and their participation in international exchange is activated, the governing principles which are in effect within the socialist community begin to be demonstrated in its relations with the developing countries. One of the basic forms of developing them is by economic and technical assistance to the liberated states. A search for new forms of assistance and reorganization of its structure are necessary conditions for more complete utilization of the many potential opportunities for developing cooperation between the two groups of countries.

The report by *M. S. Modelevskiy* (Oriental Studies Institute) evaluated the prospects for development of the world energy situation in the 1980s and 1990s and the place of Asian developing countries in these processes. In his opinion, while the current trends in energy consumption are maintained, oil will continue to occupy the leading positions in the world fuel and power balance. Moreover, the relatively low prices for liquid fuel and the decline in demand for it remove the disastrous threat of energy starvation and create an opportunity for a shift to new sources of energy which do not contain hydrocarbons throughout a period of longer duration. Considering that most of the stocks of oil are concentrated in the liberated world and the developed states are the principal consumers, the conflicts between these groups of countries will govern the energy situation as a whole.

A number of reports examined the problem of the liberated countries' foreign debt and the prospects for their development which are related to this. *S. A. Bylinyak* (Oriental Studies Institute) noted that the debt crisis is primarily the product of capitalism's structural economic crisis which began in the 1970s and is closely interwoven with the deep cyclical recessions. Moreover, this is an integral part of the structural crisis and one of its manifestations in international currency and financial relationships. The debt crisis has revealed the limited nature of any averaged model of development on the periphery of the world capitalist economy and the considerable differences between countries in the mechanisms of reproduction, factors which determine their basic parameters. Thus, while Latin American states have turned out to be in the epicenter of the crisis, Asian countries, with rare exception, have not experienced such serious economic shocks. There is hardly any doubt that both the developing countries and the imperialist powers are concerned about overcoming the debt crisis. However, if a way out of the current situation is found through export-oriented development of the periphery, this inevitably will lead to intensified competition in the West's markets and an increase in protectionism. Taking into account the fact that the developing countries' markets have turned out to be in an even worse situation, it is doubtful whether expansion of economic cooperation can serve as a real alternative to ties with the developed states.

The statements by *S. I. Shatalov* (Africa Institute) and *Ya. Ya. Melkumov* (Oriental Studies Institute) noted that the payments crisis in the first half of the 1980s was responsible for deep economic reforms aimed at reinforcing market principles in the economy and increasing the efficiency of their economies, in spite of certain costs. The programs for structural stabilization of the liberated countries, including the African countries, have not contained simply a collection of short-term measures to overcome the debt crisis, but they have been aimed at eliminating serious flaws in their economic structure, and in the final analysis, at shaping a new process for economic growth. A selective approach to the choice and implementation of basic objectives, flexibility in the economic system and a high degree of adaptability to changing domestic and foreign conditions should become the principle features in the development strategy of these countries.

Ya. Ya. Melkumov emphasized that the prospects for participation by developing countries in an international division of labor formed on the basis of the use of advanced technologies are directly linked with an increase in their economic potential and effectiveness of policy in the field of education, scientific research, and applied research efforts.

The theme of the report by *B. N. Porfiryev* (NIISI) was on the scope, directions and forms of the scientific and technical revolution's influence on the economic development of liberated countries when they are included in the international division of labor. Analyzing the basic shifts in the areas of production, management and scientific research which have taken place over the past decade in developed capitalist states, the speaker came to the conclusion that there has been a disastrous increase in the extent to which the Eastern countries are falling behind. With the increased expenditures to acquire imported technology, which have become a heavy burden for the national economies, these countries are gradually being turned into distinctive "settling tanks" of obsolete technology.

Yu. N. Cherkasov (Africa Institute) devoted his address to an analysis of the shifts in reproduction in countries on the African continent. He emphasized the deterioration of quality indicators in the 1980s. The increase in the rate of accumulation in a backward social and technical-economic environment, with low labor productivity, which made it possible to speed up economic growth in a certain stage has reached its limit; it has been accompanied by an increase in the foreign debt, underutilized capacities, and intensification of the employment problem. The growing disproportions in the economy have led to intensified misalignment between the modern and traditional sectors and in the final analysis, to a decline in the effectiveness of capital investments. The worsening economic situation in African countries requires acceleration of the restructuring process, changes in the pattern of investments in order to increase their yield, and reorientation of economic policy to a more flexible use of centralized state regulation and market stimulus measures. In describing the situation in the southern part of Africa, Yu. N. Cherkasov noted that the economic sanctions adopted in recent years against the racist regime of the Republic of South Africa are exerting considerable influence, aimed at a reformist chance in the crisis situation, on the economy of this country.

Questions related to a restructuring of the tools for political and economic analysis of developing countries held an important place in the conference's work. Thus, *Yu. G. Aleksandrov* (Oriental Studies Institute) examined the basic factors which are exceptionally important to take into account in elaborating theoretical problems. First of all, the development of capitalism has been speeded up in the liberated Eastern countries in recent years. Secondly, these processes were not foreseen by theoretical concepts in the 1960s and 1970s, and consequently could not be explained by them. Finally, acceleration of capitalist evolution in the East has taken place under crisis conditions, which complicates the analysis considerably. *B. F. Klyuchnikov* (Oriental Studies Institute) stressed that science should be linked with economic practice along with the development of theoretical theses. It appears that rejection of excessive generalizations in analyzing the processes taking place on the periphery of the world capitalist economy and recognition of the importance of their specific regional and country nature should be necessary conditions for this. Thus, it is doubtful that a statement on the crisis of

the "catch-up" model can be considered valid as applied to the group of developing countries in the Asia-Pacific region; very high growth dynamics and deep structural changes are characteristic for their economy. Analysis of the rapid capitalist transformation of this region and the development of integration processes in it, factors which have increased its role in the world economy, is impossible without working out fundamentally new approaches and recognizing that geo-economics and geopolitics continue to be realities in modern activity. In this connection, the thesis on the declining role of the liberated countries in the world capitalist economy system and the decline in the imperialist centers' interest in them seems to be debatable.

The underlying emphasis of the address by *V. L. Sheynis* (World Economics and International Relations Institute) was the need for more thorough analysis of the overall structure of the modern world and rejection on this basis of hardened stereotypes in evaluating both the current situation and the prospects for socioeconmic development in the liberated countries. The working outline he proposed provides for an asymmetrical division of global space; under conditions in which the processes of internationalization of economic relations are intensified and the world economy continues to be restructured, a corresponding mechanism of economic growth is shaped which makes new demands not only on the economic structure, but the social structure as well. Individual areas on the periphery which will be "installed" in the world capitalist economy are singled out. The processes cited modify the category of economic independence as a basic priority for the developing countries. At the same time, verification of social relationships and the maintenance of social stability in them increases in importance.

The report by *V. G. Rastyannikov* and *Ye. V. Kotovoy* (both from the Oriental Studies Institute) presented the results of work on the model of Eastern capitalism. In their opinion, the procedure for using political and economic categories in the models for development of capitalism in the East should differ from those used in the "classical" arrangement usually applied for the West. Unlike the evolution of this capitalism, the phase of free competition has been separated out in the development of capitalism in the East. However, this has led not to a "straightening" of capitalism's path of development, but to the formation of a special mechanism for the movement of capital. A system of so-called institutionalized volitional relationships which have performed the function of unique "crutches," compensating for the undeveloped state of the cost levers for its reproduction inherent in capital itself, have begun playing a special role in this mechanism. This type of relationship as applied to capital movement is realized in two ways: in the form of a noneconomic constraint and as a disruptive regulator of the law of value. It is represented as a broad spectrum of institutions which differ in origin, social roots, and the nature of their instrumental influence. Capital's use of such a system of institutionalized structures has been oriented toward the results of capitalist reproduction (profit, capital growth) and toward realization of the basic economic law of capitalism without establishing the very process of production which is adequate for these results. The so-called "disintegrated" form of the multiple-structure system in the countries of capitalistically oriented development is the result of this type of capital movement. The dichotomy of the economic system of developing countries in the East is vividly reflected in the existence of two forms of accumulation which provide for the reproduction of capital. There is the endogenous form, characteristic of the strictly capitalist structure, and the exogenous form, which is realized in capital's appropriation of the bulk of the exchange values created in subunits of the traditional economy, based on reproduction of the most severe methods of exploitation of the immediate producer. The national state has been filling the most important role in the mechanism of accumulation oriented toward the development of capitalism since the time these countries found independence.

A. Ye. Granovskiy and *A. P. Kolontayev* (both from the Oriental Studies Institute) replied to V. G. Rastyannikov and Ye. V. Kotovoy. In A. P. Kolontayev's view, the conception suggested describes primarily the development of a categorical system and its basic postulates must be defined with considerably greater precision. First of all, the economic history of India, for example, indicates passage through the phase of free competition. Secondly, it is not correct to identify disruption of the value proportions of commodity production with deformation of the mechanism of market relationships. The massive base of capitalism could not have developed without the action of spontaneous market forces. The production upsurge in India during the 1960's took place on the basis of them. Finally, devoting attention to the factor of institutionalization is of little use, since in principle, any relationships in society are institutionalized in themselves. In A. Ye. Granovskiy's view, there is no water divide between capitalism in the East and capitalism in the West. On the contrary, a continuous spectrum exists: capitalism of the first, second, and third waves. In this sense, the model described by V. G. Rastyannikov and Ye. V. Kotovoy is applicable to either Italian or Latin American capitalism. As applied to the specific nature of the East, it is sound practice to speak about a different proportion in combining value and nonvalue regulators, replacing the "volition-value" dichotomy with three groups of relationships: value; nonvalue, determined by national division of labor; and volitional relationships.

O. V. Malyarov (Oriental Studies Institute) analyzed the economic role of the state and the state sector in countries of capitalist orientation, stressing that the state-capitalist structure in developing countries is not formative, but functions in a system of two structures: private-capital and state-capital. It is called upon to develop sectors inaccessible or of little interest to private capital, but necessary to the economy, and to regulate

relationships between individual elements of the private capital structure. While a high degree of independence was characteristic of the state sector in the early stages of the colonialist economic structure's disintegration, when the national bourgeoisie was weak and the mechanism of market regulation was undeveloped, its role in the course of capitalist evolution is reduced more and more to maintenance of the private capitalist structure. Thus, by contributing to the capitalist transformation of the economy, the state-capitalist structure is objectively establishing conditions which lead to a weakening of its place and role in the economy.

N. G. Kireyev (Oriental Studies Institute) gave a similar characterization of the transformation of etatist capitalism in Turkey. Under the conditions of the economic and political crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s, the state's economic policy has been oriented to an increasing extent toward development of a system of market regulation. In particular, a number of state monopolies have been eliminated, and laws have been adopted which define the stages and forms of privatization of some of the state enterprises and which encourage the development of processes of production and capital concentration in the private sector. At the same time, the state controls the capital-intensive sectors, the defense industry, and technologically complex production facilities. As before, it plays the leading role in the country's economic development.

Demographic processes are one of the basic factors in Asian countries' social development. According to *Ya. N. Guzevatyy* (Oriental Studies Institute), the reduction that has been achieved in the population growth rates does not mean in practice that the demographic difficulties and the entire range of complicated social problems in most countries in the region will be alleviated by the end of the century. According to a United Nations forecast prepared in 1984, the growth rates of the labor force should even increase. At the same time, the labor-saving model for capitalist industrialization which is being followed in the developing countries is not capable of bringing about the social and demographic transformation of an entire society and of eliminating the dual nature of reproduction and utilization of manpower resources. Under these conditions, the thesis advanced by the United States' delegation to the World Population Conference in Mexico that it is necessary to do away with state management of the national economy and to adopt a "free market" economic system to resolve the developing countries' demographic problems essentially means a path of dependent development with an increase in mass unemployment and impoverishment of the working people.

The report by *A. P. Kolontayev* noted the need for a more positive assessment of the current situation in the East. He stressed that the dualism in economic life which has taken shape in the liberated countries to date essentially serves as a mechanism for development which make it possible to develop a modern capitalist sector while a large cheap labor force is maintained in the traditional sector. The redistribution processes which have become an integral element of this mechanism have made it possible to alleviate the acute nature of social and demographic problems somewhat in the 1980's, compared with the 1970s. Under the conditions of intensified economic differentiation among the liberated countries, a number of them have come near to the level of development, of the centers of the world capitalist economy and have entered a stage of "normal" capitalist transformation.

As A. I. Dinkevich noted in conclusion, the characteristic features of the model for economic growth in the East and the interrelationship of its internal and external factors were discussed for the most part in the course of the conference. At the same time, a number of new theses were advanced, although some of them became the subject of serious debate. For example, it is unlikely that grounds exist for statements about the possibility that the levels of development of all developing countries can be equalized under conditions of the world capitalist economy. It is true, of course, that the previous strategies for development of the liberated countries "are not working," and for that reason a search is under way for new models which respond to the realities of development and which are oriented toward internal resources. However, such a search has taken place in the past as well, but since the developing countries are not in a position to do without external resources, the structural contradiction between the degree of participation by these countries in the international division of labor, their role in the circulation of international loan capital and the ability to efficiently utilize credit resources in the national economies have assumed considerable importance in the 1980s. Intensification of this contradiction has resulted in the currency crisis.

The structural gap maintained between the centers and the peripheries in the world capitalist economy, caused by the various models for development in them, provides an answer to the question about the correctness of catch-up development: the realities of the 1980s do not attest to the crisis of this conception, but to the crisis of the social form of development in the world capitalist economy. Methodologically, several interrelated forms of duality in the internal and external arrangement peculiar to development on the periphery have to be kept in mind. A. I. Dinkevich expressed his disagreement with views on stabilization of the situation in Eastern countries, inasmuch as the fundamental bases for contradictions in their socioeconomic dynamics remain, but the contradictions themselves are being replenished with new content.

As far as the problem of the development of capitalism in the East is concerned, the specific nature of the distinction between two levels of analysis also has to be taken into account: abstract-theoretical and specific-historical analysis. It is doubtful whether there are

grounds for reassessing the spontaneous market relationships and their mechanisms as a regulator of the reproduction process and for absolutization of some single national model for development, and so forth.

The conference emphasized the need for a complex approach to analysis of the categories of economic dependence and the interdependence of economic ties under the conditions of intensified internationalization. The basic problems of the liberated countries' development remain unresolved, and solution of the problems is complicated even further under conditions of the scientific and technical revolution, the policy of economic neocolonialism, and social limitations.

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Iranian Revolution 1978-1979 Reexamined

Previous Analysis of Iranian Revolution Critiqued

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[Critique by S. L. Agayev of article "Analysis of the 1978-1979 Iranian Revolution in Soviet Oriental Studies Literature" by V. I. Maksimenko: "On the Historiography of the Iranian Revolution, 1978-1979"]

[Text] The survey article by V. I. Maksimenko, "Analysis of the 1978-1979 Iranian Revolution in Soviet Oriental Studies Literature" (NARODY AZII I AFRIKI No 3, 1987, pp 162-172) was the first endeavor to conduct historiographic research on the central problems of "one of the century's most far-reaching democratic revolutions" (p 165). This endeavor cannot help but attract the closest attention, especially, as the author correctly notes, since "we have not developed a historiographic tradition of analyzing the Iranian revolution: almost every new point of view is expressed as if the others preceding it, including opposing viewpoints, did not exist." (p 162).

Unfortunately, V. I. Maksimenko's article also raises a number of objections which, if ignored, are unlikely to contribute to a solution of the urgent tasks of further research on the problems of the Iranian revolution, it seems. My personal interest, so to speak, is related to precisely this. To forestall other intentions, I will immediately mention a circumstance of no small importance: of the 16 works on Iranian studies which the author drew upon for historiographic analysis, five (including two monographs) belong to me, and of the 69 references available in the survey, 29 (that is, a little less than half) were made to them, including in cases that were quite inessential, as when certain of my assessments and factual data are interwoven in the fabric of the author's arguments and accounts, for example. At the same time, the lowest number of direct criticisms and rebukes expressed by V. I. Maksimenko are directed at my works. The only grievance of a personal nature (if it may be interpreted that way) is that literature covering the period from 1979 to 1986, my book "Iran v proshlom i nastoyashchem (Puti i formy revolyutsionnogo protsessa)" [Iran Past and Present (The Paths and Forms of the Revolutionary Process)], which was published in 1981 and half of which is devoted to the problems of the Iranian revolution examined by V. I. Maksimenko, was completely excluded from the survey.[1] It is possible in this case that he was proceeding from the fact that he had published a very detailed and complimentary review of it at one time.[2] But this can in no way justify the position of the survey's author, especially as the very questions about the Iranian revolution which are lacking in the works analyzed by V. I. Maksimenko and lead him to the conclusion that "many important aspects of this revolution remain...unexplained" (p 162) or come through as "confounded" questions (p 109), an "open problem" (p 172), and so forth, were asked and resolved to the extent possible in the book cited. The fact that even without the book mentioned, the works of mine which he cites far exceed the volume of work by the other eight authors enlisted in writing the article under discussion can in no way be considered a justification of the author's position.

V. I. Maksimenko sees the objective of his survey article not to provide an exhaustive summarization of the conclusions reached in Soviet literature on Iranian studies, but to meet the need "to more fully identify those new problems" which the Iranian revolution raised for science (p 162). There is no question about the correctness of such an approach in principle, but the author's understanding of the degree and depth of generalization which are sufficient to shed light on the newly emerging problems is particularly important in view of the close interrelationship of these two aspects of historiographic analysis. Just how does V. I. Maksimenko resolve the problem that has been raised?

At the beginning of the survey, the author complains that "yesterday's assessments are often regarded as not being subject to scientific criticism, but to oblivion, and are disregarded as if they had not existed at all" (p 162). As corroboration he cites three "significant examples" of opinions advanced by R. A. Ulyanovskiy in the journal KOMMUNIST in 1982 and 1985 (pp 162-163). Meanwhile, close familiarity with these opinions provides no grounds for a conclusion about their incompatibility within the limits of the conceptual position criticized by the author and the terminology he uses. V. I. Maksimenko prefers to sidestep these limits, however. And what do the examples cited provide to resolve the problem facing the survey? V. I. Maksimenko says nothing about this.

The author directs all subsequent efforts toward recording and grouping together the different assessments by Iranists on key questions such as the nature and causes of the revolution, its principal motive forces, the role of the

Shiite clergy in it, and the prerequisites for defeat of the left-wing organizations. At the same time, the demonstration of the disparity existing in the majority of cases is not accompanied by any extensive commentary, or else it is dispensed with entirely. The danger that the positions analyzed will be oversimplified with this method of analysis requires that the author be particularly strict in selecting quotations and drawing conclusions, with irreproachable accuracy in the parallels and contrasting positions cited.

Unfortunately, V. I. Maksimenko does not always succeed in holding out at the required level. Thus, he examines the positions of various scientists on the nature of the revolution in accordance with the principle of their *rejection* or *use* of any one of three definitions appearing in the literature: "Islamic," "national," and "bourgeois (bourgeois-democratic)." At the same time, the fact that there is a qualitatively different vision of the object being studied when these definitions are used every time, not a mechanical combination of two or all three definitions, is disregarded. The viewpoint of A. B. Reznikov, for example, is set forth as "Islamic" and "national"; mine is "Islamic, and national...and bourgeois (bourgeois-democratic)" (pp 163-164. Nothing is said about which aspect of the revolution is characterized by each of these definitions. And V. I. Maksimenko gives his own opinion at the very end of the survey: "...the 1978-1979 revolution in Iran was *national bourgeois-democratic*" (p 172). He advances this opinion "as a hypothesis which requires factual corroborations that are more well-grounded than those at our disposal" (ibid), although he stated earlier that "the facts of the Iranian revolution serve all points of view equally" (p 165). The question arises: what purpose is served in the survey by simply estsblishing the disparity in the assessments and intensifying this disparity with one more combination?

In addition to the preceding, the author not only oversimplifies my view on the "Islamic" nature of the revolution, but obviously misrepresents it as well. After stating that I had "shaded my position...with a distinction: an *Islamic revolution* (the emphasis is mine—S. A.) 'in form' and 'in content'," he reduced the theses I had set forth to the thesis of "turning the *revolution* (the emphasis is mine—S. A.) from an Islamic one 'in form' into an Islamic one 'in content'" (p 164). But the fact is that in the article quoted by V. I. Maksimenko (as well in certain other works of mine[3]), this refers to the distinction between two phenomena—an "Islamic revolution," which expressed the class-corporate interests of the clergy, and a national revolution, which reflected the spontaneous aspiration of the masses for fundamental social reconstruction. At the same time, both phenomena are considered in the dialectically "complex relationships of antagonism and collaboration" (p 164)—a formula which is declared in another connection in an article by L. Ye. Sklyarov and which is evaluated highly by V. I. Maksimenko, who considers it necessary to contrast our positions, evidently to support the reasoning of his principal thesis, which runs throughout the article: "The works published over the past 7 years reveal their authors' lack of agreement in the fundamental assessments of the subject..." (p 162).

With regard to those individual questions on which the survey's author notes that Iranists are in agreement, he again allows obvious oversimplifications and direct misrepresentations. According to his assertion, "all" Iranists believe that "the clergy appeared as the hegemon of the national revolution" (p 166). Meanwhile, the term "hegemony" is not used in my works, and this refers only to the political leadership. "All the authors, in speaking about the causes of the revolution," V. I. Maksimenko writes further, "devote their attention to the economic disproportions which appeared as the result of forced modernization" (ibid). However, in my published works, the economic disproportions are regarded only as a factor which speeded up the ripening of the revolution's causes, which in my view were rooted in the sharply intensified socioeconmomic and sociopolitical disintegration of the modern and traditional sectors and structures. In this basic question, my view differs fundamentally from that of A. Z. Arabadzhyan in particular, whom V. I. Maksimenko does not contrast with me in this case for some reason, but with A. B. Reznikov (pp 167-168).

It is true that my disagreements with A. Z. Arabadzhyan are noted in the survey, but by no means where they really appear. After first citing a thesis from one of my articles on the reaction of the broad masses to "the path imposed on them" by bourgeois social modernization, V. I. Maksimenko transforms this thesis into the idea of "repudiation" of bourgeois modernization itself (p 166). As the result of such an operation, he contrasts my viewpoint with that of A. Z. Arabadzhyan, who sees evidence in the revolution of *specifically capitalist contradictions"* (the emphasis is mine—S. A.), not for what actually divides us, but in accordance with a boundary that is drawn artificially (the repudiation of capitalism on one hand, and the extension of opportunities for its development, on the other hand; see the same source). The facts are altogether different: while A. Z. Arabadzhyan, as evident from his other works which are not reflected in the survey. concentrates his attention on the "customary" prerequisites for a bourgeois revolution which are formed on a "natural" capitalist foundation,[4] my works, and particularly the 1981 book mentioned above, refer to the clashes of bourgeois evolution inherent precisely in Eastern society, including Iranian society.[5] But all this does not prevent V. I. Maksimenko from stating at the conclusion of his survey that it is necessary to study the most important Iranian problems "not in accordance with the laws 'for capitalism in general' but in accordance with the laws of the Iranian capitalist economy that were cited" (p 172).

In attempting to substantiate this statement, he does not contrast assessments that are essentially incomparable now, but puts them in consecutive order: on the one

hand, the clergy's programs, and on the other hand, the nature of the conflicts which predominate in Iran. V. I. Maksimenko writes: "By operating first with the concepts of 'integrism,' 'populism,' and 'the national line of the imam' and then with the concepts of *'specifically capitalist contradictions' (the emphasis is mine—S. A.), we are watering down living history with stereotyped patterns" (p 171). The definitions of "integrism" and "populism," which are interpreted as claims made for the unity of "the socially diverse Muslim community" and for expressing the interests of "all the people,"*[6] *belong to me, and the concept of "the national line of the imam" is an integral part of the general position held by the former leadership of the Iranian People's Party, which I criticized; the party's policy, in the words of V. I. Maksimenko, was "decribed in a very interesting way in one of the articles by S. L. Agayev" (p 169). We are left to guess which of the two opinions ("watering down living history with stereotyped patterns" and "a very interesting description") expresses the actual point of view of the survey's author. Incidentally, I note that in another instance he allows an incorrect quotation, combining my words with the statement by a historical figure which I quoted (p 170, reference No 61). Though in this case such a method does not involve a serious misrepresentation.*

In considering the question of the motive forces of the Iranian revolution, V. I. Maksimenko is responsible for sheer carelessness. Thus, he categorically contrasts my view (together with that of R. A. Ulyanovskiy) on the lumpens and rural migrants as "the main shock force of the mass movement" with the opinion of A. B. Reznikov, L. Ye. Sklyariv and M. I. Krutikhin, who consider "the initiator, guard and vanguard" of the February uprising to be the aircraft maintenance personnel in the Iranian Air Forces and the armed detachments of the Marxist organization of fedayeen and the Islamic-progressist organization of mojahedin (p 168). In other words, the author voluntarily or involuntarily mixes up the various layers of the questions being studied: on one hand, the revolutionary movement of January 1978 to February 1979 and the uprising of 9-11 February 1979, and on the other hand, the mass motive forces of the entire revolution and the political organizations which declared themselves in earnest for the first time on the eve of the February uprising and during it. Meanwhile, even a cursory acquaintance with my works—those that were reflected in the survey and those that were not—can reveal materials and facts on the February uprising which attest that in this specific matter my viewpoint does not differ from the opinion of the scientists named by V. I. Maksimenko.[7]

The author of the survey, however, passes by the situation mentioned and after "bringing together" the quite compatible positions of R. A. Ulyanovskiy and A. Z. Arabadzhyan (which by no means were advanced by them at first, incidentally), he draws the following conclusion with his contraposition: "The assessments of the motive forces, including the vanguard forces, of the revolution are expressed in the literature being surveyed in such a way that they appear to contradict each other... Both these views seem to be compatible... But even when both ends meet so "favorably" in theory, 'confounded' questions remain after all" (p 169). And a little farther on he repeats: "Questions remain, they are not forgotten, and they require answers..." (p 170).

Let us consider what these "confounded" questions are. There are only two. The first one is "...where did the class might of the organized Iranian proletariat, which found the forces to paralyze the monarchist regime and the country's economic life in the fall of 1978, disappear to after *the victory of the February armed uprising?"* (the emphasis is mine—S. A.) (p 169). I will counter with a question: where did the survey's author find this "class might of the organized Iranian proletariat?" Judging by the reference, in an article by A. Z. Arabadzhyan, whose position V. I. Maksimenko states in this way: "'The most telling blow against the forces of the monarchy' was inflicted by the proletariat of the factories and plants, who played a 'decisive role' in the overthrow of the old regime" (ibid)[8] V. I. Maksimenko reveals the logical conflicts in the way this question is formulated very accurately four pages earlier (p 165), but for some reason he does not define its relationship to the problem of the "ripeness" or lack or ripeness of the Iranian proletariat for the shift to "socialist revolution." He looks for the answer to his question not in A. Z. Arabadzhyan's position, but in my statement on the state of affairs in the left-wing camp *on the eve of the 1978-1979 revolution and during it,* which was characterized by "the absence of any official contacts or tactical alliances, mutual estrangement, and sometimes hostility as well" (p 169), which has absolutely no connection with this question. And right after this he formulates another question, a totally rhetorical one this time: "But is such an answer sufficient today?" (ibid). One page after this he draws an even stranger conclusion: "In hindsight, the Iranian left-wing forces may be *reproached* (my emphasis—S. A.) for their disunity..." (p 170).

However, let us refrain from further commentary and try to find direct evidence in the literary sources cited by V. I. Maksimenko of the groundleesness of the thesis on "the class might of the organized Iranian proletariat." In the works which he drew upon to search for an answer to the question raised, right after the quotation he cited on the state of affairs in the left-wing camp, it is noted: "Naturally, this did not contribute to a solution of the problem common to all the left-wing forces, acquiring a broad national and political base at a time when the clergy was able to utilize the aftereffects of the reformist policy of the shah's regime among the industrial proletariat, which were not overcome up to the end, for their own interests, in particular,"[9] and "the political inexperience and organizational weakness of the industrial proletariat (even smaller in number than the government employees, incidentally)."[10] As far as the oil workers' ability to paralyze the country's economic life is concerned, this capability was determined not by "the class might of the organized Iranian proletariat," but by the

dependence of Iran's economic life on the exploitation of oil resources, well-known to oriental studies specialists, a dependence so strong that it made itself felt even as a result of very inconsistent actions by the Iranian oil workers, who began and soon after lifted a universal strike several times in 2 or 3 months.

V. I. Maksimenko formulates the second "confounded" question in two wordings: "...how was the victors' bloody reprisal prepared and made possible not against the monarchic counterrevolution, but against their comrades in victory?..." (p 169) or "how could it happen that the people's rush toward freedom and the finding of freedom in the revolution were turned into the mass terror of the fanatical mullahs?" (p 170). If the survey's author has not found an answer to these questions in the literature he has surveyed, where the events over many years are described day by day, and often hour by hour, then it only remains to grant him the opportunity "to believe that Islam, by the will of Khomeini and his circle, were magically transformed from an instrument to express the people's will into an instrument of theocratic dictatorship" (ibid). I will note only that the insufficiently thorough analysis of the literary sources involved in the survey cannot be compensated by the obvious strained interpretations of the positions which are criticized, which belong to R. A. Ulyanovskiy in particular (pp 169, 170).

In conclusion, V. I. Maksimenko makes "several brief observations on what appear to the survey's author as typical errors in evaluating the course of the Iranian revolution and the gnosiological roots of these errors" (p 170). In running a few steps ahead, I will note that after making every effort, I could not discover anything "typical" in the "errors" noted, and that by the notion of "gnosiological roots" he means only his own vision (which is far from indisputable) of the methodological aspects of studying the Iranian revolution.

V. I. Maksimenko concentrates his attention first of all on the general theoretical problems of "a revolution from the top." Inasmuch as in Iranian studies literature this concept (as well as the thesis on the class-corporate status of the clergy, incidentally) was first used by me and inasmuch as my diffeences with the survey's author with respect to the interpretation of "a revolution from the top" were brought out much earlier, I consider it necessary to refer briefly to the past history of the problem. In the review of my book mentioned above, V. I. Maksimenko expressed the opinion, to counterbalance the view of "a revolution from the top" as a reform carried out by revolutionary methods, that this is just the opposite, "a revolution with the means of reform."[11] In explaining my position, I noted that each one of these characteristics is correct, depending on the angle of approach of the research, that is, from the viewpoint of the political or the social aspects of the revolution, which may present the correlation of revolution and reform as form and content in this case.[12] V. I. Maksimenko has agreed with me "to a certain extent."[13] In the survey under discussion, he advanced a new and somewhat contrary opinion: "...a revolution from the top is *another reality of revolution"* in which "the revolutionary content is formal, but the reactionary form is substantial," and "this is a reactionary Utopia..." (p 171). How is V. I. Maksimenko himself not to be reproached here by Iranists with respect to disregard for the assessments of yesterday?

Moving to Iran's specific problems, V. I. Maksimenko suggests that analysis not be restricted to a "dialectical pair" in the form of the shah's "revolution from the top" of 1963-1978 and the revolution "from below" of 1978-1979 as "categories of only a philosophical order ('basis,' 'superstructure,' and 'formation')," but that this "dialectical pair" be viewed within the framework of "a conflict...of two Utopian projects": the shah's Utopia of "a great civilization" and the Utopia of universal prosperity within the framework of "an Islamic state," Based on this, he regards the "Iranian outburst of 1979" as "historical retribution for the anti-people, reactionary Utopianism of the leadership of the shah's regime and for that political decay into which the country had been plunged by the reforming energy of a crowned revolutionary" (See pp 169-171). Later two rather new sociological definitions are introduced: "revolution-repression" ("stretched out for 15 years") and "revolution-celebration" ("extremely short in duration"), but at the same time "unrestricted by anything or anyone in its readiness to destroy and take vengeance") (p 171).

I will not focus attention on the fact that these arguments do not correspond to either modern Iranian reality or to F. Engels' basic conclusion: "...*the actual* problems of a revolution are always resolved as a result of this revolution, not the illusory ones."[14] I will note only certain aspects of the problem under consideration in the form in which they follow from the logic of the author's reflections. Taking into account the end results of "the Iranian outburst of 1979," it may be considered as "historical retribution for the anti-people, reactionary Utopianism of the leadership of the shah's regime" by the anti-people, reactionary Utopianism of the leadership of the Islamic regime; as "historical retribution" "for that political decay into which the country had been plunged by the reforming energy of a crowned revolutionary" and what is more, by the political decay into which the country has been plunged by the reforming energy of an "Islamic revolutionary." In actual fact, doesn't it appear that V. I. Maksimenko is identifying himself with the conclusion of A. Z. Arabadzhyan, which he had supposedly rejected, that "the theocracy simply 'took the place' of the shah's dictatorship as the result of the revolution?" (p 165) But what can the definition suggested by the survey's author: "...a revolution-celebration unrestricted by anything or anyone in its readiness to destroy and take vengeance" actually mean? It appears that it is nothing but a mutiny, a rebellion, or the like. But how does the characterization of the 1978-1979 revolution as "national bourgeois-democratic" cited

above conform to these concepts? Well, how did this "revolution-celebration" end in the final analysis? Moreover, in a "revolution-repression" which lasts for 9 years?

One more of V. I. Maksimenko's innovations is as follows: "The predominant force of the revolution can be only the revolutionary class, and not any social group. Hegemony is achieved only when this class has been produced by the entire course of socioeconomic and sociopolitical development. More often than not, we confuse hegemony with the political leadership which (in the absence of a predominant force) can be exercised by the intelligentsia, and the clergy, and revolutionary minorities of a certain type" (p 171). A new group of questions arises: what is the essential difference between hegemony and political leadership? Why only a class, but not a social group? Without geting into a debate, let us remind you only of the need for specific analysis of a specific situation.

In recognizing essentially that a "revolutionary class" in the form of the bourgeoisie or the proletariat was mot "produced" in Iran, the survey author nevertheless suggests that the positions of the Iranian clergy be analyzed no differently than in the context of a *"civil war of the classes* liberated in Iran by the February victory" (ibid). But in such a case we would have to express some relationship to my thesis that the *internal political struggle* which began in the country after February 1979, which resulted from the delimitation of political forces, was a "reflection of the extraordinary diversity of the class structure, a characteristic feature of which was that even an individual social stratum had multiple layers. The incomplete nature of the processes of social differentiation in Iranian society, stemming from the characteristics of its development on the path of capitalism, determined the predominance of group interests, not class interests, in the political arena."[15]

In other cases as well, V. I. Maksimenko does not explain the advantages of the methodological approach which he suggests to the problems of the Iranian revolution, compared with those already adopted in Iranian studies. But then, he points out to Iranists two or three problems which in his opinion "completely slipped out" of their field of vision, although in his own analysis he bypassed a definite resolution of those same problems in several of the works that he surveyed. This refers to the problems of "the state and revolution" and the different manifestations of the class-corporate status of the multiclass extraction and social ties of the Iranian clergy (p 171)[16] And in objecting to "the method of projecting the result (of a theocratic dictatorship, for example) on the entire process preceding it," V. I. Maksimenko attributes the use of this method to "many authors" (p 172) when he obviously means A. Z. Arabadzhyan[17]; arguing with him several pages above, he suggested that "things be called by their own names" (p 165).

In conclusion I can only state with regret that in spite of individual observations that are quite accurate, it did not turn out to be a historiographic analysis of the Iranian revolution in general and on the whole. As far as the "new questions" raised in the survey are concerned, they appear to be no more than a deviation from the author's old orientations, but much more profound.[18] All the other theses of the article under discussion—a graphic corroboration of the exceptional difficulties of historiographic analysis, turned out to be beyond the power of even a talented scientist, which V. I. Maksimenko unquestionably is, to master. It is a pity that his survey, in my view, not only does not accomplish the task that was set and not only does not provide any substantial assistance to Soviet Iranists, but in certain respects it may even misinform the oriental studies community.

Response to Critique

18070122j Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 2, Mar-Apr 88 pp 205-211

[Response by V. I. Maksimenko to S. L. Agayev's critique of the former's article, "Analysis of the 1978-1979 Iranian Revolution in Soviet Oriental Studies Literature": "Response to S. L. Agayev"]

[Text] S. L. Agayev's response to my survey article[19] prompts me to continue the discussion that has been begun. Inasmuch as my esteemed opponent asserts that the work mentioned "does not provide any substantial assistance to Soviet Iranists" and "may even misinform the oriental studies community," I consider it necessary to identify the points in our differences more precisely and pointedly.

I want to agree with one reproach right away. I really did not reflect S. L. Agayev's contribution to analysis of the Iranian revolution to the full extent. It is also true that this contribution is voluminous, and according to S. L. Agayev's estimates, it is "significantly" in excess of the overall volume of work by "the other eight authors" used in the survey.

The implication of the reproach is different, however. The survey had a clear objective—"to more fully identify those new problems" which the Iranian revolution raised for science, taking into account, as I wrote, that "many important aspects of this revolution continue thus far to be debatable and even unexplained."[20] In quoting this sentence, S. L. Agayev left out the word "debatable." And not accidentally. It turns out that after certain questions "had been asked by him and resolved to the extent possible," nothing debatable is left for him. And this claim that slipped into my opponent's response that his conclusions are indisputable is the first thing that we cannot agree on.

S. L. Agayev agrees that "a historiographical tradition in analyzing the Iranian revolution has not taken shape," that different points of view do not simply contradict,

but disregard each other, and that "disparity" predominates in them, but at the same time, he does not understand "the goal served by...the simple statement of disparity in evaluations." I will explain: until assessments and hypotheses are objectively argumentative, until they have been compared and introduced into a circle of coherent arguments and counterarguments and form a single field for scientific debate, the movement of thought in science will not result.

S. L. Agayev will object that his last books on Iran were not academic works. True. But their important value is that by being practically the main source of information on Iran before and after the revolution for the general Soviet reader, they successfully combine liveliness, vivid presentation of the material, and an absorbing account with a statement of important theoretical problems (revolution from the top, Bonapartism, democratic capital, and so forth). These popular works will not take the place of historical research, of course—this is another genre. But these books, I believe, can serve to overcome those "exceptional difficulties of historiographic analysis" to which S. L. Agayev refers, and which really exist—in a number of other works. If only to deny myself and others the privilege of indisputability and not to measure what has been written by volume, but to conduct a discussion, as my opponent suggests, on an understanding of the "degree and depth of generalization which are sufficient to shed light on the newly emerging problems." And this is what the discussion will be about.

I am leaving a number of the points touched upon by S. L. Agayev basically outside the limits of discussion now (the actual or imaginary contradictions in R. A. Ulyanovskiy's position, the correctness of approaching Khomeini's slogan of "Islamic revolution" as a scientific concept, and so-called Eastern capitalism) in the hope that we will continue our debate free from the burden of a priori indisputed truths. First of all, I will touch upon those two questions which S. L. Agayev quite correctly singles out as the principal ones asked in my survey.

The first one: "Where did the class might of tbe organizaed Iranian proletariat disappear to after the victory of the February armed uprising?" And closely related to it: Who missed a unique opportunity (if one really existed, as some Soviet Iranists have assumed) "to turn one of the most far-reaching democratic revolutions of the century into a socialist revolution"[21] and why was it missed?

The question—and the problem—simply does not exist for S. L. Agayev here. And where did V. I. Maksimenko find this "class might of the organized Iranian proletariat?" he asks. I will reply. In one of S. L. Agayev's own books, for a start. "The working class," he wrote, "in the new stage (October 1978—V. M.) was actually becoming a decisive force in the revolution"; "the industrial proletariat had demonstrated high fighting efficiency and organization during this period...by creating their own strike and plant committees and by supporting the position of defending national interests"; and "an actually continuous strike movement (this was during February—V. M.) involved more than 3 to 4 million workers and employees."[23] Inasmuch as S. L. Agayev, as we see from his response, is writing and maintaining the direct opposite to this, we ask: what is to be done? Close our eyes to such a "disparity" by secretly elevating it to the norm? I do not think this is a solution. But the limits of historiography, in its present condition, become narrow here: we must direct our attention to the facts that are corroborated by documents and to theoretical sources.

The question of why the highly paid industrial working class in Iran, which was drawn into the system of stock profit distribution and surrounded by "Bonapartist" trusteeship, came out as the vanguard of the revolutionary struggle in late 1978 and early 1979 deserves more attention than has been devoted to it thus far.

While there were 12 strikes throughout Iran at large industrial enterprises in 1975 (all purely economic in nature), and while the Iranian workers movement had grown relatively smoothly in making progress in the economic struggle in 1976 and 1977, there was a sharp qualitative leap in 1978. At first the uncoordinated strikes became systematic in nature, and in December (a very important fact) there was a sudden change from the predominance of economic demands to political demands.

The general strike by oil workers at the end of 1978 led to the discontinuation of Iranian oil exports. The oil workers demanded the lifting of martial law, the release of all political prisoners, and prosecution of the SAVAK leaders. At the same time, the railroad workers went on strike; subsequently, at a critical point in the revolutionary crisis when Bazargan attempted to break the strike, they displayed a developed sense of class solidarity with the oilfield workers. Demonstrations by the industrial proletariat were supported by the strikes of 400,000 teachers and employees in radio, television, the postal and telegraph services, banks, insurance companies, hospitals, and certain ministries, and the revolutionary propaganmda achieved rapid successes in the centers where modern industrial production was concentrated, including among workers in the oil refining complex at Abadan, and so forth.

The victory of the February armed uprising, Bakhtiar's flight and the Army generals' surrender to the mercy of the revolution not only did not weaken the onslaught of the Iranian working class, but reinforced it and made it even more organized. Khomeini's appeals to end the strike at the oilfields and his threats against "the groups of bandits and lawless elements" produced practically no effect.

In the very first days and weeks after the victory of the Teheran armed uprising, no matter how S. L. Agayev denied this, the Iranian proletariat came out as a class-conscious, organized, and highly politicized force. New

forms of worker self-organization emerged all over the country: first the strike committees, then the workers councils for managing the enterprises. In some cases the workers opened the plants that were closed when the employers fled, and in other cases, they drove out the old managers. Thus, at the Tabriz Tractor Plant, the workers took production management into their hands completely. In the first days after the uprising, the United Council of Railroad Workers, which included 57 representatives of 35,000 railroad workers throughout the country, was formed. The demands of the workers councils (and there have been farm laborers and soldiers councils as well as workers councils in postrevolutionary Iran) included: a wage increase, a 40-hour work week, the right to share in an enterprise's profit, legalization of strikes, the establishment of an unemployment fund under the Ministry of Labor, and so forth. The oil workers, in addition, demanded that their representatives be included in the Islamic Revolutionary Council.

The facts cited have been taken from published documents, research, and the press.[23] What can prevent them from being noted? Stereotyped patterns, I think. They lead S. L. Agayev to the statement, strange for an Iranist, that the organization of Mojahedin and Fedayeen declared itself "for the first time in earnest" "on the eve of the February uprising and during it" (or the systematic conduct of urban guerrilla warfare since the early 1970's and the many years of ideological disputes on the strategy and tactics of the revolutionary movement in Iran—aren't they a declaration "in earnest?"). The same patterns lead him to maintain that the question of the Iranian proletariat's political maturity in the events of 1978-1979 and the state of affairs in the left-wing camp have "absolutely no relationship" to each other.

But there is a relationship, after all, and a direct one. For the question of how the organizational force of the proletariat was broken and dispersed in postrevolutionary Iran involves the question of how much responsibility for this is shared by the Iranian left-wing—the communists, Mojahedin, Fedayeen and others, and the smaller groups that mobilized the workers and spoke in their name. And there is little to criticize about the answer that the leftists acted without coordination, that they were hostile to each other, and that disputes on the revolutionary nature of the clergy divided them. After all, S. L. Agayev's generally interesting portrayal of these differences and disputes is topped by a most surprising conclusion: the NPI [Iranian People's Party] and the fedayeen (the majority) supported the Khomeinist regime "not without some grounds," but then the Mojahedin and Fedayeen (the minority), after raising arms against this regime, held a position which was also "not far from the truth."[24] With such an analysis, it seems to me, we are not far from being utterly confused in the problem.

S. L. Agayev complains that after writing about the civil war among the classes in postrevolutionary Iran, I did not refer at all to his thesis on the main reason for the struggle at that time. S. L. Agayev notes that the reason was the extraordinary diversity of the class structure, "a characteridtic feature of which was that even an individual social stratum had multiple layers," which determined "the predominance of group interests, not class interests, in the political arena." I was not concerned with this thesis then and I am not now. Especially since this refers to those same stereotyped patterns in which no facts are apparent.

In every society which develops in a capitalist way, but where capital does not submit labor completely and entirely to its will (be it Iranian society in 1979, Russian society in 1917, or French society in 1848), the social structure, by definition, is diversified. Assessment of the extent of this diversity is the job of comparative historical analysis. But in any event, this does not run counter to the thesis formulated by V. I. Lenin on the sudden transition from February to October 1917 with the precision of a sociological law: "Any revolution, if it is a true revolution, comes down to *a class shift* (the emphasis is mine-V. M.)." For V. I. Lenin, it was important to understand "precisely how a class shift has taken place and is taking place in a given revolution."[25] This is the essence of a specific approach, and at the same time a theoretical approach, to profound revolutionary upheavals, for this is their unique nature, that through the plurality and diversity of social interests they reveal to the maximum extent (sometimes in the course of events, but more frequently in retrospect) the basic positions in the historical dispute about power and property between the haves and have-nots, between the class that appropriates and the class that produces.

I think it is useful to interrupt the discussion here with a critique of a specific and important episode which S. L. Agayev considered in his latest book. This refers to the mission to Iran in January and February 1979 by the deputy commander in chief of NATO forces in Europe, American General R. (Hauser), and to his contacts with key political figures in Iran, and in this connection, the general disposition of the revolutionary and counterrevolutionary forces during the Teheran uprising.[26] S. L. Agayev easily catches the "class instinct of U. S. administration officials" in this episode, but for some reason he does not find such an instinct in the conduct of R. (Hauser's) Iranian contractors, although the (Beheshti)-Bazargan-Gharabaghi arrangement on the eve of the uprising was symbolized with extreme accuracy by the alliance of the three forces in old Iran: the leaders of the clergy, the large liberal bourgeoisie, and the Army generals. The fact that the aim of this alliance was to ensure a "peaceful" transition of power from the Bakhtiar government to the new Khomeinist government is one side of the matter. The other side is the fact that such an arrangement could have been made only *against and behind the back* of the revolution. The mosque and the bazaar would have won in the final analysis only if this arrangement had succeeded completely and to the end. But it was frustrated by the uprising.

It is not simply the fact, as S. L. Agayev writes, that the uprising "was begun by leftist forces without the knowledge and participation of the religious circles," which later somehow cleverly seized "all the levers of government." The development of events was more abrupt and unambiguous: in the course of the uprising, the Shiite leadership, the political representatives of the upper bourgeoisie, and the generals in the old Army came out cohesively as a *counter*revolutionary force. This was also the significance of the class shift produced by the Iranian revolution at the highest point in its development.

For this reason, the Army's notorious declaration of "neutrality," signed by the 27 highest-ranking military officers in the first half of 11 February (the height of the uprising) could not assist or interfere in any way since the shah's generals did not control anyone or anything in the armed forces at that hour: the soldiers and officers, one part demoralized and incapable of resisting, and the other part, which was more active, began going over to the side of the armed people en masse. General Gharabaghi, who is not a bit inclined to exaggerate the significance and scope of this process, states: by 11 February most of the garrisons of infantry forces scattered about the country, the 16th Tank Division, the 64th Division in Rezaiyeh, the 18th Tank Division in Kermanshah, the group of tank forces in Shiraz, the Air Force bases in (Vakhdati) and Bandar Abbas, the gendarmerie in Bandar Abbas, Jahrom, and Mashhad, and the police in Bandar Abbas and Mashhad had joined with the insurgents or had refused to perform their duty.[27]

Under these conditions, the demarche by the 27 generals had only one meaning and pursued only one objective, clearly established in the text of their declaration: to force the Revolutionary Army to return to their barracks and to prevent further contacts between the soldiers and the civilian population at any cost. The main efforts of Khomeini and Bazargan were directed at the same objective at this time. The power and psychological mechanism of how the Iranian counterrevolution, by changing its appearance in the numbered days of the uprising, was able to gain the upper hand in February 1979 under circumstances that were extremely unfavorable for it, and even to do this so that the revolutionary masses did not notice or did not understand this at first, will be studied further by historians. The revolution continued its course for some time by inertia, but the irreparable blow had been inflicted. In returning to the February events, I believe, historians will also note that truly faultless class instinct of the people who revolted, who did not want to live under the shah as before or under the Islamic revolution" declared for them, and distinctly and consciously stated this by their actions.

The orientation of these actions in the postrevolutionary Iranian state has fully corroborated the nature of the class shift that took place during the uprising. Dual power was one side of the coin: Bazargan's provisional government, which was made up of major industrialists, financiers and landowners, some of whom were also highly placed bureaucrats in the old regime, personified the power of the upper liberal-conservative bourgeoisie in Iran, which had felt the burden of the shah's Bonapartist ambitions, but which did its utmost to exploit the masses of small producers; and the Islamic Revolutionary Council, the Khomeinist "revolutionary committees," "revolutionary tribunals" and "revolutionary guards" represented a mass counterauthority (the power of the traditional petty bourgeoisie and the urban lower classes), controlled completely by the Shiite hierarchy and the commercial leadership of the market, however. But the coin had another, no less important side.

Where soldiers revolted in prerevolutionary Iran against the Bazargan government's assignment of high-ranking officers in the shah's Army to leading positions in the new administration and put a procedure into effect for electing command personnel through soldiers councils; where the councils of agricultural workers and peasants with insufficient land proceeded to redistribute the estate lands or demanded the abolition of large agribusiness complexes and private agricultural companies; and finally, where the working class went on strike and demonstrated in defense of their demands—everywhere (because of new legislation as well as in open armed conflict) the revolutionary committees, revolutionary guards and mullahs, on the one hand, and the the Bazargan government and the military units loyal to him on the other, acted together, as a united front, by pressing the revolutionary initiative.[28]

Could the Marxists theoretically have foreseen this development of events in good time, translating this foresight into the language of political actions? The question is not an easy one.

My esteemed opponent does not remind me of his 1981 book to no purpose. It is really a good book. But after all, the theoretical material introduced by the author did not receive the proper development and rearrangement in the language of politics there. Thus, in operating with the Leninist categories of "Octobrist" and "democratic" capital and applying them to Iran, S. L. Agayev misses the "trivial detail" that this categorial pair performed a definite function in Leninist thought and served the search for a theory of democratic revolution in which the proletariat is the predominant force. In exactly the same way, in considering the shah's monarchy as a Bonapartist state (and quite rightly), S. L. Agayev makes another omission of no less importance. He sees in Bonapartism a situation of relative class equilibrium in which an authoritarian state which is comparatively free in its actions manipulates social interests and maneuvers among them.[29] True, but this is far from everything, after all. Bonapartism (as K. Marx, F. Engels, and V. I. Lenin described it) is not equilibrium between two or three classes or a great many groups in general, but a historically well-defined *equilibirium of two social antagonisms, two forms of class struggle*: between the new industrial-capitalist and the old landowning classes on one hand, and between the bourgeoisie, all the old and

new propertied strata associated with it, and the proletariat, which is the pole of attraction for the poor on the other hand.[30] Only if these two antagonisms, which are loosely interwoven in the social process, are taken into account simultaneously is it possible to understand the structure of the contradictions in prerevolutionary Iran and the distribution of forces during the revolution, in my view.

S. L. Agayev persistently returns me to my review of one of his books. But certain observations which I made in it 6 years ago appear rather superficial today—in the light of the development of events and ideas. In particular, the statement that late capitalism "can only be *different* and can only be developed *differently* with the likelihood of turning into *something completely different* compared to its classical European prototypes."[31] I hope to demonstrate in another work why this judgment is incorrect (both methodologically and historically)—no room is left here. In conclusion, I want to say one more thing.

The question of whether Iran could have been "foreseen" theoretically is a timely one today (but historical theory, which has no power of prediction, is not needed, and it does not dare to call it a theory). Even if for the reason that an end to the Iran-Iraq war and the probable passing of Khomeini from the political stage may again, at some time, drastically change the situation in Iran. And obviously because learning a historical lesson, seriously and without ostentation, from the mistakes and defeats in the past is a very difficult and painful operation, but one which is urgent and vitally necessary for modern scientific socialist thought.

FROM THE EDITORIAL STAFF: The editorial staff has also received a letter from S. L. Agayev in response to V. I. Maksimenko's reply. In S. Agayev's opinion, V. I. Maksimenko did not respond to a number of questions contained in his letter published in the same issue of the journal and reproached S. L. Agayev without justification a number of times. Ideas were expressed during the debate between the two authors which are useful for further discussion of the problem, although certain deviations from an academic tone were permitted in the process. In ending the exchange of views on the historiography of the Iranian revolution at this stage, the editorial staff invites specialists to express their opinions in the journal on the character, motive forces, and possible consequences of the Iranian revolution.

Footnotes

1. S. L. Agayev, "Iran v proshlom i nastoyashchem. (Puti i formy revolyutsionnogo protsessa" [Iran Past and Present (The Paths and Forms of the Revolutionary Process], Moscow, 1981.

2. See NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, No 6, 1982, pp 163-168.

3. See S. L. Agayev, "Iranskaya revolyutsiya, SShA i mezhdunarodnaya bezopasnost. 444 dnya v zalozhnikakh" [The Iranian Revolution, the United States and International Security. Hostages for 444 Days], Moscow, 1984, p 20; Ibid, 2d edition, Moscow, 1986, pp 24-26; S. L. Agayev, "Iran mezhdu proshlym i budushchim. Sobytiya. Lyudi, Idei" [Iran Between the Past and the Future. Events, People, and Ideas], Moscow, 1987, pp 11-12, 16, 34, 63-64, 96, 151, 195, and so forth.

4. For example, see "Iran. Problemy ekonomicheskogo i sotsialnogo razvitiya v 60-70e gody" [Iran: Problems of Economic and Social Development in the 1960's and 1970's], Moscow, 1980, pp 1, 3-54; "Iranskaya revolyutsiya 1978-1979 gg. i problemy sotsialno-politicheskogo razvitiya strany" [The 1978-1979 Iranian Revolution and the Country's Social and Political Development Problems], Moscow, 1980, pp 5-6.

5. For details, see S. L. Agayev, "Iran Past and Present," pp 164-189 and 249-263.

6. See S. L. Agayev, "Zigzags in the Iranian Revolution," VOPROSY ISTORII, No 1, 1985, p 45.

7. For example, see S. L. Agayev, "Iran Past and Present," p 212; and "Iran, rozhdeniye respubliki" [Iran: The Birth of a Republic], Moscow, 1984, pp 58-59, and so forth.

8. See A. Arabadzhyan, "The Iranian Revolution: The Causes and Lessons. The First Article." AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA, No 3, 1986, p 34.

9. S. L. Agayev, "Levyye sily i islamskiy rezhim v sovremennom Irane (1979-1983). Revolyutsionnaya demokratiya i kommunisty Vostoka" [Left-Wing Forces and the Islamic Regime in Modern Iran (1979-1983). Revolutionary Democracy and Communists in the East], Moscow, 1984, pp 335-336.

10. S. L. Agayev, "Zigzags in the Iranian Revolution," p 47.

11. NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, No 6, 1982, p 165.

12. AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA, No 9, 1985, pp 27-28. Also see RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENNYY MIR, No 1, 1986, pp 185-186.

13. AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA, No 9, 1985, p 27.

14. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Sochineniya" [Works], Vol 35, p 219.

15. S. L. Agayev, "Iran Past and Present," p 214.

16. I will note the following works not involved in the survey: S. L. Agayev, "Vnutripoliticheskoye razvitiye Irana v 1981-1985 gg. [Iran's Domestic Political Development, 1981-1985] and "Natsionalnyye i sotsialnyye

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17. See A. Arabadzhyan, "The Iranian Revolution: Causes and Lessons. The Second Article," AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA, No 4, 1986, pp 19-22, 38.

18. See NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, No 6, 1982, pp 163-168; and AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA, No 9, 1985, pp 30-31.

19. V. I. Maksimenko, "Analysis of the 1978-1979 Iranian Revolution in Soviet Oriental Studies Literature," NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, No 3, 1987, pp 162-172.

20. Ibid, p 162.

21. Ibid, pp 169, 165.

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23. For example, see "Iran: Selected Political Documents," New Delhi, 1986, p 97; A. Garabaghi, "Vrits sur la crise iranienne," Paris, 1985, pp 106, 171-172; H. Bashiriyeh, "The State and Revolution in Iran, 1962-1982," London, 1984, pp 88-90, 115, 122, 144-145; A. Parsons, "The Pride and the Fall: Iran 1974-1979," London, 1984, pp 77, 85; and INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 20 February 1979 and 23-25 February 1979.

24. S. L. Agayev, "Left-Wing Forces and the Islamic Regime in Modern Iran (1979-1983)," p 362.

25. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 32, p 384.

26. See S. L. Agayev, "Iran Between the Past and Future," pp 50-64.

27. See A. Gharabaghi, op. cit., pp 234-259.

28. See H. Bashiriyeh, op. cit., pp 133-146.

29. See S. L. Agayev, "Iran Past and Present," pp 249-262.

30. See K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," Vol 18, p 254; Vol 8, pp 145-146, 207-213; and V. I. Lenin, "Complete Collected Works,", Vol 22, p 325.

31. V. I. Maksimenko, review on S. L. Agayev, "Iran Past and Present," Moscow, 1981, NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, No 6, 1982, p 166.

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